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When it comes to learning factual information, students may benefit from having opportunities 
where they can learn from their mistakes as opposed to only being asked to study that 
information. However, the achievement goals that instructors set for their students may influence 
how students engage with these learning opportunities. Although some instructors may focus 
students on learning (i.e. mastery goals), others may seek to motivate students by focusing them 
on doing better than others (i.e. performance goals), which is thought promote greater sensitivity 
to errors and impair learning. Across two studies, the present dissertation examined the roles of 
dorsolateral frontal and lateral temporal regions in learning from errors as a function of goals that 
were hypothesized to underlie different mechanisms and examined whether goals differentially 
influence learning from errors. Participants were instructed to adopt a mastery or performance 
goal and answered challenging general knowledge questions. Following their response, they 
were then presented with accuracy feedback indicating whether their response was correct or 
incorrected followed by the subsequent learning feedback (i.e. the correct answer). The first 
study used Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) to examine processing of the correct answer, and it 
was expected that ERPs indicative of attention and deeper elaborative processing (i.e. superior 
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frontal positivity) would be more enhanced for mastery compared to performance goals during 
the learning feedback. Differences over inferior temporal regions were not expected between 
goals since this region was only thought to index bottom-up semantic processing of the correct 
answer. The second study employed High-Definition transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
(HD-tDCS), where during the same instructions and task, HD-tDCS was applied to either left 
dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC) or lateral temporal regions in order to examine the causal 
influence of each region on learning as a function of goals. As in the first study, stimulation was 
expected to benefit learning across both regions, but DLPFC stimulation was expected to 
primarily benefit learning under mastery compared to performance goals. Learning was 
examined using immediate and/or week later delayed surprise retests. Both studies showed that 
learning from errors engaged both dorsolateral frontal and lateral temporal regions, but only in 
the ERP study was superior fontal positivity modulated by goals. Here, mastery goals led to early 
and late enhancements and also benefited learning across both retests compared to performance 
goals. In the second study, differences in learning between goals were not shown at the delayed 
retest. When it comes to learning from errors, mastery compared to performance goals may 
promote enhanced attention and elaborative processing of the learning information and benefit 
learning outcomes. However, behavioral benefits may not be always evident. Factors that may 
have contributed to these behavioral inconsistencies between the two studies are discussed along 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
Instructors may shy away from using challenging assignments or pose challenging 
questions in their classes that are likely to result in students making errors. Likewise, students 
may hesitate to volunteer answers that are likely to be wrong and may prefer the instructor 
simply informs them of the correct information as opposed to making them guess. Instead, 
students may only be provided with opportunities to make errors when it comes to exams or 
assignments whose sole purpose is to assess learning of course material. However, when students 
make errors they are more likely to learn the correct information as opposed to when they are 
only presented with or asked to study that information (for a review see Metcalfe, 2017). 
Consequently, it is beneficial to learning when students are actively engaged in coming up with 
answers, even if they are wrong, so long as they provided with the correct information (Pashler, 
Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005).  
The effort of making educated guesses seems to lead to the strengthening of the 
relationship between two pieces of information (e.g., a question and a correct answer, a term and 
its definition, etc.) and various explanations have been proposed to underlie successful learning 
of those associations (see Metcalfe, 2017). Yet, less is known about the neural mechanisms that 
support successful learning following errors and whether differences occur as a function of the 
achievement goals that instructors set for students. Achievement goals are thought to influence 
how students interpret the value of mistakes and consequently whether they learn from them 
(Ames & Archer, 1988). The present dissertation examined the neural mechanisms that underlie 
learning of semantic information following errors in the context of a mastery achievement goal 
that focused students on developing knowledge versus a performance achievement goal that 
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focused students on answering more questions correctly in comparison to others. In particular, 
this dissertation is focused on the complementary roles of lateral prefrontal and lateral temporal 
cortex in the error correction process and how achievement goals may differentially modulate 
neural activity in these regions during learning. Investigating differences in neural mechanisms 
between environmental goals can help researchers make inferences regarding the involvement of 
putative cognitive processes that underlie these neural regions and explain why differences in 
learning as a function of goals may appear. Beyond informing instructors and students about the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of goal environments, differences in cognitive processes 
can also lead to the development of interventions to promote learning that are tailored to each 
type of goal environment. 
 
Achievement Goals: Overview 
 
 Majority of the work on achievement goals has focused on the goals that students 
personally endorse that were categorized either as mastery or performance goals (for a review 
see Elliot, 2005; Anderman & Patrick, 2012). Generally, mastery goals (MGs) are defined as 
goals with a focus on learning, improving, and/or doing well on a task, whereas performance 
goals (PGs) are defined as goals with a focus on demonstrating ability and/or doing better than 
others (for more on differences in operational definitions see Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & 
Harackiewicz, 2010). Although researchers were initially interested in how personal goals relate 
to various academically-relevant outcomes, Ames and Archer (1988) later suggested that goals 
may also be promoted by instructors in developing a MG or PG classroom environment that 
influences these academically-relevant outcomes as well. They developed classroom MG and PG 
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criteria based on multiple factors, such as how instructors defined academic success, how they 
viewed mistakes, and how they evaluated student performance.  
 In an MG classroom, instructors focus on learning and developing skills though effort, 
whereas in a PG classroom, instructors focus on student ability in comparison to others through 
little effort. In addition, mistakes are perceived as part of learning under MG, but as a threat to 
ability under PG. Both personal and classroom achievement goals are typically measured using 
surveys where students rate the extent to which they endorse characteristics of MG and PG, or 
the extent to which they perceive their classroom to be focused on aspects of MG and PG, 
respectively. In support of their characterizations of MG and PG classroom, Ames and Archer 
(1988) showed that when students were more likely to perceive their classroom to reflect a PG 
environment they were more likely to attribute failure to a lack of ability, whereas perceptions of 
an MG environment were not related to failure attributions. Instead perceptions of an MG 
classroom were related to reports of effort as being a cause for success. Researchers typically 
find greater perceptions of classroom MG relate to positive outcomes, such as greater reports of 
intrinsic motivation (Murayama & Elliot, 2009), interest in course material (Barron & 
Harackiewicz, 2003), effort, persistence, and use of rehearsal and elaborative learning strategies 
(Wolters, 2004). However, greater perceptions of a PG classroom are typically linked to negative 
outcomes, such as reports of less effort (Wolters, 2004), lower levels of intrinsic motivation 
(Murayama & Elliot, 2009), and less interest in course material (Barron & Harackiewicz, 2003).  
It is important to note that definitions of MG and PG, especially when it comes to 
classroom goals, typically incorporate multiple constructs in relation to a goal. For example, 
Barron and Harackiewicz (2003) defined classroom MG with survey items that asked about 
being challenged to learn new things, having interest, and instructors being willing to help 
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among other items. They defined classroom PG with survey items that asked about participating 
when having the correct answer and impressing the instructors, among other items. The 
challenge with definitions that are composed of multiple constructs is that it’s not clear which 
factor relates to an outcome. Interestingly, later examination of personal achievement goals 
showed that when PGs are defined in terms of demonstrating ability (e.g. appearing smart) they 
are linked to worse outcomes, such as poorer grades, but when PGs are defined in terms of 
normative comparison (e.g. doing better than others) they are linked to better outcomes, such as 
better grades (Hulleman et al., 2010). Less is clear about which definition of an MG is most 
beneficial as there has been greater variability in defining MGs unlike PGs and it appears that 
definitions that are actually void of goal language (e.g. I feel successful when I learn something 
interesting) may be best (Hulleman et al., 2010). When it comes to inducing goals in laboratory 
tasks, differences in outcomes between MG definitions that are typically defined as self-
referenced (e.g., improve on your previous score) or task-referenced (e.g. master the task) have 
yet to be examined due to a low number of studies being available under each definition (Van 
Yperen, Blaga, & Postmes, 2015). 
Findings from survey research conducted in the classroom and from laboratory memory 
tasks during which goals were induced suggest that an MG environment may lead to a greater 
use of learning strategies (Wolters, 2004) and deeper elaborative learning (Ikeda, Castel, & 
Murayama, 2015; Murayama & Elliot, 2011b). In line with this, Avery, Smillie, and de Fockert 
(2013) showed that MGs led to greater reports of using explicit step-by-step strategies that were 
more dependent on working-memory during a math problem solving task, whereas PGs led to 
greater reports of implicit short-cut strategies that were less dependent on working-memory. 
Similarly, other laboratory studies showed that PGs compared to MGs impair working memory 
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performance (Avery & Smillie, 2013) possibly as a result of concerns regarding task 
performance in relation to others (Crouzevialle, Smeding, & Butera, 2015). However, Avery and 
colleagues (2013) also showed that math problem solving was poorer under MG compared to PG 
if participants had to concurrently maintain a sequence of letters in working-memory so that they 
could later recall a letter from that sequence after completion of the math problem. The authors 
suggested that this disruption occurred because MGs relied more on working memory processes 
compared to PGs. Interestingly, Avery and colleagues (2013) provided participants with positive 
feedback throughout the task informing participants that they were accomplishing the goals sets 
for them in the MG or PG induction. Thus, positive feedback may have alleviated concerns 
regarding one’s own performance under PG and this may have neutralized negative effects of 
PG, or even led to benefits in task performance compared to MGs. Indeed, other studies have 
found that participants under PG showed improvements on a reading comprehension and analogy 
task when they were told they had performed better than others compared to when they were told 
they performed below average (Cianci, Klein, & Seijts, 2010; see also Crouzevialle et al., 2015). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that MGs may bias working-memory processing more 
toward the task, whereas PGs may bias working-memory processing toward concern about one’s 
own performance in relation to others. 
However, the mechanisms that directly underlie learning as a function of goals have been 
largely unexplored. Recently, Mangels and colleagues (2017) used event-related potentials 
(ERPs) to examine the mechanisms that underlie learning of semantic information following 
errors as a function of goals. Under an MG or PG induction, participants were asked to answer 
challenging general knowledge questions that were followed by the correct answer (i.e. learning 
information) and later retested on that same information to examine error correction. The authors 
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showed that MGs led to greater fronto-temporal negativity thought to index deeper semantic 
processing during learning of semantic information, whereas PGs led to greater parieto-occipital 
negativity thought to index shallower visual processing during learning of the semantic 
information. However, they did not find behavioral differences in learning of semantic 
information between their MG and PG instruction. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), Lee and Kim (2014) also did not show behavioral differences as a function of personal 
MG or PG endorsement on a rule-finding task, but did show that personal endorsement of MGs 
compared to PGs was associated with greater frontal activity during presentation of accuracy 
feedback thought to reflect the use of cognitive control. Thus, despite differences in neural 
mechanisms that are associated with greater benefits under MG than PG (Lee & Kim, 2014; 
Mangels, Rodriguez, Ochakovskaya, & Guerra-Carrillo, 2017), when it comes to laboratory tasks 
benefits of MG compared to PG on behavioral outcomes are not always as evident (see also 
Crouzevialle, Smeding, & Butera, 2015; Murayama & Elliot, 2011; Van Yperen et al., 2015). 
 
Neural substrates of Learning from Errors in Semantic Knowledge: Overview 
 
The updating of general knowledge through corrective feedback can be considered a 
specific case of associative learning in declarative memory, which has been studied extensively 
with regard to neural substrates (see Kim, 2011). Yet, relatively few studies have examined 
knowledge updating processes in particular. Past research on correction of errors in factual 
knowledge (i.e., declarative memory) implicates cortical regions over the lateral temporal cortex 
(LTC) (e.g. Butterfield & Mangels, 2003) and frontal cortex (Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good, 
& Dweck, 2006; Pine, Sadeh, Ben-Yakov, Dudai, & Mendelsohn, 2018). However, these cortical 
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regions likely make separate, but interactive contributions to this knowledge updating process. 
Previous ERP studies have linked the memory-encoding benefits of LTC to the bottom-up 
activation of pre-existing semantic representations of the correct answer, given that this activity 
predicted later memory only for familiar answers and not for unfamiliar answers (Butterfield & 
Mangels, 2003; Mangels, Hoxha, Lane, Jarvis, & Downey, 2018; Whiteman & Mangels, 2016). 
Furthermore, LTC has been implicated both in semantic processing of verbal information (Gold 
et al., 2005; Gold & Buckner, 2002; Kirchhoff, Wagner, Maril, & Stern, 2000) and in the 
successful encoding of verbal information, when participants were instructed to memorize 
information (Ezzyat et al., 2018; Wittig, Jang, Cocjin, Inati, & Zaghloul, 2018).  
Simply encoding the correct answer is necessary, but not sufficient for updating 
knowledge in semantic memory; this answer must be properly associated with the question to 
which it is related. Thus, elaborative processing may also support learning following errors (Cyr 
& Anderson, 2015; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Knight, Hunter Ball, Brewer, DeWitt, & Marsh, 
2012), with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) serving as a strong candidate for this 
elaborative processing (for a review see Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007). For example, DLPFC 
has been linked to memory success of paired stimuli when participants had to elaborate on or 
make judgments regarding the association of the stimuli in each pair (Blumenfeld, Parks, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2011; Leach, McCurdy, Trumbo, Matzen, & Leshikar, 2018; Sandrini, 
Cappa, Rossi, Rossini, & Miniussi, 2003; but see Hawco, Berlim, & Lepage, 2013). Thus, this 
region is likely to be implicated in the strengthening the relationship between a question and the 
correct answer following errors, but through top-down elaborative processing of semantic 





The goal of these present experiments is to investigate the neural mechanisms that 
underlie learning of semantic information following errors as a function of achievement goals. 
To this aim, this dissertation will focus on 1) the role of regions within the frontal and temporal 
lobes in learning following errors; 2) how activity in these regions is modulated by Mastery 
(MG) and Performance Goal (PG) inductions. As previously discussed, the wording of goal-
relevant instruction, particularly with regard to what aspects of the task they emphasize can 
influence outcomes. Yet, the effects of MGs and PGs on behavioral outcomes are not always 
evident. Thus, the two experiments that comprise this dissertation will employ the same MG and 
PG instructions and use the same general knowledge test-feedback-retest paradigm, but will use 
different, yet converging methods. Specifically, study 1 will use ERPs and study 2 will use High-
Definition transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (HD-tDCS) that provide complementary 
approaches. We will provide an overview of the paradigm, instructions and predictions for each 
study in the sections that follow. 
 
The General Knowledge Paradigm 
 
The general knowledge test-feedback-retest paradigm used here was based on a task used 
extensively in our lab (e.g., Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Mangels, Rodriguez, Ochakovskaya, 
& Guerra-Carrillo, 2017), in which participants provided responses to challenging general 
knowledge questions and were provided with both accuracy feedback and learning opportunities 
after each response. This initial semantic retrieval task was purposely made challenging by using 
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a computer adaptive titration of task accuracy to a ~35%. Differences between goals are 
generally more evident when tasks are difficult, but not when they are relatively easy (see Avery 
& Smillie, 2013; Murayama & Elliot, 2011). Later participants were retested on those items that 
they had initially answered incorrectly. They were not informed about the retest because the 
present dissertation was interested in differences in incidental learning as a function of goals that 
may speak more to intrinsic motivational states. This is in contrast to intentional learning that 
may instead motivate students to learn information primarily because of the presence of a retest. 
Whereas the accuracy feedback simply indicated whether their own response was correct or 
incorrect, the learning opportunity provided the correct answer to the question. Learning success 
was defined as the percentage of initial errors that were corrected on a subsequent retest which 
occurred immediately after the initial test (Study 1) and/or after a 1-week delay (Study 1 and 2).  
 
Defining PGs and MGs 
 
In this dissertation, PGs were defined in terms of normative comparison only, and not 
ability, to examine how a more beneficial PG compares to MGs. With respect to having multiple 
factors for each definition, MGs and PGs were defined in terms of the type of a goal that 
participants were assigned and also mentioned how participants under each goal would be 
evaluated (see Ikeda, Castel, & Murayama, 2015; Murayama & Elliot, 2011). Some achievement 
goal researchers have pushed to operationalize MGs and PGs only with respect to the 
competence-based goal where students are either focused on learning or on doing better than 
others, respectively (Elliot & Murayama, 2008; for a review see Elliot, 2005). This is in contrast 
to the operational definitions employed by earlier achievement goal researchers, also described 
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above in relation to classroom goal definitions, who defined achievement goals orientations that 
does not only speak to a goal but also to the beliefs that underlie goal adoption such as the role of 
effort, ability, and mistakes among other aspects (see Anderman & Patrick, 2012; Pintrich, 
2000). Although orientations are more relevant to the classroom goal literature and may reflect a 
more real-world representation of achievement goals than the competence-based definition, in 
the present dissertation it was deemed that manipulating only a few aspects of a goal 
environment (i.e. goal and evaluation criteria) would reveal whether such aspects are crucial 
when it comes to learning. 
Specifically, across two studies, participants under an MG induction were instructed to 
develop their knowledge (i.e. goal) and that they would also be evaluated based on how well they 
develop their knowledge (i.e. evaluation). Under a PG induction, participants were instructed to 
do their best to perform better than others (i.e. goal) and that they would be evaluated based on 
how well they compare to others (i.e. evaluation). Evaluation language was also included 
because a previous study showed that students were more likely to personally endorse MGs 
when informed that they would be evaluated in terms of individual progress and PGs when 
evaluated in terms of social comparison (Pekrun, Cusack, Murayama, Elliot, & Thomas, 2014). 
Lastly, an additional component was added to the MG induction, where participants were 
instructed not to focus on doing better than others (i.e. not to endorse PG), because a previous 
study showed that students value social comparison even under an MG induction unless they are 
explicitly instructed to ignore such normative comparisons (Van Yperen & Leander, 2014). 
Thus, these experiments examined differences in neural mechanisms that support learning of 
semantic information following errors as a function of an MG induction that suppressed PGs, 




 Study 1 (ERPs). The first experiment employed ERPs examine neural mechanisms during 
presentation of the learning information following errors as well as mechanisms that underlie 
processing of feedback indicating answer accuracy (i.e. correct or incorrect) as a function of 
achievement goals. ERPs represent neural activity extracted from a continuous 
electroencephalography (EEG) recording that is time-locked to the onset of a stimulus (or 
response) and averaged as a function of task-relevant conditions. One major advantage of EEG is 
its temporal specificity, such that differences between conditions during specific time windows 
of these ERPs can help researchers make inferences about the timing of underlying cognitive 
processes associated with processing of discrete stimuli (see Hauk, 2016). Of relevance to the 
present aims, ERPs have been used extensively to study processing of both 
performance/accuracy feedback (e.g. Van Meel & Van Heijningen, 2010) and differences due to 
memory (i.e. Dm effects) (e.g., Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Mangels et al., 2017). Dm effects 
(for a review see Paller & Wagner, 2002) refer to differences in neural responses at encoding that 
predict successful versus unsuccessful retrieval at a later test. 
 In Study 1, we examined ERPs during accuracy feedback that putatively indexed bottom-
up (i.e. FRN and P3a) and top-down (i.e. P3b and LPP) attentional processes such as attention to 
unexpected events and arousal, respectively (for reviews see Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 
2010; Polich, 2007; San Martín, 2012). It was expected that PGs would lead to enhancement of 
ERPs that underlie bottom-up and top-down attentional processing during errors in comparison 
to MGs. Alternatively, if normative PGs do not elicit ability concerns during errors, then errors 
may be perceived as similarly informative under both goals. 
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 We also examined both early (200-300 ms) and late (500-1500 ms) ERPs during learning 
feedback over superior frontal regions and late ERPs over inferior frontal and inferior temporal 
regions. Superior frontal regions were selected for analysis given previous studies demonstrating 
sensitivity of early waveforms at these sites to attentional orienting (Blanchet, Gagnon, & 
Bastien, 2007), and later, sustained waveforms to elaborative processes that predict subsequent 
retrieval success (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Y. Liu, Rosburg, Gao, Weber, & Guo, 2017; 
Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 2001). Sustained waveforms over inferior frontal and temporal 
regions were also examined given that they have also been shown to predict subsequent memory 
in this particular general knowledge paradigm as well (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Mangels et 
al., 2017).  
 Given that MGs are thought to facilitate deeper elaborative processes (Ikeda et al., 2015; 
Mangels et al., 2017; Murayama & Elliot, 2011b), it was expected that an MG compared to a PG 
induction would result in greater early attentional orienting to learning feedback, as well as 
evidence of sustained elaborative along with semantic processing. Learning was also examined 
as a function of retest-delay, where participants were retested on half of questions immediately 
after and the other half a week later. Since Mangels and colleagues (2017) did not show 
differences in learning using an immediate retest, the present study investigated whether benefits 
of MG over PG in learning might be more evident at a more delayed retest. 
  
Study 2 (HD-tDCS). Although ERPs can provide precise information about the temporal 
sequence of processes engaged during processing of specific stimuli, the measurement of activity 
by electrodes at the scalp makes it challenging to determine which neural regions give rise to that 
activity. In addition, ERPs only show neural activity that is correlated with processing a given 
 13 
stimulus or response and cannot speak to causality when it comes to behavioral outcomes. To 
address these issues, Study 2 employed HD-tDCS to establish causality between frontal and 
temporal regions and learning as a function of goals. Specifically, participants completed the 
same challenging general knowledge task under the same MG or PG inductions and received 
HD-tDCS over DLPFC, LTC or sham HD-tDCS. Unlike Study 1, participants were retested on 
the same questions only a week later in order to focus on directly on predictors of long-term 
learning. 
 HD-tDCS is a form of non-invasive brain stimulation that involves a low-level current 
applied over the scalp to target a neural region (for a review see Nitsche et al., 2008; Yavari, 
Jamil, Mosayebi Samani, Vidor, & Nitsche, 2018). The amount of current is not sufficient to 
cause neurons to fire but is thought to facilitate firing for neurons that are already near threshold.  
Thus, if a task relies on specific cognitive processes that enhances neuronal activity across a 
neural region, then applying HD-tDCS to that neural region should facilitate that cognitive 
process and as a result improve behavioral outcomes (see Miniussi, Harris, & Ruzzoli, 2013). It 
was predicted that application of HD-tDCS to lateral frontal and inferior temporal regions would 
facilitate encoding of the correct answer in our general knowledge task.  
 Specifically, it was reasoned that the DLPFC and LTC may boost learning following 
errors through top-down elaborative (for a review see Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007) and 
bottom-up semantic processing (Gold, Balota, Kirchhoff, & Buckner, 2005; Gold & Buckner, 
2002), respectively. Additionally, although general benefits of MG compared to PG on learning 
following errors were expected, HD-tDCS over DLPFC and LTC were expected to benefit 
learning compared to sham HD-tDCS regardless of differences between achievement goals 
inductions. However, to the extent that MGs lead to deeper elaborative processing (Ikeda et al., 
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2015; Mangels et al., 2017; Murayama & Elliot, 2011b), it was expected that stimulation of 
DLPFC to be particularly beneficial to memory when an MG is emphasized. In contrast, to the 
extent that stimulation of LTC is involved in more of a bottom-up role in basic word processing 

























 When it comes to teaching students factual information, we may praise students’ accurate 
responses as indicative of learning to the point of avoiding situations where students may make 
mistakes. However, giving students opportunities test their knowledge in low-stakes retrieval 
situations where they can make mistakes and learn from them has been shown to provide better 
long-term benefits to learning compared to having students merely review that information 
passively (for a review see Metcalfe, 2017). Nonetheless, these learning benefits may depend on 
the how students engage with that feedback (for a review see Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), and there 
is growing evidence that the goals and mindsets with which they approach that feedback can 
impact the efficacy of errors as a learning opportunity (see DePasque Swanson & Tricomi, 2014; 
Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good, & Dweck, 2006; Moser, Schroder, Heeter, Moran, & Lee, 
2011). Yet, it is not only the personal goals that the student brings to the classroom that may 
impact feedback-based learning, but also the classroom goals emphasized by the instructor and 
peers. Despite the importance of the classroom environment in learning success, however, little 
is known about how these environments might influence the neurocognitive processes by which 
students learn from their mistakes.  
The present study focuses on how the achievement goals that instructors set for their 
students (for a review see Ames & Archer, 1988; Anderman & Patrick, 2012) influence whether 
and how students engage with and learn from feedback following errors. Achievement goals are 
typically categorized into mastery or performance goals, but each goal can be operationalized in 
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various ways (for a meta-analysis on personal achievement goals see Hulleman, Schrager, 
Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010). Generally, a classroom mastery goal (MG) is defined as one 
where instructors focus their students toward learning and mastering information, and evaluate 
students based on the knowledge and skills that students acquired in the class. A classroom 
performance goal (PG) is defined as one where instructors focus their students toward getting 
high grades and doing better than others, and evaluate students based on their performance 
compared to others. In the present study, we modeled a core aspect of classroom learning —
learning to correct errors in general knowledge — and addressed whether and how emphasizing 
MG or PG may be differentially beneficial to this type of learning. 
In our task, participants answered challenging general knowledge questions (see 
Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Mangels, Rodriguez, Ochakovskaya, & Guerra-Carrillo, 2017) 
while they were assigned to an MG or PG induction. For each question, participants were 
sequentially provided with 2 types of feedback: the first informed them whether their answer was 
right or wrong (i.e. accuracy feedback) and the second informed them of the correct answer (i.e. 
learning feedback). We employed event-related potentials (ERPs), a noninvasive method of 
measuring neural activity derived from scalp-recorded electroencephalography (EEG), to 
examine mechanisms that underlie processing of accuracy and learning feedback as a function of 
goals. ERPs can provide millisecond-level resolution, where differences in ERPs within specific 
time frames and scalp distributions can assist researchers in making inferences regarding the 
cognitive processes that underlie processing of that information (see Hauk, 2016). In the present 
study, ERPs will allow us to investigate neural mechanisms as participants are presented with the 
performance and learning information in real-time, as well as help us make inferences about the 
putative cognitive processes that may underlie learning as a function of goals. Learning was 
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examined as a proportion of errors that were corrected on a later immediate and a week later 
surprise retest as we were interested in differences in retention as a function of goals as well.  
An overarching framework for understanding differences in mechanisms between goals 
stems from goal-setting theory that proposes that goals direct attention and effort to goal-relevant 
information (see Locke & Latham, 2002, 2006). When it comes to making mistakes, Ames and 
Archer (1988) theorized that PG environments elicit concerns regarding ability, where errors are 
likely to be perceived as threatening in that they may indicate low ability. Using surveys, the 
authors showed greater perceptions of classroom PG were positively related to beliefs that a lack 
of ability was a cause of failure. MG were thought to diminish ability concern, and errors were 
likely to be perceived as part of learning. Thus, PG environments may direct more attention 
toward errors compared to MG possibly due to concerns regarding ability.  
It is important to note that Ames and Archer (1988) defined PG as a goal where students 
are focused on demonstrating their ability. However, in a meta-analysis of personal goals 
Hulleman and colleagues (2010) showed that when PGs are defined only in normative terms (i.e. 
focus on doing better than others) they are linked to better grades, but when they are defined in 
terms of ability (i.e. focus on appearing smart) are linked to worse grades. Ames and Archer 
(1988) classroom PG definition contains both ability and normative terminology, where doing 
better than others is a means by which one can achieve higher ability. In the present study, we 
defined PGs only in normative terms and did not include any language regarding ability to 
examine if under a normative PG errors are perceived to be more threatening compared to an 
MG induction. It may be that normative PGs also foster concerns regarding ability during failure. 
Alternatively, it may be that errors are perceived similarly under a normative PG induction that 
does not speak to ability in comparison to an MG induction. We also defined MGs and PGs in an 
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approach manner where goals are framed toward success (e.g. do better than others) as opposed 
to an avoidance manner where goals are framed away from failure (e.g., do not do worse than 
others), because approach goals are typically associated with better outcomes compared to 
avoidance goals especially when it comes to PGs (Van Yperen, Blaga, & Postmes, 2015). 
Given the focus of MG on learning, goal-setting theory would suggest that an MG 
environment should bias attention toward learning-relevant information. Specifically, to the 
extent that negative performance feedback identifies where knowledge needs to be developed, 
students under an MG environment should be more likely than those under a PG environment to 
be motivated to maintain attention and engage effort to process the correct answer. Indeed, 
research in the classroom shows that a greater perception of an MG classroom is linked to greater 
reports of intrinsic motivation (Murayama & Elliot, 2009), interest in course material (Barron & 
Harackiewicz, 2003), effort, persistence, and use of rehearsal and elaborative learning strategies 
(Wolters, 2004). In addition, perceptions of an MG classroom are linked to greater reports of 
effort as being a cause for success (Ames & Archer, 1988). In contrast, greater perceptions of a 
PG classroom are linked to reports of less effort (Wolters, 2004), intrinsic motivation 
(Murayama & Elliot, 2009), and interest in course material (Barron & Harackiewicz, 2003).  
Similarly, researchers using laboratory memory tasks suggest that MGs compared to PGs lead to 
deeper elaborative processing of learning material (Ikeda et al., 2015; Mangels et al., 2017; 
Murayama & Elliot, 2009). Elaborative processing is thought to facilitate learning following 
errors (Cyr & Anderson, 2015; Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Knight et al., 2012) and is also likely 
to support learning in our task where error correction requires that the correct answer is 
successfully associated with a particular general knowledge question, not just remembered in 
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isolation. Thus, we expected an MG compared to a PG induction to facilitate greater engagement 
with the learning feedback and facilitate learning as evident by greater error correction.  
To investigate the neural mechanisms that underlie processing of errors and learning as a 
function of achievement goals we examine ERPs during the presentation of accuracy and 
learning feedback. In the following sections we discuss ERPs of interest and the cognitive 
processes that they are likely to index to help us makes inferences of the cognitive processes that 
may underlie processes under each goal. We end with a section on study overview and 
predictions.  
 
Accuracy Feedback & ERPs 
 
In the present study, we examined ERPs during accuracy feedback that informed 
participants whether their response was correct or incorrect. Although errors may carry different 
meaning under PG compared to MG environments, thus far, differences have only been observed 
when examining personal endorsement of achievement goals, as measured through surveys, and 
not when goals are experimentally manipulated. Specifically, Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good, 
and Dweck (2006) showed that greater personal endorsement of performance goals were 
associated with enhanced orienting to negative feedback signaling a response was wrong, 
particularly when participants were initially confident that they were going to be correct, and 
thus, negative feedback would have been particularly unexpected. This enhanced orienting 
response evidenced by positive correlations between the amplitude of the P3a, an early midline 
positive ERP potential, and endorsement of performance goals that were defined using both 
normative and ability terms. The P3a is a positive-going ERP component that occurs between 
 20 
250 and 500 ms post-stimulus that is thought to index attention to unexpected events (for a 
review see Polich, 2007). In a later study focusing on manipulating achievement goals in the 
context of the same task, however, Mangels and colleagues (2017), failed to show any goal-
related modulation of the P3a. These inconsistencies in goal effects on the response to signals of 
failure may be related to differences in how achievement goals function in a state (inducted) 
versus trait (individual difference) situation or the inclusion of both ability and normative 
language in the definition of personal PGs in the first study. 
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) is another ERP component that is typically 
examined during accuracy feedback. The FRN precedes the P3a and is a negative-going ERP 
peaking around 250 ms post-stimulus over frontal electrodes during errors compared to correct 
responses (for a review San Martín, 2012). Although differences in the FRN have not been 
shown as a function of either induced (Mangels et al., 2017) or personal achievement goals 
(Mangels et al., 2006), Van Meel and Van Heijningen (2010) did show differences in the FRN 
between errors and corrects during a probabilistic learning task when participants were instructed 
to outperform others, but not when the trials were presented as practice. It seems that students 
may be more sensitive to accuracy feedback when placed in a competitive setting, which may 
reflect similar attentional processes under our normative PG induction. 
The P3a may speak to bottom-up attentional processing in response to feedback (see 
Polich, 2007), however, we were also interested in the effects of achievement goals on the P3b 
and the Late Positive Potential (LPP), two ERPs that have been characterized as indexing aspects 
of top-down, voluntary attention. The P3b is a positive-going ERP over parietal electrodes in the 
range of 300 to 600 ms post-stimulus that is generally thought to index top-down processes 
involved in updating working memory in response to a task-relevant event (for a review see 
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Polich, 2007), although it is also enhanced for unexpected outcomes as long as those outcomes 
have motivational relevance (for a review San Martín, 2012). Van Meel and Van Heijningen 
(2010) did not show the presence of competition to differentially modulate the P3b as they did 
with the FRN in relation to accuracy feedback compared to a practice condition. However, 
participants in that study typically provided correct responses, where in the present study the 
majority of responses are likely to be errors. In the context of repeated failures, PGs may elicit 
concerns about ability when it comes to errors (Ames & Archer, 1988). Consequently, the FRN 
may index bottom-up processing to negative feedback but only when negative feedback is rare or 
unexpected (see also Sambrook & Goslin, 2015), whereas the P3b may be more reflective of top-
down processing to errors when they are more prevalent in the context of failure. Alternatively, 
goals may only modulate the P3b but not the FRN since negative feedback is persistent in our 
task. Thus, a PG compared to an MG induction may lead to greater enhancements of P3b during 
errors indexing the use of working-memory processes that are directed toward this undesirable 
event.   
The LPP is also a positive-going ERP that appears around 300 ms post-stimulus over 
posterior midline electrodes, however unlike the P3b it is may extend even past 1000 ms post-
stimulus. It is thought to index sustained attention and arousal to motivationally relevant 
information (for a review see Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010; Lang & Bradley, 2010). 
Previously, (Mangels, Good, Whiteman, Maniscalco, & Dweck, 2012) found that an enhanced 
LPP to negative feedback during a math problem solving task lead to poorer learning from 
corrective feedback in women who were informed about the negative stereotypes regarding 
female’s abilities in math (i.e., under stereotype threat). More recently, Whiteman & Mangels 
(2016) found, using a similar task to the present study, that the LPP to negative feedback was 
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enhanced in individuals who had a greater trait tendency to ruminate on the negative 
consequences of failing to attain personal goals. Consequently, in the context of a task where 
participants repeatedly experience negative feedback, a PG compared to an MG induction may 
also enhance LPP during errors. This may be the case especially if normative PGs may foster 
concerns regarding ability and the repeated negative feedback threatens perceptions of that 
ability.  
 
Learning Feedback & ERPs 
 
In support of goal theory (see Locke & Latham, 2002, 2006), where an MG compared to 
a PG induction is expected to direct greater attention and effort to learning-relevant information, 
Mangels and colleagues (2017) showed MGs compared to PGs led to deeper processing of 
learning feedback. Here, MGs led to enhanced inferior fronto-temporal negativity from 400 to 
800 ms during learning feedback when that learning feedback was later remembered compared 
to when it was not remembered on a retest ( i.e., difference due to memory (Dm) effects; Paller 
& Wagner, 2002). As for PGs, Dm effects during learning feedback in the same time window 
were instead shown over parieto-occipital regions. In accordance with views on the progression 
of visual verbal information progression through the ventral stream (see Marinkovic et al., 2003), 
the authors proposed that parieto-occipital Dm effect under PGs was more indicative of basic 
visual processing of the learning feedback, whereas the inferior fronto-temporal Dm effect under 
MGs putatively indexed semantic processing of the learning feedback. Thus, an MG compared to 
a PG induction may facilitate deeper processing of the learning feedback. 
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The present study will attempt to replicate these findings by examining ERPs over 
inferior fronto-temporal and parieto-occipital regions, but additionally will examine ERPs over 
superior frontal regions putatively involved in attentional orienting and elaborative processing. 
ERPs over superior frontal regions are typically more positive going when tasks necessitate 
semantic processing or elaborative memory strategies, compared to when participants are 
focused on less demanding tasks such as those involved in detecting visual features of words or 
using rote rehearsal memory strategies (Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Guo, Zhu, Ding, Fan, 
& Paller, 2004; Wieser & Wieser, 2003). Superior frontal positivity from as early as 150 ms 
post-stimulus and up to 400 ms has been shown to be enhanced when participants  were 
instructed to employ deeper semantic processing or elaborative memory strategies compared to 
shallow visual processing or when participants were not instructed or able to use specific 
memory strategies (Blanchet, Gagnon, & Bastien, 2007; Guo et al., 2004; Wieser & Wieser, 
2003). For example, tasks that instructed participants to evaluate the meaning of an item (Guo et 
al., 2004) or a relationship between two items (Wieser & Wieser, 2003) led to early enhanced 
frontal positivity compared to tasks that instructed participants to evaluate perceptual aspects of 
stimuli (e.g., Is a stimuli in bold face? Are words of equal length?). In another study, greater 
frontal positivity was shown for words when participants may have been more likely to use 
organization memorization strategies compared to when participants were unlikely to employ 
any specific memorization strategy (Blanchet et al., 2007), suggesting that this early frontal 
positivity reflects enhancements in attention and effort toward processing the incoming 
information. Thus, an MG compared to a PG induction may lead to enhanced early frontal 
positivity that may reflect enhancements in attention and effort to the learning feedback 
following errors in our task as well. 
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Later sustained positivity over superior frontal regions starting around 300 ms post-
stimulus has been shown predict later memory and is thought to reflect elaborative processes that 
contribute to encoding success (e.g., Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Guo et al., 2004; Kamp, 
Bader, & Mecklinger, 2017; Liu, Rosburg, Gao, Weber, & Guo, 2017; Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 
2001). For example, Fabiani and colleagues (1990) found that sustained frontal positivity was 
enhanced for later remembered words compared to words that were not remembered (i.e. Dm 
effect) when participants were instructed to use an elaborative memorization strategy such as 
forming sentences between words, but differences in frontal positivity was not related to later 
memory outcomes when rote-rehearsal was employed. Similarly, following initial study of word 
pairs, Liu and colleagues (2017) showed frontal Dm effects when participants were instructed to 
employ an elaborative associative strategy when presented with the same word pairs again (i.e. 
generate a word that relates to both words for each word pair), but not when participants were 
instructed to only use a retrieval strategy where they were presented with the first word of a 
previously studied word pair and asked to try and remember the other word that was paired with 
it. Liu and colleagues (2017) concluded that frontal positivity may index semantic processing or 
working-memory based elaboration given that participants were asked to link and strengthen the 
association of words in each pair. Thus, in our task, an MG compared to a PG induction may 
lead to greater Dm effects over superior frontal regions that may index greater use elaborative 






In the present study, we examined whether MG or a PG inductions differentially affected 
learning after errors in a general knowledge task, both in terms of behavior as measured by error 
correction on both an immediate and 1-week delayed retest, and in terms of their influence on 
selected ERP waveforms associated with processing of accuracy and learning feedback. As 
mentioned above, both MGs and PGs inductions were defined in an approach manner in terms of 
developing knowledge and in normative terms (i.e. do better than others), respectively. We also 
measured personal incoming achievement goals at the onset of the study to ensure that pre-
existing differences in endorsement of MG and PG between groups did not occur prior to the 
goal induction.  
Examining neural mechanisms as a function of goals that support learning even when 
memory is tested a week later can provide insight into the type of cognitive processes that may 
boost retention and speak to cognitive processes that benefit learning across both retest-delays. 
Behaviorally, we expected that the MG induction would result in better learning outcomes than 
the PG induction, and that these effects would be magnified when examining memory over a 
longer delay. Thus, the use of an immediate and week later retest will allow us to examine when 
learning differences between goals may appear and whether differences in delay matter.  
Regarding processing of accuracy feedback, we expected that compared to MGs, 
normative PGs would lead to greater involuntary and/or voluntary attention to negative feedback 
impugning ability, as evidenced by enhancement of fronto-centrally focused FRN and P3a 
components, and/or centro-parietally focused P3b, and LPP components, respectively. In relation 
to the FRN, we also measured the preceding P200 component to ensure that our FRN measure 
was not influenced by this preceding positivity, and for that reason along with the peak-picked 
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means we also conducted peak-to-peak measures from the P2 to the FRN, as well as from the 
FRN to the P3a.  
Regarding processing of learning feedback, we first attempted to replicate Mangels and 
colleagues (2017)’s findings of differential Dm effects for MG and PG inductions over inferior 
fronto-temporal and parieto-occipital regions, respectively, and examine whether the addition of 
the greater delay would enhance these effects further, in addition to revealing behavioral effects 
that had not been apparent in that earlier study. Then, to the extent that MGs not only foster 
deeper, semantic processing of learning-relevant feedback, but also more elaborative, associative 
learning strategies in particular, we expected greater attentional enhancement and deeper 
elaborative processing of the learning feedback under an MG compared to a PG induction. These 
would be evident in enhancement of superior frontal positivity during both an early and later, 
more sustained period, respectively. Again, we expected that indices of these relational processes 
might be particularly evident when examining memory at the 1-week delay. While we also 
expected to replicate sensitivity of activity at inferior temporal sites to error correction success 
overall, regardless of delay (e.g., Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; see also Whiteman & Mangels, 
2016; Mangels et al., 2018), we did not predict differences here as a function of MG and PG 
instructions (see also Mangels et al., 2017), given the proposed role of this activity in more 
bottom-up processes involved in the activation of pre-existing representations of the correct 







 We tested 80 eligible participants in the ERP study, with half of the sample randomly 
assigned to each condition (MG = 40 [18 female]; PG = 40 [19 female]). These students 
represent 31% of the 260 EEG-eligible participants identified through an online prescreen of 
1182 Baruch college students. Participants were eligible for the study if they reported to be right-
handed, have normal vision and hearing, no psychological or neurological disorders, to have 
learned English by age 6 and have all of their schooling in the United States. As for ethnicity, 21 
identified as Asian (MG = 13), 5 identified as Black or African American (MG = 3), 13 
identified as white (MG = 7), and 9 identified as more than one race (MG = 4). Of the 80 
participants, fourteen participants identified as Hispanic (MG = 7), and 2 participants did not 
respond at all to this or the ethnicity question. Participants in the ERP study were provided with 
research credits and/or paid $10 per hour with an additional credit/$10 for returning to the 




Overview. Our basic research design used a computerized test-feedback-retest general 
knowledge paradigm similar to that used in previous studies (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; 
Mangels et al., 2017). In the current study, after completing a questionnaire assessing their 
personal achievement goals (Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised; Elliot & Murayama, 
2008)1, participants were prepared for EEG recording, and began the initial test phase. During 
                                               
1 This measure consists of 12 items, with 3 items per goal (i.e., MG approach, MG avoidance, PG approach, PG 
avoidance) that participants rate on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). MG approach items focus 
on learning the potential maximum (e.g., My goal is to learn as much as possible), whereas MG avoidance items 
focused on avoidance of not learning the potential maximum (e.g., My aim is to avoid learning less than I possibly 
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this phase, participants first were presented with either MG or PG approach instructions (see 
Achievement Goal Induction section), then answered 200 general knowledge questions broken 
down into four equal blocks of 50 questions while EEG activity was recorded. Presentation® 
software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA) was used to present goal 
instructions and the general knowledge questions.  
 For each question, participants typed in an answer and their confidence in the answer’s 
accuracy, then received veridical positive or negative feedback about their answer accuracy 
followed by the correct answer (see General Knowledge Test & Retests section). Overall initial 
test accuracy was titrated to ~35% correct in order to ensure a similar experience of challenge for 
all participants, as well as a similar (and large) number of errors to be corrected on the retest, 
regardless of any pre-existing differences in general knowledge. After completion of the initial 
test, participants answered manipulation check questions (see Manipulation Check section). The 
EEG apparatus was then removed and participants were asked to complete a surprise retest 
comprised of half of the questions they encountered at the first test of the general knowledge 
questions. A week later, they were asked to complete a second retest of the remaining half of the 
first-test questions. No mention of either upcoming retest was made during the initial test phase 
rather participants were told they would return to answer additional general questions. Both 
retests included both initially correct and incorrect questions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
could). PG approach items focused on attaining normative competence (e.g., I am striving to do well compared to 
other students) while PG avoidance items focused on avoidance of not achieving the lowest level of normative 
competence (e.g., My goal is to avoid performing poorly compared to others). Because this survey was originally 
developed to assess incoming personal goals within a class, minor updates were made to the original survey to gear 
students toward thinking about their goals more generally. The first item queried MG approach and asked students 
to respond to this item in relation to “in this class”, which was updated to “in my courses.” The other minor change 
for 2 other MG items was an update from “this/the course” to “my courses.” Scores for the incoming goals were 
computed by averaging the 3 items for each of the 4 goals. 
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Achievement Goal Induction. Prior to answering questions in the general knowledge task, 
participants were presented with a screen titled “Task Instructions.” This instruction geared 
students toward an MG or PG.  
 
Participants in the MG condition were instructed with the following: 
 
You are here to explore a set of general knowledge questions in order to develop your knowledge 
about various topics. You will be given feedback about the accuracy of your answers. Sometimes 
people think that we are comparing their performance to that of other students who have 
completed the task. However, your focus should NOT be to do better than other students, but 
rather to develop you own knowledge. 
 
At the end of session 2, you will be provided with information you may find useful for 
understanding how your knowledge has developed over the course of this task. 
 
Participants in the PG condition were instructed with the following: 
 
You are here to answer a set of general knowledge questions about various topics. You will be 
given feedback about the accuracy of your answers in order to give you a sense of how well you 
are performing. Your performance on this task will be compared to other Baruch students and 
you should do your best to perform better than others. 
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At the end of session 2, you will be provided with information about how well you did compared 
to other Baruch students. 
 
This full instruction set was only presented prior to block 1, but at the onset of blocks 2, 
3, and 4, participants were provided with brief goal reminder instructions. Specifically, in the 
MG condition, participants were simply reminded that they “are here to explore the general 
knowledge questions and to develop your knowledge.” In the PG condition, participants were 
reminded that they “are here to do your best to perform better than other students at Baruch.”  
 A brief version of the achievement goal instructions was also restated prior to both the 
immediate and delayed retest. Participants in the MG instruction were instructed to “keep in 
mind that you are here to explore the general knowledge questions and to develop your 
knowledge” and that “at the end of Session 2, you will be provided with information you may 
find useful for understanding how your knowledge has developed over the course of this task.” 
For the PG instruction, participants were instructed to “keep in mind that you are here to do your 
best to perform better than other students at Baruch” and that “at the end of session 2, you will be 
provided with information about how well you did compared to other Baruch students.” 
 
General Knowledge Test & Retests. The 200 general knowledge questions that comprised the 
initial test for each participant were selected from a larger database of 416 difficulty-normed 
questions (http://www.mangelslab.org/bknorms). Questions were related to topics in history, 
geography, math, sciences, arts and humanities. The particular subset of questions presented 
varied across participants because it was based on an individualized titration algorithm designed 
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to stabilize their performance at ~35% accuracy across the initial test (see Mangels et al., 2017 
for algorithm details).  
 On each individual trial, participants first were asked to type in their response within a 3-
minute time limit and then select a confidence rating on a scale of 1 (sure the response is wrong) 
to 7 (sure the response is right). Then participants were presented with a central fixation cross for 
1.5 seconds, followed by feedback signaling accuracy (accuracy feedback; negative feedback: 
low pitched tone paired with a red asterisk, positive feedback: high-pitched tone paired with a 
green asterisk. Positive feedback was shown if there was at least a 70% letter match (regardless 
of letter order) between a participant’s response and the correct answer. This algorithm allowed 
for participants to receive positive feedback for a slightly misspelled correct answer. Negative 
feedback was shown when the letter match between a participant’s response and the correct 
answer fell below 70%. The accuracy feedback was followed by another fixation cross for 1.5 
seconds and then with the corrective learning feedback (i.e., correct answer) for 2 seconds (see 
Figure 1). The ITI was 500 ms. 
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Fig 1. Trial sequence of an incorrect response in the general knowledge test. Participants have a 
3-minute time limit to type in a response to a question. After their response, participants are 
asked to make a confidence rating with a response of 1 if they are sure the answer is wrong, a 4 if 
they are unsure whether their answer is right or wrong, and a 7 if they are sure they are right. If 
the answer is incorrect, then the participant is presented with a red asterisk paired with a low 
pitch sound, but if they are correct then a green asterisk is presented with a high pitch sound. If a 
participant does not respond within 3 minutes, then they are immediately presented with the first 
fixation skipping the confidence rating and are presented with negative feedback (i.e. incorrect 
response). Learning feedback (i.e. correct answer) is presented regardless of response accuracy. 
 
The immediate surprise retest was given on the same day as the initial test, following 
removal of the EEG cap and an opportunity for the subject to clean and refresh themselves (~15 





















What is the capitol of Canada?
Toronto
1   2   3   4   5   6   7
Sure        Unsure        Sure 
Wrong                          Right What is the capitol of Canada?
Toronto
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came back after 1 week and 1 day. To ensure that the two retests were well-matched to each 
other for difficulty, the split of first test questions across retests attempted to distribute questions 
equally as a function of question block, subject accuracy and subject confidence. Each of the 100 
question retests were subdivided into 4 blocks of 25 questions. For both retests, question block 
was preserved (i.e., a question in block 1 of the initial test was presented in block 1 of the retest), 
however question order within a block was randomized. The trial structure of the retest questions 
was identical to the first test, with the exception that feedback combined accuracy and learning 
components into a single composite feedback (negative feedback: correct answer in red and a 
low pitch tone; positive feedback: correct answer in green and a high pitch tone).  
 
Manipulation Check. In line with Murayama and Elliot (2011), participants completed 2 goal 
adoption questions after completion of the general knowledge task, but before the start of the 
immediate retest. Here, participants were asked to rate their adoption of mastery (MG adoption) 
and then of the performance goal (PG adoption) on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). For 
the MG adoption question, participants were asked to rate how hard they tried to develop their 
knowledge. For the PG adoption question, participants were asked to rate how hard they tried to 
do well in comparison to other Baruch college students.  
 
EEG Recording. Continuous electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded during the first test 
only using Neuroscan Synamps 2 (Compumedics USA Charlotte, NC) system with a 64-channel 
Quick-Cap. This montage included 7 monopolar electrodes to capture eye movements (Nz, 
IO1/IO2, LO1/LO2, and an electrode midway between lateral and inferior sites under each eye). 
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EEG was sampled at 500 Hz with a bandpass of DC-100 Hz and referenced to Cz. Impedance 
was established at 5 kΩ or below for all electrodes before the start of the study.  
After recording, we applied an offline average-reference and added Cz back in. Data was 
filtered from .15 Hz to 35 Hz and eye movements were corrected using a PCA-derived ocular 
correction algorithm in BESA 5.3 (Brain Electric Source Analysis, Gräfelfing, German) resulting 
in 6 ocular components for each participant. Prior to averaging, epochs underwent baseline 
correction (-100 ms prior to stimulus onset) and artifact rejection (manual review, and automatic 
scan set to reject epochs with amplitudes ±100 µv). Epochs of 1 s and 1.5 s were used in analyses 




Behavioral data. Of the 80 participants, 6 participants (MG = 4) were excluded because 
of missing retest data either due to running out of time to complete the immediate retest or not 
returning for the delayed retest. An additional participant was excluded in the PG condition for 
falling asleep and another in the MG condition for reporting to look up numerous answers prior 
to the completion of week-delayed retest.2 In addition, we excluded 5 participants who were 
outliers in initial test accuracy despite our use of titration to stabilize performance (boxplot 
outlier method: >1.5 inter-quartile range above or below median). Extreme differences in initial 
                                               
2 Two participants in the MG condition reported looking up or rehearsing some items in the week intervening 
between the immediate and delayed retests. This post-encoding rehearsal may undermine the relationship between 
EEG activity recorded during encoding and memory performance on a retest. One participant could report the 17 
questions/answer they rehearsed, and thus, we opted to remove these trials from their delayed retest analysis, but 
otherwise keep the participant in the analysis. The rehearsed trials were also kept in the immediate retest analysis. 
However, the other participant was removed from analysis because we did not have specific information on the trials 
they rehearsed. This participant was also an outlier (more than 1.5 IQR) in their delayed retest score, but not at the 
immediate retest, suggesting rehearsal had advantaged their delayed performance. 
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test performance could impact cognitive and emotional factors known to influence retest 
performance (i.e., memory load, pre-existing semantic knowledge, feelings of failure). There 
were 3 outliers in the MG condition (2 below, 1 above), and 2 in the PG condition (both below). 
This left 32 participants (13 females) in the MG condition and 35 participants (16 females) in the 
PG condition for behavioral analysis. 
In considering how accuracy at the initial test and retests were calculated, we note that 
the letter-matching algorithm the program used to provide rapid, automatic feedback was 
occasionally imprecise and resulted in inaccurate or ambiguous feedback (1% of all trials)3. This 
necessitated manual review and confirmation of response accuracy by three raters. The majority 
determination by manual rating was used in calculating both first-test and retest accuracy, 
irrespective of the feedback provided by the program. Given the importance of accurate feedback 
as a learning signal, however, we opted to exclude questions from the calculation of retest error 
correction that had received inaccurate or ambiguous feedback at the initial test. In total, this 
resulted in the loss of an average of 2.9 behavioral trials for the MG and 3.5 trials for the PG 
condition, but this did not significantly differ between goal conditions, t(58) =  .777, p > 0.43. 
Although confidence ratings prior to accuracy feedback were measured, we did not 
subdivide trials further as a function of confidence levels because of concerns about meeting 
criteria for an adequate number of trials in all bins, especially given that encoding trials were 
already subdivided as a function of immediate and delayed retest. A 2 (Induced Goal: MG or 
PG) x 2 (Accuracy: Corrects or Errors) ANOVA on median confidence only showed a main 
                                               
3 Incorrect positive feedback occurred when a correct and incorrect answer shared 70% or more letters (e.g., correct 
answer: “Uranus;” given answer: “Saturn”). Ambiguity regarding the appropriateness of negative feedback occurred 
in situations where their response was semantically similar (e.g., correct answer: “human”; given answer: “people”), 
was the first name instead of the last name of the correct answer (e.g., correct answer: “Dickens”; given answer: 
“Charles”), a misspelling close to a correct response but the match was less than 70% (e.g., correct answer: 
“ostrich”; given answer: “ostrid”). 
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effect of Accuracy, F(1, 58) =  239.971, p < 0.001. Median confidence for corrects (M = 5.55, 
SEM = .18) was greater than median confidence of errors (M = 2.54, SEM = .14). No other 
significant effects were shown (ps > .51). Furthermore, if we use this median for errors to split 
these trials into higher and lower confidence errors, we find that there are no goal differences in 
the frequency of either error type as evident by a lack of differences in the number of high 
confidence errors trials, t(58) =  .226, p > 0.82 (MG: M = 44.50, SEM = 2.56; PG: M = 43.60, 
SEM = 3.06). Thus, although confidence in errors can influence the amplitude of ERPs to 
accuracy feedback and the likelihood of correcting errors on a subsequent retest (i.e., 
hypercorrection effect; see Butterfield & Mangels, 2003), given the lack of goal effects on 
confidence, we collapsed across confidence in order to focus on our primary aim of examining 
goal effects (for similar approaches see also Mangels, Hoxha, Lane, Jarvis, & Downey, 2018; 
Mangels et al., 2017; Whiteman & Mangels, 2016).  
 
ERP Data Analyses 
 
ERP Sample. From the 67 participants in the behavioral sample, it was necessary to exclude an 
additional 7 participants (2 from MG condition) from ERP analysis: 4 due to electrode bridging, 
and 3 due to excessive noise (i.e., alpha activity, muscle noise or issues with the reference 
electrode). The final ERP sample included 30 participants (13 females) in the MG condition and 
30 participants (12 females) in the PG condition. Only trials with usable feedback were included 
in these analyses. 
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Accuracy Feedback. ERPs were averaged for positive and negative accuracy feedback 
separately. Trial counts did not differ as a function of conditions for either the positive feedback 
(t(58) =  .606, p > 0.45; MG: M = 67.8, SEM = 1.35; PG: M = 66.7, SEM = 1.29) or negative 
feedback (t(58) =  .296, p > 0.76; MG: M = 117.2, SEM = 1.42; PG: M = 116.5, SEM = 1.87). 
Given their close temporal proximity, we measured FRN and P3a components by peak-
picking at Fz and analyzing the amplitude of the 25 ms mean around each peak. In addition, we 
also used this strategy to select the large positive peak prior to the FRN (i.e., the P2) that then 
enabled us to analyze the FRN, which could sometimes be more difficult to isolate, with peak-to-
peak measures from this prominent positive waveform. The peak of the P2 was identified as the 
first positive peak between 100 and 300 ms, the FRN was identified as the most negative peak 
following the P2, and the P3a was identified as the most positive peak following the FRN. Peak 
latencies of these did not differ as a function of goal, feedback valence or their interaction (ps > 
.25; see Supplemental Table A1 in Appendix A for means and SEMs). In addition to the 
analyzing the peak-picked mean amplitudes of each component, we also evaluated peak-to-peak 
amplitude differences between the P2 to the FRN and from the FRN to the P3a. As for the P3b 
and LPP components, mean average windows between 200 to 400 ms and 500 to 1000 ms were 
used, respectively, at electrode CPz. 
 
Learning Feedback. Our analysis of the learning feedback focused on trials in which the 
participant made an error on the initial test, both in terms of the activity of all learning feedback 
following errors, and then after back-sorting as a function of whether that error was later 
corrected on a retest or not (i.e., difference due to memory [Dm] effects). We set a minimum of 8 
usable trials in both corrected and uncorrected conditions for a participant to be included in the 
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analysis. Using this criterion, it was possible to include all participants if we collapsed over retest 
delay, but if we included the factor of test-delay, it reduced our sample to 22 participants in the 
MG condition and 26 participants in the PG condition. Thus, analyses both collapsing over test 
delay (30 subjects in each condition) and as a function of test delay (22 in MG, 26 in PG) are 
reported here.  
Our replication of Mangels and colleagues (2017) focused on the sustained negative-
going potentials observed over the inferior fronto-temporal (FT9, FT10, T7, T8) and parieto-
occipital (PO3, O1, PO4, O2) regions that they had identified by as sensitive to achievement goal 
manipulation. As in that study, activity at fronto-temporal and temporal electrodes in each 
hemisphere were averaged to create a left (FT9/T7) and right (FT10/T8) fronto-temporal 
average, and activity at parieto-occipital and occipital electrodes in each hemisphere were 
averaged to create a left (PO3/O1) and right (PO4/O2) parieto-occipital average. Although 
Mangels et al. (2017) focused their analyses on the 400 - 800 ms period, in the current study we 
conducted analyses on the 500 – 1000 ms window for parsimony with our other analyses.  
Our measurement of superior frontal activity focused on F3, Fz, and F4. Using average 
windows, we measured an early positivity to learning feedback from 200 to 300 ms, a mid-
latency sustained positivity from 500 – 1000 ms, and a later sustained positivity from 1000 – 
1500 ms. To examine the scalp distribution of activity during these time periods, these analyses 
also included central (C3, Cz, C4) and parietal (P3, Pz, P4) electrodes. Finally, we examined 
temporo-parietal negativity during the learning feedback using average windows from 500 – 
1000 ms and 1000 – 1500 ms at two electrode sites within each hemisphere (TP7/TP8; 
TP9/TP10), similar to previous studies (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Whiteman & Mangels, 
2016).  
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Although all significant (p < .05) and marginal (.10 > p > .05) main effects and 
interactions are reported, only effects involving either memory and/or goals are discussed in 
detail (i.e., other effects are described in footnotes). Post-hoc comparisons were conducted using 






Pre-task Measures. There were no differences in any pre-task measures between our goal 
conditions (see Table 1). A 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 2 (Goal Type: Mastery or 
Performance) x 2 (Valence: Approach or Avoidance) ANOVA on mean AGQ-R ratings did not 
show any significant effects of Induced Goals (ps > .66). In addition, because Shapiro-Wilk tests 
showed that the 4 personal goals (i.e. MAP, PAP, MAV, PAV) failed normality (ps< .04), we 
also ran non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests and all 4 tests showed that differences at each 
personal goal did not differ between Goal Conditions (ps> .58). An independent t-test also 
showed that age did not differ between Goals (MG: M = 21.53, SEM = .83; PG: M = 20.30, SEM 
= .66), t(58) =  1.161, p > 0.24. 
 
Table 1  
Pre-task measures for the main ERP sample for each goal condition. Personal goal measures (i.e., 
MAP, PAP, MAV, PAV) reflect averages across 3 question items that were rated on a scale of 1 
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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Standard errors of the mean (SEM) are shown in 
parentheses. 
 
           MG            PG    
              
 Age   21.53 (.83)  20.30 (.66) 
MAP     4.47 (.08)    4.42 (.13)  
PAP     3.77 (.19)    3.82 (.22) 
MAV     3.74 (.18)    3.74 (.21) 
PAV     3.48 (.22)      3.62 (.20) 
 
Manipulation Check. Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were conducted 
between the Mastery and Performance Goal Adoption ratings, for each Goal condition because 
data failed normality in all 4 Shapiro-Wilk tests (ps < .014). Participants under MG had a higher 
median for Mastery Goal Adoption (Median = 4) compared to the Performance Goal Adoption 
(Median = 3), Z = 3.115, p < .003, whereas those under PG had similar medians for the Mastery 
Goal Adoption (Median = 4) and Performance Goal Adoption (Median = 4.5), Z = 0.406, p > .68 
(see Fig 2). Thus, although under MG participants were focused more on mastery than 




Fig 2. Median ratings of Mastery and Performance Goal Adoption as a function of Goal 
Induction Condition. 
 
First-test Performance. We calculated first test accuracy in two different ways to 
evaluate whether goals influenced first test performance: 1) based on accuracy assigned by our 
program via the letter matching algorithm (i.e., a measure of our titration algorithm’s 
effectiveness), and 2) after removing problematic trials where the wrong accuracy had been 
assigned or responses were ambiguous (i.e., characterizing those trials that were included in the 
ERP and retest analyses; see Data Analysis for further details). 
Independent t-tests comparing the goal induction conditions showed that general 
knowledge accuracy did not differ across conditions regardless of how it was calculated (all ps > 
.63), and regardless of whether the full sample was included in analysis or only the subsample 
that met the criterion trials for ERP analyses involving the delay factor. These findings support 
the view that our titration was successful in equalizing performance. Interestingly, one-sample t-















by our titration (M = .36, SEM = .03), and after removal of problematic trials (M = .37, SEM = 
.03; ps < .04). PGs only led to higher accuracy after problematic trials were removed (M = .36, 
SEM = .03), t(29) =  2.140, p < 0.05, but not when accuracy was determined only by our titration 
algorithm, (M = .36, SEM = .03), t(29) =  1.479, p > 0.14. The same pattern was found for the 
smaller ERP sample that involved the delay factor under MGs (ps < .03), but for PGs accuracy 
scores did not differ from .35 (ps > .89). Thus, even though goals did not differentially influence 
first test accuracy, MGs generally led to better accuracy in comparison to the pre-set titration 
level even before the removal of problematic trials increased overall test accuracy.  
Finally, because our titration algorithm relied on the level of question difficulty to 
maintain performance ~.35, we also examined differences in mean difficulty between goals using 
independent t-tests. Focusing on the usable trials, there were no differences across goal condition 
in the mean level of difficulty when it came to overall mean question difficulty, mean difficulty 
of questions answered correctly, or answered incorrectly, for either the whole sample or the 
delay-analysis subsample (ps > .67).  
 
Retest Performance. When considering the full sample, a 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 
2 (Retest-Delay: Immediate or Delayed) ANOVA on proportion of errors corrected showed a 
main effect of Goal, F(1, 58) =  4.257, p < 0.05, and a main effect of Test-Delay, F(1, 58) =  
786.964, p < 0.001, but no Goal by Test-Delay interaction, F(1, 58) =  1.240, p > 0.26. As shown 
in Figure 3, participants under MG corrected more errors overall (MEAN = .60, SEM = .02) than 
participants under PG (M = .55, SEM = .02), and across goals, participants corrected more errors 
at the immediate (M = .75, SEM = .01) than the delayed retest (M = .40, SEM = .01). Thus, MG 
induction appeared to lead to benefits in error correction compared to PG, regardless of retest 
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delay, and both groups similarly showed a reduction in memory performance as a function of the 
longer delay. 
When confirming these findings with the subsample used in the ERP analysis with the 
delay factor, the main effect of delay remained robust, F(1, 46) =  584.947, p < 0.001, but the 
main effect of goal was no longer significant (p > .13), although it was in the same direction 
numerically (MG: M = .58, SEM = .02; PG: M = .54, SEM = .01). Nor did goal interact with 
delay (p > .45). While this may be the result of a general reduction in power, it may also be that 
excluding individuals who did not have enough uncorrected items in the immediate condition 
and/or corrected items in the delay condition had the consequence of constricting the range of 
participant performance values and reducing group differences. Regardless, this result means that 




























Fig 3. Proportion of errors corrected at retest as a function of induced goal and retest delay 





In order to test the hypothesis that induction of PG goals might enhance attention to 
performance feedback, we analyzed ERP waveforms maximal over frontal (FRN, P3a) and 
parietal sites (P3b, LPP) previously shown to be sensitive to feedback valence, target expectancy 
and/or motivation (see Figure 4). Mean amplitudes of each waveform were submitted to A 2 
(Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 2 (Valence: Positive or Negative) ANOVA. For the FRN, P3a and 
P3b, these means were centered around a peak-picked latency. For the broader LPP, we analyzed 
the mean amplitude from 500-1000 ms. 
FRN. The FRN exhibited only a main effect of feedback valence, F(1, 58) =  29.429, p < 
0.001. No other effects were significant (ps > .27). As shown in Figure 4A, the FRN was more 
negative-going for the negative feedback to errors (M = -1.19, SEM = .22) than for the positive 
feedback to corrects (M = -.13, SEM = .31). However, when the FRN was analyzed as a function 
of amplitude differences from the P2 (i.e. peak-to-peak P24 to FRN differences), no effects were 
significant (ps > .49), including the effects of feedback valence. Thus, despite the appearance of 
                                               
4 Although the P2 was not the focus of our analysis, 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 2 (Accuracy: Corrects or Errors) 
ANOVA on peak-picked mean P2 amplitude at electrode Fz showed a main effect of Accuracy, F(1, 58) =  58.405, 
p < 0.001, in that the P2 was enhanced for positive feedback (M = 2.83, SEM = .33) compared to negative feedback 
(M = 1.60, SEM = .28). There was no main effect of Goal, F(1, 58) =  1.378, p > 0.24, but the Goal by Accuracy 
interaction approached significance, F(1, 58) =  3.472, p < 0.07. Exploration of this interaction using 5 Bonferroni 
tests with a significance of p < .01 indicated that the interaction seemed to be driven by a marginally greater 
difference between corrects and errors under MG (M = 1.54, SEM = .24) compared to PG (M = .93, SEM = .22), 
t(58) =  1.863, p < .07.  
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more negative-going FRN activity in the PG condition (see Figure 4A), goals did not reliably 
influence FRN amplitude. 
 
P3a. A main effect of feedback valence was also found for this waveform, F(1, 58) =  
5.941, p < 0.02. However, as shown in Figure 4A, peak-picked mean P3a amplitude was more 
positive-going for the relatively “rare” positive feedback to correct answers (M = 1.26, SEM = 
.32), than compared to the more frequent negative feedback to errors (M = .75, SEM = .23). All 
other effects were not significant (ps > .54). When considering this waveform in relation to the 
preceding FRN (i.e. FRN to P3a peak-to-peak amplitudes), the main effect of feedback valence 
remained, F(1, 58) =  4.285, p < 0.05, in that FRN-to-P3a mean amplitudes were smaller for 
positive feedback (M = 1.39, SEM = .40) than negative feedback (M = 1.94, SEM = .29). No 
other significant effects were found (ps > .70). Thus, goals did not appear to influence P3a 
amplitude.  
 
P3b. When analyzing the P3b maximal over parietal sites, we also found only a main 
effect of feedback valence, F(1, 58) =  51.767, p < 0.001. As shown in Figure 4B, the P3b was 
more positive-going for positive feedback following corrects (M = 3.03, SEM = .34) than 
negative feedback following errors (M = 1.89, SEM = .23) (see Figure 4B). Nonetheless, there 
was no evidence that the goal manipulation influenced P3b amplitude. All other effects were not 


















Fig 4. Grand mean ERP waveforms time-locked to accuracy feedback and averaged as a function 
of induced goal and feedback type (negative feedback to incorrect answers [errors], positive 
feedback to correct answers [corrects]). A) Waveforms at Fz, highlighting the P2, FRN and P3a. 
B) Waveforms at CPz, highlighting the P3b and LPP. 
 
LPP. Finally, although the amplitude of the LPP appears numerically higher overall in 
the PG condition (see Figure 4B) neither the overall goal effect (p > .19), nor the interaction 
between goal and accuracy (p > .53) reached significance. There was only a main effect of 
Accuracy, F(1, 58) =  11.643, p < 0.002, in that amplitudes were higher for positive feedback to 













 In the analyses that follow, we evaluate the hypothesis that a MG induction will result in 
increased engagement of neural regions involved in the successful encoding of learning 
feedback. We focus on regions within the frontal and lateral temporal cortex, and assess effects 
of induced goal and subsequent memory performance across hemisphere and region first after 
collapsing over delay, and then after including Retest Delay as a factor.  
 We note that each approach to the delay variable has its advantages and disadvantages. 
By collapsing over delay, we ensure that all participants can be included in analysis with 
sufficient trial counts. Importantly, these participants represent the sample where a significant 
error correction advantage found for participants in the MG induction condition. Also, the MG 
advantage did not interact with delay, supporting the value of collapsing over this factor for the 
ERP analysis. However, we must also consider that when collapsing, a larger percentage of later 
corrected items come from the immediate retest, where as a larger percentage of later 
uncorrected items come from the delay condition. Therefore, we also follow-up with the analysis 




   
Fig 5. Selected grand mean waveforms over fronto-temporal (electrodes: FT9, T7, FT10, and T8) 
and parieto-occipital (electrodes: PO3, O1, PO4, O2) regions for the first-test learning feedback 
following errors, as a function of induced goal, and sorted as a function of whether the error was 
later corrected or not on a later retest. Waveforms are averaged over retest delay. The bracket 
over electrode FT9 signifies the time window (500 – 1000 ms) of interest.  
 
Inferior Fronto-Temporal vs Parieto-Occipital Negativity  
 
The primary goal of this analysis was to examine whether we would replicate the 













PG:  Errors Corrected
MG: Errors Not Corrected




fronto-temporal and parieto-occipital regions that was originally reported by Mangels and 
colleagues (2017). Specifically, in that study, fronto-temporal regions were differentially 
involved in encoding under MGs, whereas parietal-occipital regions are differentially involved in 
encoding under PGs, although there were no goal-related differences in behavioral outcomes on 
the later retest.  
The present study primarily differed from Mangels and colleagues (2017) in that it 
included both an immediate and delayed retest, rather than just an immediate test, and used a 
between-subject rather than within-subject manipulation of goals. There were also some subtle 
differences in goal wording. Finally, whereas in that study, differential involvement of region as 
a function of goal was found despite no goal differences in behavioral outcomes, here, we have 
the opportunity to evaluate these neural effects in the context of significant behavioral 
differences. To this aim, these analyses employ a series of 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 2 
(Memory: Corrected or Not Corrected) x 3 (Hemisphere: Left or Right) x 2 (Region: Fronto-
temporal or Parieto-occipital) ANOVAs. Mangels and colleagues (2017) found effects from 400-
800 ms after the onset of the learning feedback. In the present analysis, we focus on the 500-
1000 ms period in order to make these analyses more comparable to the analysis of other sites of 
interest to our study.  
When collapsing over retest delay, we found a significant main effect of Memory (Dm 
effect), F(1, 58) =  20.607, p < 0.001, where errors that were later corrected (M = -1.06, SEM = 
.13) elicited more negative-going waveforms during presentation of the learning feedback that 
were compared to errors that were not corrected (M = -.82, SEM = .13) (see Figure 5). Although 
there was a trend toward a Memory by Hemisphere by Region interaction, F(1, 58) =  2.842, p < 
0.10, there were no significant or marginal interactions that involved both Goal and Memory (ps 
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> .35), which were of the greatest relevance to the current hypothesis. The only effect involving 
Goal was a marginal Goal by Hemisphere5 interaction, F(1, 58) =  3.995, p < 0.06, that 
subsumed a significant main effect of Hemisphere, F(1, 58) =  6.624, p < 0.014. Post hoc 
analysis of the interaction with goal indicated that the overall pattern of more negative-going 
right hemisphere activity was only significant in the MG condition (MG: left: M = -.79, SEM = 
.21; right M = -1.38, SEM = .19; PG: left: M = -.75, SEM = .21; right: M = -.83, SEM = .19). 
Thus, although these finding replicate the sensitivity of these waveforms to later error correction, 
as well as their greater magnitude over the right hemisphere, it appears that during this time 
frame, neural activity across both the more posterior and anterior aspects of the ventral stream 




                                               
5 Additionally, there was a significant Hemisphere by Region interaction, F(1, 58) =  6.734, p < 0.013, which post 
hoc comparisons indicated resulted from the pattern of greater right- than left-hemisphere negativity being confined 
to the parieto-occipital region (parieto-occipital: right: M = -1.42, SEM = .22; left: M = -.78, SEM = .25; fronto-





















Fig 6. Subsequent memory (Dm) effects at fronto-temporal and parieto-occipital sites from 500-
1000 ms. A) Dm effects (later corrected-not corrected) as a function of Goal, Region and 
Hemisphere B) Dm effects as a function of Goal, Delay and Region. 
 
Nonetheless, given that this analysis was designed to replicate the previous results of 
Mangels et al (2017), we explored whether significant Dm amplitudes might be observed for 
each Goal as a function of Region collapsed over hemisphere (as were found in that study), using 
one-sample t-tests with zero as the comparison value (i.e., zero would represent no difference in 
amplitude between later corrected and not correct items). As illustrated in Figure 6A, these Dm 
difference values were significantly different from 0 over fronto-temporal regions under MG (M 
= -.39, SEM = .13), however after Bonferroni correction, no other Dm values reached 
significance.  
Results from this analysis suggest that we partially replicated the results of Mangels and 
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 52 
MG condition, but not the PG condition. Only a single dissociation was observed here, however, 
unlike the double dissociation found in Mangels et al. (2017). Indeed, over the parieto-occipital 
region, not only did the induction of PG did not lead to a differential Dm effect, but the 
magnitude of the Dm effect did not differ from zero for either condition.  
When including retest-delay as a factor, which reduced our sample size (see Data 
Analyses), learning feedback that was later remembered at retest similarly elicited more 
negative-going waveforms (M = -1.03, SEM = .14) than those that were forgotten (M = -.78, 
SEM = .15), F(1, 46) =  16.416, p < 0.001 (see Figure 6B). There was also a trend toward an 
interaction of this memory effect with retest delay, F(1, 46) =  2.995, p < 0.10, and a significant 
3-way interaction between Memory, Hemisphere and Delay, F(1, 46) =  4.822, p < 0.04. Post 
hoc tests of the higher-order interaction indicated that Dm effects appeared at all hemispheres 
and retest-delays, except over the left hemisphere at the delayed retest (errors corrected: M = -
.82, SEM = .18; errors not corrected: M = -.83, SEM = .18).  
As with the full sample, there were no significant interactions involving both Memory 
and Goal (all ps > .35), but unlike when the full sample was employed, targeted analysis the 
magnitude of the Dm effects using t-tests against zero found that none of the 8 conditions 
representing goal, region and delay survived Bonferroni correction. In terms of other effects 
involving goal, only a Goal by Region6 by Delay interaction approached significance, F(1, 46) =  
3.134, p < 0.09, but post-hoc tests found no significant comparisons involving the factor of 
Goals. 
                                               
6 Other effects involving Region were also observed, including a marginal main effect of Region, F(1, 46) =  2.874, 
p < 0.10, marginal Memory by Region interaction, F(1, 46) =  2.862, p < 0.10, and a significant Region by 
Hemisphere interaction, F(1, 46) =  11.701, p < 0.002. Focusing on the significant interaction, post hoc analyses 
confirmed what was observed in the full sample. Specifically, the overall greater negativity over the right 
hemisphere is limited to the parieto-occipital region (parieto-occipital: right: M = -1.45, SEM = .26; left: M = -.83, 
SEM = .28; fronto-temporal: left: M = -.76, SEM = .18; right: M = -.51, SEM = .19). In addition, differences between 





Fig 7. Selected grand mean waveforms over a superior frontal (Fz), central (Cz), and parietal 
(Pz) electrode for the first-test learning feedback following errors, as a function of induced goal, 
and sorted as a function of whether the error was later corrected or not on a later retest. 
Waveforms are averaged over retest delay. The brackets over electrode Fz signify the early (200 
– 300 ms), middle (500 – 1000 ms), and late (1000 – 1500 ms) time periods of interest. 
Electrodes that are filled-in white in were also included in analyses but are not illustrated in this 
figure.  
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In this section, we tested whether a series of positive-going waveforms maximal over the 
superior midline, were sensitive to memory and the manipulation of achievement goals. We were 
particularly interested in whether the MG induction would differentially modulate early and later 
sustained frontal activity that past studies suggest may index more effortful and elaborative 
encoding. To this aim, we conducted separate 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 2 (Memory: 
Corrected or Not Corrected) x 3 (Region: Frontal, Central, or Parietal) x 3 (Electrode: Left, 
Middle or Right) ANOVAs on an early positive deflection (200-300 ms), and both the 
midlatency and later portion of a sustained positive waveform (see Figure 7). We added the 2-
level factor of Retest Delay for a secondary analysis for each of the sustained time periods. 7 
 Early positivity (200-300 ms). This early potential exhibited an overall effect of Memory, 
F(1, 232) = 14.791, p < 0.001, where errors that were corrected (M = 1.22, SEM = .11) elicited 
more positive-going activity compared to errors that were not corrected (M = 1.05, SEM = .10). 
There were no other effects involving Memory, indicating that similar memory effects could be 
observed across both anterior and posterior sites during this period. 
Although there were no interactions involving Memory and Goal, we did find a Goal by 
Region8 interaction, F(1.352, 213. 820) = 4.970, p < 0.02, ε = 0.68. Post hoc comparisons 
indicated that goal differences in goals were only significant at the frontal regions. As shown in 
Figure 8A, this early frontal positivity was greater for participants under the MG induction 
                                               
7 We did not analyze this period as a function of retest delay with the smaller subsample because it was reasoned 
that the strength of the memory trace and stability against memory decay would be influenced more by mid-latency 
and later sustained activity. 
 
8 In addition to the interaction of Region and Goal, a significant Region by Electrode interaction was found, F(4, 
232) = 6.575, p < 0.0013, that subsumed a significant main effect of Electrode, F(2, 232) = 10.478, p < 0.001, and 
marginal effect of Region, F(1.352, 213. 820) =  3.288, p < 0.07, ε = 0.68. Post hoc tests of the interaction found no 
differences across frontal left, right and midline electrodes (left: M = 1.01, SEM = .22; midline: M = 1.12, SEM = 
.28; right: M = 1.11, SEM = .23), (ps > .43). However, at central sites, activity peaked over the midline region (left: 
M = 1.11, SEM = .16; midline: M = 1.94, SEM = .25; right: M = 1.46, SEM = .15), whereas at parietal sites activity 
was greatest over central and right hemisphere sites compared to left (left: M = .30, SEM = .19; midline: M = 1.03, 
SEM = .19; right: M = 1.11, SEM = .20).  
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compared to the PG induction. At parietal sites no effects of goal were observed. Thus, as 
expected, goals modulated the early positivity in the expected direction, although this modulation 
did not interact with subsequent memory effects. 
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Fig 8. Average amplitude of superior positive-going ERP waveforms time-locked to learning 
feedback at frontal, central and parietal sites for the full sample (i.e., collapsed over retest delay) 
during the A) early (200-300 ms), B) middle (500-1000 ms), and C) later (1000-1500 ms) 
periods, as well as for (D) the retest-delay analysis subsample for the later period (1000-1500 
ms). Waveforms are collapsed over later memory outcomes (i.e., later corrected and not 
corrected) given that no interactions were found between Goal and Memory, as well as across the 







































Mid-Latency Positivities (500-1000 ms). In this time period, we found a significant effect 
of Memory, F(1, 232) =  32.812, p < 0.001, in the full sample. Errors that were later corrected 
elicited more positive-going activity in this time frame (M = 1.33, SEM = .11) compared to errors 
that were not corrected (M = 1.07, SEM = .10). We also found a Memory by Region interaction, 
F(1.228, 202. 227) = 4.747, p < 0.03, ε = 0.61, which post-hoc tests indicated arose from Dm 
effects occurring over frontal sites (errors corrected: M = .18, SEM = .19; errors not corrected: M 
= -.27, SEM = .20) and central sites (errors corrected: M = 1.67, SEM = .15; errors not corrected: 
M = 1.41, SEM = .14), but not parietal sites (errors corrected: M = 2.13, SEM = .16; errors not 
corrected: M = 2.06, SEM = .15; see also Figure 7). 
Dm effects did not interact with any other variables, including Goal (ps > .25). Moreover, 
although the overall distribution of positivity also differed as a function of Region and 
Hemisphere in a pattern highly similar to that described for the early waveform9, unlike the early 
positive deflection, Goal did not modulate the distribution of these effects (all ps > .10; see 
Figure 8B). Thus, induction of an MG goal did not lead to increased frontal activity during this 
period, at least when considering the full sample, even as the distribution of Dm effects shifted to 
a more frontal focus overall. 
When adding the factor of retest delay to this analysis, we continued to find enhanced 
positivity for items later corrected (M = 1.27, SEM = .12), compared to those later not corrected 
(M = .99, SEM = .11), F(1, 184) =  30.290, p < 0.001), regardless of region, electrode, goal or 
                                               
9 We found a Region by Electrode interaction, F(3.138, 202. 227) = 5.158, p < 0.003, ε = 0.78, that subsumed 
significant effects of Region, F(1.445, 202. 227) = 48.888, p < 0.001, ε = 0.72, and Electrode, F(2, 232) =  5.003, p 
< 0.009. Post hoc tests on the source of the interaction indicated that there were no electrode differences within the 
frontal region (left: M = -.002, SEM = .17; midline: M = .01, SEM = .23; right: M = -.14, SEM = .22), (ps > .27), or 
central regions (left: M = 1.43, SEM = .16; midline: M = 1.72, SEM = .21; right: M = 1.46, SEM = .16) (ps  > .09), 
but over parietal region, waveforms at the right electrode were more positive-going than at the other sites, which did 
not differ from each other (left: M = 2.40, SEM = .17; midline: M = 2.25, SEM = .18; right: M = 1.62, SEM = .20). 
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delay.10 Additionally, we found a main effect of Delay, F(1, 184) =  4.065, p < 0.05, where 
positivity was greater overall under the delayed (M = 1.18, SEM = .11) compared to immediate 
retest (M = 1.07, SEM = .11), but no interactions between Delay and Memory that might suggest 
that the predictors of successful encoding during this time period differed across midline sites as 
a function of test delay. Although there was a trend for a Region by Delay interaction, F(1.378, 
163. 366) = 2.946, p < 0.08, ε = 0.69, exploration of this interaction indicated that the pattern of 
distribution of this waveform was overall quite similar across retest delays, as well as to the 
general patterns observed when the full sample was included.11 
However, in the subsample used for this analysis, the Goal by Region interaction now 
approached significance, F(1.375, 163. 366) = 2.745, p < 0.10, ε = 0.69. Over frontal regions, 
MG induction elicited numerically greater positivity compared to the PG induction (MG: M = 
.23, SEM = .32; PG: M = -.50, SEM = .29), whereas over parietal sites the PG induction elicited 
numerically greater positivity over the parietal regions compared to MG (PG: M = 2.24, SEM = 
.24; MG: M = 1.74, SEM = .26), however these differences did not survive Bonferroni 
correction. No other effects of Goal met or approached significance (ps > .20). Thus, similar to 
the analyses across test-delay, the positive midline waveforms were sensitive to memory 
outcomes, but not significantly influenced by the manipulation of achievement goals.  
                                               
10 Although there was a 5-way interaction that just met the criteria for significance, F(4, 184) =  2.610, p < 0.05, we 
opted not to explore this further because any goal effects that might emerge, but be specific only to single electrode, 
were considered less reliable than those that occurred across a broader region.  
 
11 We found a Region by Electrode interaction, F(2.971, 163. 366) = 4.409, p < 0.007, ε = 0.74, that subsumed a 
main effect of Region, F(1.375, 163. 366) = 35.906, p < 0.001, and Electrode, F(1.723, 163. 366) = 4.154, p < 0.03, 
ε = 0.86. Post hoc evaluation of the interaction confirmed that there were no differences across the electrodes 
making up the frontal region (left: M = -.10, SEM = .19; midline: M = -.10, SEM = .27; right: M = -.20, SEM = .25) 
or central region (left: M = 1.36, SEM = .17; midline: M = 1.75, SEM = .24; right: M = 1.46, SEM = .19), but at the 
parietal region, the midline site was more positive than the right with no differences compared to the left site (left: M 
= 2.22, SEM = .19; midline: M = 2.24, SEM = .20; right: M = 1.51, SEM = .23). 
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Later sustained positive waveform (1000-1500 ms). An ANOVA with the full sample that 
focused on the later sustained portion of these waveforms confirmed presence of a significant 
Dm effect, F(1, 232) =  21.049, p < 0.001 (errors later corrected: M = .86, SEM = .08; errors later 
not corrected: M = .69, SEM = .08). However, in this time period, the overall Memory effect was 
qualified by a significant Memory by Region12 interaction, F(1.359, 205. 355) = 6.646, p < 
0.007, ε = 0.68, which post hoc comparisons indicated was driven by the presence of significant 
Dm effects at both frontal sites (errors corrected: M = .84, SEM = .16; errors not corrected: M = 
.45, SEM = .15) and central sites (errors corrected: M = 1.33, SEM = .12; errors not corrected: M 
= 1.13, SEM = .12), but not at parietal sites (errors corrected: M = .41, SEM = .12; errors not 
corrected: M = .48, SEM = .11; see also Figure 7).  
Although there were no main effects of Goal or interactions involving Goal and Memory 
(ps > .29), we did find a significant Goal by Region interaction F(1.343, 205. 355) = 4.610, p < 
0.03, ε = 0.57. The mean amplitudes plotted in Figure 8C suggest that MGs led to greater 
positivity over the frontal regions compared to PG, whereas PGs led to greater positivity over the 
parietal regions compared to MG, however these differences were not significant after 
Bonferroni correction. 
  
When including retest delay in the analysis, there was significant evidence of both the 
overall Dm effect, F(1, 184) =  22.872, p < 0.001, and Memory by Region13 interaction, F(1.508, 
                                               
12 Region also interacted with Electrode, F(3.513, 205. 355) = 4.318, p < 0.004, ε = 0.88, with interactions involving 
Region also subsuming a main effect of this factor, F(1.343, 205. 355) = 11.038, p < 0.001, ε = 0.57. Post hoc tests 
confirmed that interactions along the electrode factor resulted from there being no amplitude differences across the 
electrodes making up the frontal region (left: M = .57, SEM = .14; midline: M = .78, SEM = .18; right: M = .59, SEM 
= .18), or parietal region (left: M = .63, SEM = .13; midline: M = .46, SEM = .14; right: M = .25, SEM = .15), but at 
the central region, amplitude of the sustained positivity being lower at the left compared to central site. 
13 As with the analysis of the full sample, there was a significant effect of Region, F(1.339, 177.064) = 9.573, p < 
0.002, ε = 0.67, as well as a Region by Electrode interaction, F(3.408, 177.064) = 2.865, p < 0.04, ε = 0.85. Post hoc 
analysis of this interaction indicated that here were no differences across left, midline, or right frontal electrodes 
(left: M = .62, SEM = .17; midline: M = .71, SEM = .20; right: M = .53, SEM = .21), or parietal electrodes (left: M = 
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177.064) = 9.507, p < 0.002, ε = 0.75, showing that Dm effects were focused over frontal and 
central (rather than parietal sites). No other significant effects involving Memory were found.14 
Interestingly, similar to the analyses with the full sample, in this retest-delay subsample, we 
found a Goal by Region interaction, F(1.339, 177.064) = 6.254, p < 0.01, ε = 0.67, that did not 
interact further with delay. However, unlike in the full sample, here MGs also led to significantly 
greater frontal positivity compared to PG, whereas PG led to significantly greater parietal 
positivity compared to MG (see Fig. 8D), even after Bonferroni correction for multiple post-hoc 
comparisons. No other significant effects involving Goal were found (ps > .19). 
 
Inferior Temporo-Parietal Negativity.  
 
To examine the hypothesis that inferior temporo-parietal sites would be sensitive to 
subsequent memory (e.g., Butterfield & Mangels (2003), but not the manipulation of 
achievement goals, we conducted a 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) x 2 (Memory: Corrected or Not 
Corrected) x 3 (Hemisphere: Left or Right) x 2 (Electrode) ANOVA on mean amplitudes of mid-
latency (500-1000 ms) and later (1000-1500 ms) sustained waveforms observed over in these 
regions (see Figure 9).  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
.52, SEM = .15; midline: M = .46, SEM = .16; right: M = .22, SEM = .17). However, at central regions the sustained 
activity at the left electrode was less positive going than at the midline electrode (left: M = 1.00, SEM = .13; midline: 
M = 1.48, SEM = .19; right: M = 1.12, SEM = .14). In addition, a significant Region by Delay interaction, F(1.367, 
177.064) = 6.052, p < 0.02, ε = 0.68, revealed that activity was more positive going at the delay compared to the 
immediate retest over the frontal region only ([frontal: immediate retest: M = .47, SEM = .18; delayed retest: M = 
.78, SEM = .17]; [central: immediate retest: M = 1.20, SEM = .13; delayed retest: M = 1.22, SEM = .13]; [parietal: 
immediate retest: M = .46, SEM = .13; delayed retest: M = .34, SEM = .14]). 
 
14 Although a Memory by Region by Electrode by Delay interaction approached significance, F(4, 184) = 2.148, p < 
0.08, unpacking this 4-way interaction involved 18 comparisons, and after Bonferroni correction, the only remaining 




     
 
Fig 9. Selected grand mean waveforms over inferior temporo-parietal regions for the first-test 
learning feedback following errors, as a function of induced goal, and sorted as a function of 
whether the error was later corrected or not on a later retest. Waveforms are averaged over retest 
delay. The brackets over electrode TP7 signify the middle (500 – 1000 ms), and late (1000 – 
1500 ms) time periods of interest.  
 
500-1000 ms. As expected, a significant Dm effect emerged in this time window, F(1, 58) 
=  27.676, p < 0.001, such that waveforms were more negative for errors that were corrected 
compared to errors that were not corrected (later corrected: M = -1.73, SEM = .16; later not 
corrected: M = -1.34, SEM = .16; see also Figure 9). Although Memory also interacted with 
Electrode site, F(1, 58) =  25.639, p < 0.001, post hoc analyses indicated that Dm effects were 







PG:  Errors Corrected
MG: Errors Not Corrected




Figure 9).15 Most importantly, however, no effects involving the manipulation of achievement 
goal were observed (ps > .12), indicating that the contribution of this region to successful 
encoding was similar regardless of induced goal.  
Including delay as a factor in this analysis did not influence either of the above effects 
involving memory (ps < .002),16 but with this subsample, the Goal by Memory interaction 
showed a weak trend toward significance, F(1, 46) =  2.971, p < 0.10. However, no differential 
effects of goal were found after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (see Figure 
10A). Additionally, although Memory and Retest Delay did not interact, indicating that this 
activity was predictive of subsequent memory regardless of whether memory was tested 
immediately or at a 1-week delay (see also Butterfield & Mangels, 2003), there was an overall 
effect of the Delay, F(1, 46) =  6.095, p < 0.02. Items tested on the delayed retest elicited more 
negative waveforms at these sites overall, regardless of subsequent memory performance 





                                               
15 There was also a significant main effect of Hemisphere, F(1, 58) =  10.646, p < 0.003, where mean amplitudes 
were more negative over to right hemisphere (M = -2.00, SEM = .20) compared to left (M = -1.12, SEM = .20) 
hemisphere, and a significant main effect of Electrode, F(1, 58) =  127.267, p < 0.001, where mean amplitudes 
across both regions were more negative over inferior temporo-parietal sites  (M = -2.41, SEM = .20) compared to 
more superior temporo-parietal (M = -.66, SEM = .14) sites. 
 
16 A Memory by Hemisphere by Electrode interaction approached significance in this subsample, F(1, 46) =  3.040, 
p < 0.09, which post hoc comparisons indicated was the result of the Dm effects for the superior electrodes (TP7/8) 
being significant over the right hemisphere (TP8), but not the left (TP7). Additionally, there were significant main 
effects of Hemisphere, F(1, 46) =  4.845, p < 0.04, waveforms were more negative-going over the right (M = -1.80, 
SEM = .23) compared to left (M = -1.16, SEM = .23) hemisphere, and a significant main effect of Electrode, F(1, 46) 
=  118.100, p < 0.001. Mean amplitudes across both regions were more negative over inferior (M = -2.34, SEM = 































































Fig 10. Average amplitude of inferior temporo-parietal ERP waveforms (collapsed over 
electrode and hemisphere) time-locked to learning feedback during (A) 500-1000 ms for the full 
sample (i.e., collapsed over retest delay), (B) 500-1000 ms for the delay analysis subsample, (C) 
1000-1500 ms for the full sample (i.e., collapsed over retest delay), and (D) 1000-1500 ms for 
the delay analysis subsample. Error bars show the standard error of the mean (SEM). 
 
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 10B, a post hoc analysis of a significant Goal by Delay 
interaction, F(1, 46) =  5.257, p < 0.03, indicated that this pattern of greater negativity for items 
tested at the delayed test was only significant in the MG condition ([MG: immediate retest: M = -
1.55, SEM = .27; delayed retest: M = -1.90, SEM = .27]; [PG: immediate: M = -1.23, SEM = .25; 
delayed: M = -1.24, SEM = .24]), suggesting the greater overall engagement of these regions in 
the items that MG subjects retrieved during the delay. Since it was not clear why this interaction 
appeared, we explored whether significant Dm amplitudes might be observed for each Goal as a 
function of Delay using one-sample t-tests with zero as the comparison value (i.e., zero would 




















Bonferroni correction, we found Dm difference values were significantly different from 0 for 
both retest delays under MG, but only at the immediate retest under PG. Thus, inferior-temporal 
negativity may have generally supported learning under MG, but only supported learning given a 
shorter retest delay under PG. No other effects involving Goal were found (ps > .18). 
1000 – 1500 ms. At this later time window, a significant Dm effect also emerged, F(1, 
58) =  18.453, p < 0.001, in which errors that were later corrected elicited more negative-going 
waveforms in this region compared to errors that were not corrected (errors later corrected: M = -
1.35, SEM = .13; errors later not corrected: M = -1.04, SEM = .12). Memory also interacted with 
Electrode site, F(1, 58) =  21.127, p < 0.001, however in this later time frame, only the inferior 
sites exhibited robust Dm effects (errors later corrected: M = -2.03, SEM = .17; errors later not 
corrected: M = -1.56, SEM = .16). The Dm effects at the superior sites were not significant 
(errors later corrected: M = -.66, SEM = .12; errors not corrected: M = -.52, SEM = .11).17 
Interestingly, a marginally significant interaction of Goal by Memory by Electrode F(1, 
58) =  3.429, p < 0.07, suggested that Goal might moderate these differential site effects. 
However, post hoc comparisons confirmed that the MG and PG conditions exhibited similar 
patterns of memory effects; both goal conditions demonstrated significant Dm effects over the 
more inferior sites, but not at the more superior sites. No other effects involving Goal were found 
(ps > .20). 
The majority of these effects remained significant when including Retest Delay as a 
factor, including the significant overall effect of Memory, F(1, 46) =  15.966, p < 0.001 (errors 
later corrected: M = -1.35, SEM = .15; errors later not corrected: M = -1.03, SEM = .15), and the 
finding that these effects were only significant at the more inferior pair of temporo-parietal sites 
                                               
17 There was also a main effect of Electrode, F(1, 58) =  111.231, p < 0.001. Mean amplitudes across both temporo-
parietal regions were more negative over the more inferior pair of electrodes (M = -1.79, SEM = .16) compared to 
the more superior pair (M = -.60, SEM = .11). 
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(ps  < .001).18 Additionally, in the delay analysis subsample, a significant Memory by 
Hemisphere interaction emerged, F(1, 46) =  8.481, p < 0.007, whereby only Dm effects over the 
right temporo-parietal region survived post hoc analysis ([Right: errors later corrected: M = -
1.46, SE = .18; errors later not corrected M = -1.14, SE = .18]; [Left: errors corrected: M = -1.21, 
SE = .20; errors not corrected M = -.90, SE = .19]). In this later window, we also found a main 
effect of Retest-Delay, F(1, 46) =  3.511, p < 0.07, and a marginal Goal by Retest-Delay 
interaction, F(1, 46) =  3.663, p < 0.07. As with that earlier analysis, waveforms associated with 
items tested on the delayed retest demonstrated overall more negative-going activity over this 
region compared to items tested immediately (immediate: M = -1.11, SEM = .16; delayed: M = -
1.27, SEM = .14). When examining the marginal interaction with goals, however, post hoc 
comparisons did not support any significant differences of Goal conditions as a function of Delay 
or Delay as a function of Goal. No other effects involving the factor of Goal approached 




 The present study examined the neural mechanisms that underlie learning following 
errors as a function of goals, and in particular, the influence of goals on error correction as a 
function of retest delay. In support of the benefits of MG induction on engagement with learning, 
memory for the learning feedback (i.e. error correction) was better in the MG condition 
compared to the PG condition. However, in contrast to our predictions, we found no differential 
                                               
18 A significant effect of Electrode in the Retest Delay subsample, F(1, 46) =  36.673, p < 0.001, revealed that 
waveforms were more negative-going over the inferior sites (M = -1.81, SEM = .18) compared to superior sites (M = 
-.57, SEM = .12) within the temporo-parietal regions. Additionally, a significant effect of Hemisphere in this 
subsample, F(1, 46) =  33.733, p < 0.001, revealed that waveforms were generally more negative-going over the 
right (M = -1.31, SEM = .18) compared to left (M = -1.07, SEM = .18) hemisphere in this region. 
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benefits for the MG induction in terms of error correction at the delayed as compared to 
immediate retest. In other words, a MG environment did not appear to provide any particular 
buffer against general declines of memory that occurred for both groups as a function of a 1-
week delay.  
 Based on goal-setting theory (see Locke & Latham, 2002, 2006), we had proposed that 
PGs may enhance attention to negative feedback compared to MGs given that they are thought to 
provoke concerns about one’s own ability (Ames & Archer, 1988). As for MGs, we expected 
greater attention and effort compared to PGs to the learning feedback given their focus on 
learning. However, we did not find that the PG induction differentially enhanced attention to the 
accuracy feedback. ERP correlates of bottom-up (FRN, P3a) and top-down (P3b, LPP) attention 
exhibited expected effects of feedback valence, but none of these potentials were enhanced under 
inducement of a PG state. These null effects replicating the findings of a previous study of 
induced achievement goals (Mangels et al., 2017), but are in contrast to findings of motivation-
based modulation of feedback-elicited waveforms by trait (personal) achievement goals 
(Mangels et al. 2006; see also Lee & Kim, 2014).  
 We did find evidence that MG differentially modulated the neural response to learning 
feedback, however. Specifically, inducing MGs led to enhanced early and late positive 
waveforms over superior frontal electrode sites compared to PGs. Activity at these sites was also 
associated with successful encoding of that feedback (i.e., enhanced when that learning feedback 
was later successfully retrieved on a retest compared to when it was not retrieved). In contrast, 
inducing PGs differentially enhanced a late superior parietal positivity, however unlike the 
frontal positivity, the amplitude of this parietal positivity was unrelated to memory outcomes on 
the retest.  
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 Successful encoding of the corrective feedback also enhanced negative-going waveforms 
over multiple electrode sites proximal to the visual ventral stream, from parieto-occipital sites, 
putatively involved in more perceptual processes, to inferior temporal-parietal and more fronto-
temporal sites that have previously exhibited sensitivity to semantic, conceptual processing. As 
expected, goal state did not influence the inferior temporal parietal activity, but somewhat 
surprisingly, the double dissociation between MG-modulation of fronto-temporal Dm activity 
and PG-modulation of parieto-occipital Dm effects, as observed in Mangels et al. (2017), was 
not clearly replicated here. Only limited evidence for a single dissociation was found, with MGs 
leading to significant Dm effects over the fronto-temporal region, but no difference as a function 
of goal at the parieto-occipital region.  
 In the following sections, we first discuss the benefits of MG on error correction in 
comparison to PG in relation to past research, including past successes and failures to find 
significant effects of achievement goal inductions on behavioral measures. Then, we will address 
cognitive processes that may be indexed by the superior frontal positivity and superior parietal 
positivity that exhibited a dissociation between MG and PG conditions. This will then be 
considered in light of the similar effects of both goal conditions on inferior temporo-parietal 
waveforms. Finally, we will discuss possible reasons for the failure to fully replicate Mangels 






 In the present study, inducing MGs led to benefits in error correction across both the 
immediate and week-delayed retest compared to inducing PGs. Thus, focusing participants on 
developing their knowledge and not on trying to outperform others boosted learning even when 
participants were retested a week later compared to only focusing participants on doing better 
than others. A recent meta-analysis also showed benefits of MGs on general task performance 
compared to PGs (Van Yperen et al., 2015) and other studies showed similar benefits of MG 
compared to PG on working-memory tasks (Avery & Smillie, 2013) suggest that PGs may 
impair task performance because concerns regarding performance may deplete working memory 
resources unlike MGs (Crouzevialle et al., 2015). These findings are also broadly consistent with 
studies showing that perceptions of an MG classroom environment are positively associated with 
greater persistence when faced with difficulty, whereas the opposite relationship was shown 
when considering perceptions of a PG environment (Wolters, 2004).  
 It is important to note that participants under both goal inductions reported to focus on 
mastery goals, but those under PGs were also focused to a greater extent on performance goals. 
The main difference in goal adoption between the MG and PG conditions was that, in the MG 
condition, adoption of performance goals was suppressed. Thus, even in a task context where 
one is making repeated errors, it may be possible to maintain a focus on learning goals regardless 
of whether the environment is oriented toward PG or MG, however to the extent that 
performance goals are suppressed, one may be more able to direct that orientation toward 
learning-relevant task information in the context of repeated negative performance outcomes. In 
other words, we cannot rule out the possibility that it was the suppression of performance goals 
under MGs compared to PGs that was the most critical in boosting learning for the MG group. 
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 Nonetheless, our findings of significant learning benefits in the context of a MG 
environment (compared to a PG environment) support the general consensus that giving students 
a mastery orientation is more effective for learning success in challenging situations where 
failure is experienced. However, not every study that manipulated achievement goals has found 
behavioral benefits of MG compared to PG (Avery et al., 2013; Mangels et al., 2017; Murayama 
& Elliot, 2011b). The extent to which MG inductions benefit memory processes may depend on 
subtle differences in task and instruction parameters. For example, Avery and colleagues (2013) 
showed benefits in math problem solving when participants also had to concurrently complete a 
working-memory task under PG compared to MG. However, participants under both PG and MG 
were informed throughout the task that they accomplished the PG or MG goal assigned to them, 
and this feeling of competence may have preferentially boosted performance under PG (Cianci, 
Klein, & Seijts, 2010; see also Crouzevialle et al., 2015).  
 Importantly, using the same task as the present study, Mangels and colleagues (2017) did 
not show differences between goals in error correction. Although both studies broadly defined 
PGs in terms of normative comparison (i.e. doing better than others), goals were not induced in 
the same manner and MGs were also not based on the same operational definitions. The present 
study not only included goal language in the MG and PG inductions but also included 
differences in evaluation that spoke to the type of information (i.e. how well knowledge was 
developed under MG or scores in comparison to others under PG) that participants in each goal 
condition would receive at the end of the task. In addition, the MG induction also included 
language to suppress adoption of PGs. As for operational definitions of MGs, the present study 
defined MGs in terms of developing knowledge, whereas Mangels and colleagues (2017) defined 
MGs in terms of learning information that was interesting and useful. Indeed, a meta-analyses on 
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differences in personal achievement goal definitions shows outcomes depend on how goals are 
defined (see Hulleman, Schrager, Bodmann, & Harackiewicz, 2010). However, differences in 
goal induction definitions have not been explored given that there are only few studies available 
within each type of definition (see Van Yperen, Blaga, & Postmes, 2015). The present study also 
manipulated goals at the retest, where the effects of goals due to differences in encoding versus 
retrieval cannot be easily disentangled and goals may have influenced both encoding and 
retrieval processes. Finally, the present study used a between-subject design where participants 
answered all questions either under a consistent goal (MG or PG), whereas Mangels and 
colleagues (2017) used a within-subject design where participants answered half the questions 
under MG and the other half under PG. The longer and more consistent induction period in the 
present study may also be responsible for its stronger effects. Further research is needed to 
examine the task and instructional variables that optimize learning outcomes for individuals in 
mastery (or performance) goal environments.   
 Although MGs led to benefits in error correction when we collapsed across retest-delay, 
there were no benefits in errors correction in the smaller sample when we included retest-delay 
as a factor. Examination of the source of this difference indicates that in the subsample, the 
exclusion of MG participants who had corrected most of their errors at the immediate retest (i.e., 
because of low trial counts in the uncorrected bin), reduced the overall advantage of this group. 
Further research is needed to examine the influence of goals on within-subject variance as 
opposed to only examining goals as a between-subject factor since MGs may not always lead to 
similar behavioral benefits for all individuals. Indeed, Urdan and Schoenfelder (2006) warn that 
MGs may not be sufficient to promote learning when it comes to students who rely on 
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maladaptive learning strategies. Thus, MGs may lead to the use of successful learning strategies 
if students are also aware which learning strategies are best. 
 
Learning Feedback: Superior Frontal & Parietal Positivity 
 
 When it comes to processing of the learning feedback following errors, MGs led to 
greater superior frontal positivity during the early time window (200-300 ms) in comparison to 
PGs in the full sample. The view that this indexes enhanced orienting of attention in order to 
more deeply encode the correct answer is consistent with past research showing that early frontal 
positivity is enhanced when participants were instructed to make deeper, semantic judgments of 
an upcoming stimuli, compared to when they were asked to make shallower, perceptual 
judgments (e.g. word length) (Guo et al., 2004; Wieser & Wieser, 2003). Similarly, Blanchet and 
colleagues (2007) showed early enhancement over frontal regions when participants were 
presented with word lists that could be memorized using organizational strategies (i.e. grouping 
semantically similar words) reflecting use of self-initiated strategies or when participants were 
instructed to memorize words using a semantic organization strategy compared to when they 
were asked to memorize semantically unrelated words. The authors concluded that this early 
positivity may reflect the influence of top-down processing where attention is directed to 
semantic processing of upcoming stimuli. Thus, in the present study, focusing participants on 
developing their knowledge under the MG induction may have led to greater attentional 
orienting to the correct answer following an error compared to focusing participants on doing 
better than others in the PG induction.  
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MGs also led to greater superior frontal positivity during the later time window (1000-
1500 ms) in comparison to PGs, although this effect was more evident for analysis of the smaller 
sample that involved retest delay as a factor. Nonetheless, differential enhancement of this 
potential under MGs approached significance in the larger sample when we collapsed across 
retest delay. Unlike early frontal positivity, later frontal positivities have been examined in 
relation to memory outcomes and are generally more positive for words that were successfully 
encoded using elaborative, associative strategies, as rather than more item-specific or rote-
rehearsal strategies (e.g., Fabiani, Karis, & Donchin, 1990; Kamp, Bader, & Mecklinger, 2017; 
Kamp & Zimmer, 2015; Liu, Rosburg, Gao, Weber, & Guo, 2017; Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 
2001). In the present study, later frontal positivity was similarly enhanced for errors that were 
later corrected across both the immediate and delayed-retest compared to errors that were not 
corrected, supporting the view that the integration of the corrective learning feedback with the 
question benefits from elaborative, associative processing as well. Taken together with the 
finding of overall greater positivity in this region in the MG condition, this suggests that MGs 
may have also led to the greater use of elaborative associative strategies compared to PGs. 
Interestingly, the lack of an interaction between goal condition and subsequent memory 
at either the early or late positivity suggests that both MG and PG participants engaged in similar 
strategies and that the difference between goal conditions was more quantitative than qualitative 
in nature. Interestingly, Fabiani and colleagues (1990), in their seminal ERP study on the 
relationship between subsequent memory and encoding strategies (i.e. elaboration versus rote-
rehearsal), also found overall greater frontal positivity under elaboration compared to rote-
rehearsal for both later remembered and forgotten items. It may be that actively generating 
responses to a question engaged some elaborative processing of the correct answer all 
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participants, regardless of goal (see Metcalfe, 2017), however inducing MGs may have fostered 
overall deeper and more sustained elaborative processing, both within a trial, as suggested by the 
lack of robust goal differences in the mid-latency period (500-1000 ms), and perhaps throughout 
the task as a whole, compared to PGs. 
Unlike later frontal positivity, later parietal positivity that was enhanced under PG was 
not predictive of memory outcomes. Although some studies have found a mid-latency (i.e., 
~400-800 ms) parietal positivity to be predictive of subsequent memory (for a review see Paller 
& Wagner, 2002), particularly for items that are encoded with rote-rehearsal (Fabiani et al., 
1990), or retrieved on the basis of more item-specific processes (i.e., Mangels, Craik, & Picton, 
2001), few studies have addressed encoding-specific effects at the later latency (1000-1500 ms) 
where current effects were found. In one recent study, however, Liu and colleagues (2017) 
showed greater late parietal positivity under an elaborative encoding condition that was more 
enhanced for later unsuccessfully retrieved items compared to successfully retrieved items. Thus, 
although other studies (e.g., Fabiani et al., 1990; Schott, Richardson-Klavehn, Heinze, & Düzel, 
2002) have not explored or shown differences in later parietal positivity as a function of 
encoding strategies, greater parietal enhancement under PGs compared to MGs may reflect lower 
engagement of elaborative processing. Indeed, to the extent that this later positivity captures 
some of the processes associated with the mid-latency parietal activity described above, it may 
be that participants under PGs participants relied more on rote-rehearsal or other item-specific 
processing of the correct answer, as opposed to elaborative processing, which would be less 
diagnostic of error correction on this general knowledge task. 
 
Learning Feedback: Inferior Temporo-Parietal Negativity 
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In line with Butterfield and Mangels (2003), the amplitude of a negative-going waveform 
over inferior temporo-parietal regions thought to reflect early semantic processing (Gold et al., 
2005; Gold & Buckner, 2002) predicted learning for both the immediate and week-later retest 
delay. However, although goals did not influence either the magnitude of the memory effect, or 
negativity over temporo-parietal regions when including the retest delay as a factor, items tested 
at the delay compared to the immediate were associated with greater negativity during the mid-
latency period (500-l000 ms) for the MG condition only. Because individuals did not know at the 
time of encoding what items would be tested immediately or at the delay, it is not immediately 
clear what might have driven this difference. However, when further investigating this effect 
through analyses of Dm effect magnitude, we found significant Dm effects for both retest delays 
under MG, but only at the immediate retest under PG. These results suggest that processes 
indexed by the inferior temporo-parietal negativity appear to have supported learning under MGs 
regardless of retest delay, but only supported learning under PGs at the immediate retest. 
With regard to the processes that might underlie these differential effects, it is important 
to note that they were only evident during the middle latency period. This positions the timing of 
these effects as between the early frontal positivity putatively associated with attentional 
orienting and the later sustained frontal positivity putatively associated with elaborative, 
associative encoding. As such, it continues to be a good candidate for initial bottom-up semantic 
processing of the correct answer (Gold et al., 2005; Gold & Buckner, 2002), that then makes the 
answer available for further elaborative processes indexed by the late frontal positivity. 
Nonetheless, these results would also imply that these basic bottom-up processes are less 
predictive of participants’ ability to retain the correct answer over a 1-week period when 
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encoding had taken place in a PG goal environment. It may be that under PGs, encoding of a 
delay-resistant memory relies on other processes and corresponding potentials that were not 
measured in the current study. 
 
Learning Feedback: Inferior Fronto-Temporal & Parieto-Occipital Negativity 
 
Although Mangels and colleagues (2017) found goals to differentially modulate memory 
over fronto-temporal and parieto-occipital regions, the present study did not fully replicate these 
results. Mangels and colleagues (2017) had found that from 400-800 ms MGs, but not PGs, led 
to differences in memory over fronto-temporal regions thought to index greater semantic 
processing of the learning feedback under MGs. In the present study, a similar single dissociation 
was found when examining the magnitude of Dm effects in the full sample, from 500-1000 ms, 
although this difference was no longer apparent when retest delay was included as a factor. As 
for PGs, Mangels and colleagues (2017) showed differences in memory to appear over parieto-
occipital regions, but not for MGs thought to reflect visual processing of the learning feedback. 
However, in the present study, analysis of Dm effect magnitude indicated that activity over the 
parieto-occipital region was not diagnostic of subsequent memory performance for either goal 
condition. Thus, not only did both goals lead to similar engagement of the processes indexed by 
these parieto-occipital potentials, but unlike Mangels and colleagues (2017), they did not appear 
to preferentially support successful learning in this study.  
In summary, evidence of a partial replication of Mangels and colleagues (2017) was 
apparent in the present study suggesting that deeper semantic processing of the learning feedback 
may have generally supported learning across both retest delays under MGs, but not PGs. 
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Although differences between goals were not observed at the parieto-occipital sites, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that differences between goals might have emerged if stronger subsequent 
memory effects had been observed at these sites. Indeed, taken together, Mangels and colleagues 
(2017) and the present study converge in demonstrating that MG may lead to greater engagement 
over more anterior regions, whereas PGs may lead to greater engagement over posterior regions. 
The specificity of engagement within each region may depend on how goals are defined along 
with task demands. Thus, differences between the two studies may have contributed to 
differences in both behavioral and ERP effects. 
 
Accuracy Feedback: FRN, P3a, P3b, LPP 
 
 When it comes to the accuracy feedback, it was reasoned that being informed an error 
was made would be more threatening under PGs compared to MGs (see Ames & Archer, 1988) 
and that this may be evident by attentional enhancements under negative feedback under PGs 
compared to MGs. However, there were no goal-related differences in the feedback-related ERPs 
measured in the present study, regardless of whether we assessed feedback processing in relation 
to earlier, more bottom-up aspects of attention to feedback (i.e. FRN and P3a) or later, more top-
down aspects of attentional processing (i.e. P3b and LPP). Although some studies have found 
that personal achievement goals can influence the amplitude of the feedback-relevant ERPs 
(REFs), fewer studies have found positive support for the influence of induced goals. One of 
those studies used a probabilistic learning task, and found differences in the FRN between 
positive and negative feedback when participants were instructed to outperform others, but not 
when the task was framed as practice Van Meel and Van Heijningen (2010). However, in 
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contrast to the present study, negative feedback was rare in their task and the increase in salience 
may have modulated both its behavioral relevance and the sensitivity of the FRN to motivational 
effects (see Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). 
 One additional consideration for why our ERPs to accuracy feedback were not influenced 
by achievement goal condition may be that negative feedback is more threatening when ability 
goals, as opposed to purely normative goals, are activated. Indeed, Ames and Archer (1988) 
generally defined PGs structure as a classroom environment where students are focused on 
demonstrating their abilities and research on personal goals shows that when PGs are defined in 
terms of demonstrating ability they are linked to negative outcomes but when defined in 
normative terms they are linked to positive outcomes (Hulleman et al., 2010). Similarly, Mangels 
and colleagues (2006) showed greater P3a enhancement to negative feedback in relation to 
greater endorsement of PGs that were defined in both ability and normative terms. Interestingly, 
in that study, the relationship between P3a amplitude and PGs was strongest for high confidence 
errors, which are not only fairly rare, but represent both an error in accuracy and in the ability to 
gauge one’s own knowledge (i.e. ability) accurately. We necessarily sacrificed the power to 
subdivide trials along levels of confidence in favor of having the power to examine the 
manipulation of goals across both immediate and delayed tests. However, future studies could 
test the relationship of induced PGs on attention to accuracy feedback as a function of its relative 





 The present study examined differences between MG and PG inductions on error 
correction as a function of retest delay and the neural mechanisms that underlie processes during 
learning following errors. The findings that an MG compared to a PG induction led to greater 
superior frontal positivity during the learning feedback following errors along with benefits in 
errors correction across retest delay supports the assertion that MGs unlike PGs facilitate 
adaptive approaches to learning in response to failure. Evidence of greater orienting to the 
learning feedback followed by sustained elaborative processing of that feedback confirms that 
MGs compared to PGs may potentially enhance learning through various cognitive processes. 
Thus, although instructors are already encouraged to provide students with opportunities to make 
mistakes and learn from them, they may also want to consider instilling an MG compared to a 





Chapter 3: HD-tDCS over DLPFC and LTC Benefits Learning Following Errors Under Both 




 When trying to learn new semantic information, which is a fundamental aspect of school-
based education, both instructors and students may undervalue instances when students provide 
the wrong answers to instructor-posed questions and place greater value on responses that are 
correct. Consequently, instructors may try to avoid situations where students are likely to make 
mistakes. However, research has consistently shown that learning is best when students first 
actively generate answers to questions, even if they are incorrect, and only after this generation 
exercise, are presented with the correct answer (for a review see Metcalfe, 2017). Compared to 
only having students review or study that information, allowing students to make errors 
ultimately seems to strengthen the association between the correct answer and question. 
Although various theories have begun to emerge regarding this associative process (Metcalfe, 
2017), less is known about the underlying neural substrates. To this aim, the present study used 
High-Definition transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (HD-tDCS) to investigate the causal role 
of two candidate neural regions for successfully encoding new general knowledge associations 
following initial retrieval errors: the lateral temporal cortex (LTC) and dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC). Given our particular interest in the DLPFC, we also manipulated the 
achievement goals for the participants and whether instructions emphasized developing 
knowledge (mastery goals) or simply focused participants on answering questions correctly and 
doing better than others (performance goals).  
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Past research has implicated both the LTC and DLPFC in the process of updating of 
question-answer associations, at least when the correct answers already have a pre-existing 
representation in semantic memory. However, these regions may serve different roles. Regarding 
the LTC, in some of the earliest research into the neural correlates of general knowledge 
updating, which used event-related potentials (ERPs), Butterfield and Mangels (2003) showed 
that greater early negativity at electrodes over the left temporal cortex predicted learning of 
correct familiar, but not unfamiliar answers to general knowledge questions (familiarity was self-
reported by the participant for each answer), regardless of whether memory was tested 
immediately or a week later. The authors reasoned this left temporal negativity may index 
activation of pre-existing semantic representations elicited upon presentation of the correct 
answer. Although ERPs have low spatial resolution so the exact source of the activity was 
unclear, a lateral temporal source would be consistent with fMRI findings localizing semantic 
processing of verbal information within the LTC (Gold et al., 2005; Gold & Buckner, 2002).  
The view that areas of the LTC may be primarily involved in bottom-up processes 
involved in the activation of representations of the correct answer is further supported by the role 
of posterior portions of the LTC in basic word form processing (McCandliss et al., 2003). 
However, top-down attention to words can further enhance activity in these regions, and 
increases in LTC activity have been linked to benefits in memory when participants were 
explicitly instructed to memorize words (Ezzyat et al., 2018; Wittig et al., 2018). Thus, LTC may 
support early semantic processing of the corrective feedback following errors that is necessary, 
but not sufficiently for learning of the question-answer association. Updating semantic 
knowledge following errors additionally requires the association of the correct answer with a 
question to which it may not have a strong pre-existing semantic association, and that may not 
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even be concurrently presented. In other words, successful encoding is likely to also benefit from 
associative processing and the engagement of top-down strategic processes that serve to 
strengthen the integration of the correct answer and question (Cyr & Anderson, 2015; Huelser & 
Metcalfe, 2012; Knight et al., 2012). 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is a candidate region for this top-down 
strategic association process, given its general implication in associative memory (for a review 
see Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007). Studies examining both activation of and brain stimulation 
over the DLPFC have shown that this region supports associative memory, particularly when 
associative demands are increased by the lack of pre-existing semantic relationships (i.e., 
unrelated word pairs: Blumenfeld, Parks, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2011; Sandrini, Cappa, Rossi, 
Rossini, & Miniussi, 2003; but see Hawco, Berlim, & Lepage, 2013); face and name 
associations: Leach, McCurdy, Trumbo, Matzen, & Leshikar, 2018). Similarly, brain stimulation 
(i.e. TMS, tDCS) studies have not found DLPFC activity to be linked to memory for items that 
already have strong semantic relationships (Lara, Knechtges, Paulus, & Antal, 2017; Sandrini et 
al., 2003), further supporting the view that DLPFC may be particularly engaged by the effortful 
strengthening of associations.  
The DLPFC appears to support associative encoding even when participants are not 
explicitly instructed to memorize items, as long as task instructions emphasize associations, such 
as imagining items interacting together (Blumenfeld et al., 2011) or making judgments about 
whether items relate to each other (Leach et al., 2018; Sandrini et al., 2003). However, regions of 
the frontal cortex also have been implicated in the use of more strategic memory processes 
engaged in intentional learning tasks (Gershberg & Shimamura, 1995; Kirchhoff, 2009; Mangels, 
1997). In general, through top-down processes, the DLPFC may facilitate the co-activation of 
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multiple representations in posterior cortex and as such, enhance the likelihood that inputs to the 
hippocampus will integrate into associative memories (Summerfield et al., 2006). Thus far, 
however, only a few studies have discussed the role of the DLPFC in associative memory 
pertaining to the correction of errors (X. L. Liu, Liang, Li, & Reder, 2014). Nonetheless, taken 
together, evidence is emerging that suggests the LTC as a candidate region for bottom-up 
processing of the correct answer when it is presented, whereas the DLPFC is a candidate region 
for the successful top-down integration of this answer with the previously presented question.  
Although both the LTC and DLPFC may contribute to the successful encoding of 
corrective feedback, given the proposed sensitivity of the DLPFC to top-down goals, it may be 
possible to increase dependence on the DLPFC by manipulating the achievement goals 
emphasized by the task instruction. Specifically, we either directed students toward learning and 
mastery of new material for the sake of their own knowledge (mastery achievement goal) or on 
providing correct answers and how that compares to others knowledge (performance 
achievement goal) (see also Chapter 2). Manipulation of task goals in this manner draws upon 
both educational and social cognitive research (see Ames & Archer, 1988; Anderman & Patrick, 
2012; Meece, Anderman, & Anderman, 2006), where the effects of promoting a mastery goal 
(MG) is typically found to enhance more semantic and elaborative processes compared to 
promoting a performance goal (PG) (Ikeda et al., 2015; Mangels et al., 2017; Murayama & 
Elliot, 2011a). Thus, compared to a PG emphasis, an MG emphasis may lead to greater use of 
elaborative associative memory processes and consequently, stimulation of DLPFC may lead to 
greater benefits in learning following errors under an MG induction.  
In support of this hypothesis, previous ERP studies using the same task as the present 
study showed that, compared to a PG induction, an MG induction led to both greater error 
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correction and/or enhanced ERPs over frontal electrodes during presentation of the correct 
answer (Mangels et al., 2017; see also Chapter 2). In the first study of this dissertation, benefits 
under an MG induction persisted at a retest given one week later and were coupled with greater 
sustained frontal positivity at superior sites proximal to DLPFC but demonstrated no differences 
from PGs over temporal sites proximal to LTC. The superior frontal activity that was enhanced 
for MGs has been interpreted in past studies of memory encoding to index elaborative 
associative processing (Fabiani et al., 1990; Y. Liu et al., 2017; Mangels et al., 2001). Indirect 
support for the greater engagement of DLPFC by mastery-focused task goals also comes from a 
recent fMRI study finding that participants whose personal goals were more MG- than PG-
focused exhibited greater DLPFC activity during feedback in a challenging rule-finding task 
(Lee & Kim, 2014). Thus, to the extent that an MG instruction similarly benefits error correction 
here, we expected that HD-tDCS stimulation over DLPFC would also disproportionately benefit 
students in the MG condition in contrast to LTC stimulation, which would equally benefit 
participants regardless of condition, compared to sham. Thus, the findings of this study will 
inform our understanding of the DLPFC and LTC to feedback-based learning of semantic 





In the present experiment, we used HD-tDCS to examine the causal effects of the left 
LTC and DLPFC on feedback-based learning after errors as a function of MG and PG 
inductions. We stimulated over left hemisphere sites only, given that memory benefits for verbal 
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material are most consistently found over the this hemisphere (Blumenfeld et al., 2011; 
Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Ezzyat et al., 2018; Javadi & Walsh, 2012; Sandrini et al., 2003; 
Wittig et al., 2018). Stimulation of cortical sites was compared to a sham condition at the same 
sites as the active DLPFC stimulation.  
We employed a general knowledge task where students first generated responses to 
challenging questions (e.g., What is the capital of Canada?), then were provided first with 
feedback about the accuracy of their response (correct, incorrect), then finally, with the correct 
answer (e.g., Ottawa) (e.g. Butterfield & Mangels, 2003). However, to increase the likelihood 
that presentation of the correct answer would activate pre-existing semantic representations in 
LTC regions, we also only used questions for which correct answers had been previously rated as 
familiar by at least 95% of a comparable student population (see Whiteman & Mangels, 2016). 
Finally, to increase the likelihood that DLPFC regions will also be engaged, we presented the 
correct answer after the question (4s) rather than concurrently, such that successful question-
answer association may place greater demands on working memory processes. We note that it is 
not uncommon in classroom discussions for questions and answers to be presented sequentially 
rather than concurrently. Learning was examined by calculating the proportion of initial errors 
that were corrected on a surprise retest given after a one-week delay. We chose a week later 
retest and not an earlier time because we were interested in processes that supported learning that 
was retained over a longer period, which is also similar to the general goals of educators.  
HD-tDCS is a type of brain stimulation during which a low-level current is applied to a 
targeted neural region (Miniussi, Harris, & Ruzzoli, 2013; Nitsche et al., 2008; Yavari et al., 
2018). HD-tDCS is not thought to cause neurons to fire, but the addition of low-level current is 
thought to facilitate firing only for neurons that are near threshold. Stimulation is expected to 
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result in both “on-line” benefits as a result of actual stimulation and “off-line” benefits that 
persist even after stimulation is over (see Nitsche & Paulus, 2001). On-line effects may reflect 
changes in the membrane potential as evident by a lack of stimulation effects when sodium and 
calcium channels are blocked, whereas offline effects may reflect changes in plasticity as evident 
by lack of stimulation effects when NMDA receptors are blocked (for a review see Yavari et al., 
2018). To examine both online and offline effects, the task was divided into 4 blocks. In the first 
two blocks, there was no stimulation, and thus, these blocks served to establish a baseline. 
Participants received HD-tDCS over the DLPFC, LTC, or sham HD-tDCS during the 3rd block of 
questions, which was off for the 4th block. The 4th block allowed us to examine “offline” 
stimulation effects.  
It is important to mention that although HD-tDCS was applied during the 3rd block while 
participants were answering questions to examine differences in encoding of the correct answers, 
retrieval processes in relation to generating correct answers to these questions may also have 
been influenced by HD-tDCS over DLPFC and/or LTC. To ensure that the task was similarly 
challenging for all participants under all conditions, we used adaptive testing to bring all 
participants to a similar level of 35% correct. Thus, differences in correct responses between 
conditions were not expected.  
Overall, both DLPFC and LTC stimulation were expected to facilitate error correction 
compared to sham. This would be evident in stimulation benefits compared to sham in either 
Block 3, during stimulation, or Block 4, in the post-stimulation period. The extent to which 
benefits to error correction carried over into block 4 (i.e. “off-line” benefits), would be 
particularly instructive about relationship between long-term plasticity in these regions and error 
correction on the delayed retest. Performance during the first two blocks would not necessarily 
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be expected to differ as a function of stimulation condition, and rather, serve as a baseline against 
which to evaluate the effects of stimulation. 
We also predicted that the stimulation of DLPFC might infer greater benefits to error 
correction to participants who were engaged in the task under an induction that emphasized 
learning over performance compared to stimulation of the LTC and sham HD-tDCS. To this aim, 
at the outset of the task, and then before each block, participants received specific instructions 
designed to emphasize either an MG or PG (see also Chapter 2). Under PG participants were 
instructed to do better than others, whereas under MG instructions, participants were instructed 
to develop knowledge, but not to focus on doing better than others. The explicit direction to not 
focus on how others were doing in the MG condition was based on a previous study, which 
showed that even when MG goals are emphasized, participants may still engage in social 
comparison unless it is explicitly stated that this information is unimportant (Van Yperen & 
Leander, 2014). In both MG and PG instructions we also let participants know that at the end of 
the study they would be provided with information in relation to knowledge development or how 
they performance relative to others, respectively. 
Benefits of an MG induction on error correction were expected to be observable as early 
as the first two blocks (i.e., pre-stimulation). However, to the extent that our MG instructions 
were successful in enhancing error correction compared to PG instruction in the pre-stimulation 
period, the application of DLPFC stimulation during Block 3 was predicted to amplify this effect 
further, given the proposed involvement of this area in the associative processes emphasized by 
the MG instruction. Stimulation of LTC was also expected to enhance error correction, equally 
for participants in MG and PG conditions, given that both instructional groups would be 
similarly engaged in bottom-up processing of the correct answer.  The effects of goal inductions 
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seem to appear when the task is relatively difficult as opposed to easy (Avery & Smillie, 2013; 
Crouzevialle et al., 2015; Murayama & Elliot, 2011a) suggesting that the effects of stimulation 
as a function of goals may most influential later on in the task, such as during this third block, 




Participants. Participants were eligible if they reported to be right-handed, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, had no psychological or neurological disorders, learned 
English by age 5, had completed most of their education in the United States, and had no wounds 
or skin conditions on their scalp. 135 Brooklyn College students who met these eligibility 
requirements consented to participate in a manner approved by the Human Research Protection 
Program of the City University of New York (CUNY). They were compensated with research 
credit or $15 for each hour of participation.  
 A total of twenty participants were excluded from the analyses resulting in a final sample 
of 115 (ages 18-32; M = 20.47, SEM = .27; 78 Female/37 Male; see Table 2). Specifically, eight 
participants withdrew from the study due to: being unable to tolerate a HD-tDCS “pre-stim 
tickle” prior to the experiment (n=1), being unable to tolerate HD-tDCS during the experiment 
(n=1), time constraints (n=1), and failing to return for the retest (n=5). Additionally, twelve 
participants were withdrawn by the experimenter due to: issues with electrode impedance/contact 
quality from bridging or hair styles (n=4), the computer crashing during the stimulation period 
(n=1), using their cell phone during the experiment (n=1), rehearsing or discussing more than 15 
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items with others between session 1 and 2 (n=3; see Data Processing section), and due to poor 
performance on our task prior to administration of stimulation (n=3; see Data Analyses section).  
 
Table 2 
Pre-task measures for the final study sample. Participants reported their gender and age and prior 
to the start of the task completed the AGQ-R (Elliot & Murayama, 2008). Responses from the 
AGQ-R were averaged for the MAP (Mastery Approach) and PAP (Performance Approach) 
items that were rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
 
    Gender       Age    MAP   PAP 
               N       Mean (SEM)  Mean (SEM)  Mean (SEM) 
MG 
DLPFC 18 6 M/ 12 F 19.17 (.41) 4.07 (.10) 3.89 (.20) 
LTC  20 6 M/ 14 F 20.40 (.52) 4.15 (.16) 3.85 (.16) 
Sham  19 6 M/ 13 F 20.63 (.68) 4.30 (.13) 3.75 (.17) 
PG 
DLPFC 20 7 M/ 13 F 21.20 (.88) 4.07 (.15) 3.95 (.19) 
LTC  19 6 M/ 13 F 20.95 (.69) 4.00 (.17) 3.70 (.22) 
    Sham     19     6 M/ 13 F     20.37 (.66)     4.01 (.20)     3.84 (.22) 
 
  Participants were well-matched in terms of age, gender, and incoming personal mastery 
and achievement goals. As shown in Table 2, there were no differences between conditions in 
age (3 [Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham] x 2 [Induced Goal: MG or PG] ANOVA conducted on 
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age: ps > .15) or gender. We also measured incoming personal mastery (i.e. MAP) and 
performance (i.e. PAP) goals prior to inducing goals (see Materials section) to ensure 
participants in all conditions similarly adopted both types of personal goals. A 2 (Induced Goal: 
MG, PG) x 3 (HD-tDCS: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 (Goal Type: MAP, PAP) ANOVA on 
questionnaire means showed that personal mastery (i.e. MAP) and performance (i.e. PAP) means 
did not differ between goal and stimulation conditions (ps > .30). 
 
HD-tDCS. Active and sham stimulation was administered using a 4x1 HD-tDCS adaptor 
connected to a 1x1 tDCS Low-Intensity Stimulator (Soterix Medical, USA) using 5 sintered 
Ag/AgCl electrodes. One central electrode was used as the stimulating electrode (i.e., the anode) 
and the other 4 electrodes were the returns (i.e., cathodes). The electrodes were fixed on an EEG 
cap with HD electrode holders and filled with SignaGel to ensure electroconductivity.  Active 
stimulation consisted of a 2 mA current for 20-minutes.  For each electrode, lead quality values 
above 0.10 were deemed acceptable (M = 0.84, SEM = .04), whereas values that were equal or 
below 0.10 were indicative of bridging and those participants were withdrawn from the study.  
In the DLPFC group, the stimulating electrode was placed at F3, and the return electrodes 
at AF3, F5, F1, and FC3. In the LTC group, the stimulation electrode was placed at Tp7, and the 
return electrodes at P5, P7, P9 and CP5 (see Figure 11 for DLPFC and LTC montage and 
modelled current maps). The Sham group used the same electrode placements as the DLPFC 
group; during sham stimulation there was a 30 second ramp-up to 2 mA, then a ramp-down to 
.01 mA for the entire 20-minute period followed by a ramp-up to 2mA and a ramp down. This 
was a single-blind study. 
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DLPFC            LTC 
   
 
Fig 11. Montage (left) and current mapping (right) of DLPFC and LTC stimulation. Sham 
stimulation entails the same placement as DLPFC. DLPFC/Sham anode at F3 (red electrode); 
cathodes at AF3, F5, F1, and FC3 (blue electrodes). LTC anode at TP7 (red electrode); cathodes 
at P5, P7, P9 and CP5 (blue electrodes). 
 
After the end of session 1, participants were given a post-stimulation survey, in which 
they were asked to report the extent to which they experienced side effects of HD-tDCS (e.g., 
tingling, burning, etc.) (Villamar et al., 2013) and whether they thought they received active or 
sham stimulation. One participant could not decide whether they received sham or active HD-
tDCS and was omitted from analyses related to subjective beliefs about stimulation. Side effects 
data are included in Appendix B. 
 
Materials. After consenting to participate in the experiment, participants were asked to complete 
a 12-item achievement goal questionnaire (Achievement Goal Questionnaire-Revised (AGQ-R); 
Elliot & Murayama, 2008) measuring their endorsement of personal achievement goals. The 
questionnaire taps into 4 types of goals (i.e., mastery approach [MAP], mastery avoidance 
[MAV], performance approach [PAP], performance avoidance [PAV]) with 3 items per goal type 
that are rated on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Minor modifications were 
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made to the original questions. The first item asked students to rate their goal endorsement “in 
this class”, which was updated to “in my courses” to query goal endorsement in a general 
manner. Similarly, 2 other items were updated from “this/the course” to “my courses.” 
Both approach goals focus on goal attainment (e.g., MAP: My goal is to learn as much as 
possible; PAP: I am striving to do well compared to other students), whereas avoidance goals 
focus on avoiding failure to achieve the goal (e.g., MAV: My aim is to avoid learning less than I 
possibly could; PAV: My goal is to avoid performing poorly compared to others). For the 
purposes of the present experiment, we will focus only on approach goals given that they map 
more directly onto the MG and PG induction. Furthermore, many participants inquired about the 
meaning of a MAV item (i.e., My goal is to avoid learning less than it is possible to learn), and 
students often rephrased this item in terms of approach (i.e., MAP) when inquiring about its 
meaning, suggesting that the question was poorly understood, and participants may not have 
answered these items accurately. Scores for the personal achievement goals were computed by 
averaging ratings for the 3 items under MAP and PAP.  
The “general knowledge” task was composed of 160 trivia questions  
(www.mangelslab.org/bknorms) in relation to history, geography, math, sciences, arts and 
humanities (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Mangels et al., 2006, 2017), and were presented across 
4 blocks with 40 items per block. An example of a question that a participant may have been 
presented with is “What are the only birds able to fly backwards?” with “hummingbird” as a 
correct response. The correct answer for each question consisted of a single word and each 
answer was rated as being a familiar word to at least 95% by Baruch College undergraduates in a 
previously normed sample. During this norming study participants were not asked to rate 
familiarity of question and answer associations.  
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The 160 questions were selected for each individual participant from a pool of 416 
questions that ranged in difficulty. Difficulty scores were calculated for each question based on 
the percentage of previous participants’ who correctly answered each question from both 
published (Mangels et al., 2018; Whiteman & Mangels, 2016) and unpublished studies 
conducted at Baruch College, with an average difficulty of 33% and a range of 0-95%. Note that 
difficulty is expressed in the percentage of previous participants who correctly answered the 
questions, which means that a higher percentage indicates an easier question. The range of 
difficulty allowed us to titrate question difficulty for each individual participant [see First-Test 
Titration (Session 1) below], which was important for 1) ensuring participants committed 
sufficient errors to allow for analysis of error correction, and 2) would experience failure. The 
experience of failure was further emphasized by framing these questions to participants as 




After completing the AGQ-R survey, participants were set up for HD-tDCS and given a 
30 second dose of 1 mA stimulation (i.e., a “pre-stim tickle”) to decide whether the sensations 
were tolerable or if they wanted to end their participation. Participants were then seated in front 
of a computer monitor and listened to recorded instructions that were read aloud to them through 
headphones. Presentation® software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, 
CA) was used to present the task instructions and the general knowledge test.  
Participants then completed the “First-Test” of general knowledge. First, to induce a 
specific goal, participants were presented with either MG or PG instructions before they began to 
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answer any general knowledge questions. Both MG and PG inductions were framed in an 
approach manner (i.e. toward success) as opposed to in an avoidance manner (i.e. toward 
avoiding failure) since approach goals are typically associated with better task performance (Van 
Yperen et al., 2015) and better achievement-related outcomes in the classroom, such as higher 
grades and greater interest in course material (Hulleman et al., 2010). The first paragraph of each 
induction focused students toward a goal while the second paragraph presented evaluative 
information in relation to that goal. Participants in the MG condition were instructed with the 
following: 
 
You are here to explore a set of general knowledge questions in order to develop your knowledge 
about various topics. You will be given feedback about the accuracy of your answers. Sometimes 
people think that we are comparing their performance to that of other students who have 
completed the task. However, your focus should NOT be to do better than other students, but 
rather to develop you own knowledge. 
 
As the end of session 2, you will be provided with information you may find useful for 
understanding how your knowledge has developed over the course of this task. 
 
Participants in the PG condition were instructed with the following: 
 
You are here to answer a set of general knowledge questions about various topics. You will be 
given feedback about the accuracy of your answers in order to give you a sense of how well you 
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are performing. Your performance on this task will be compared to other Brooklyn College 
students and you should do your best to perform better than others. 
 
At the end of session 2, you will be provided with information about how well you did compared 
to other Brooklyn College students. 
 
 In addition to these instructions, participants were also presented with shorter MG or PG 
reminder instructions at the onset of blocks 2 through 4. In the MG condition, participants were 
instructed, “you are here to explore the general knowledge questions and to develop your own 
knowledge”. In the PG condition, participants were instructed, “you are here to do your best to 
perform better than other students at Brooklyn College.”  
A sample trial sequence is shown in Figure 12. For each general knowledge question, 
participants were instructed to type in their answer or their best guess if they did not know the 
answer within 3 minutes and to provide a confidence rating for their response on a scale of 1 
(sure wrong) to 7 (sure right). This was followed by a 1.5 second fixation cross and then 
“accuracy feedback” that lasted for 1 second, which consisted of a green asterisk paired with a 
high pitch tone for correct responses or a red asterisk paired with a low pitch tone for errors. The 
program gave participants feedback indicating their response was correct (i.e., a green asterisk) if 
there was at least a 70% letter match between their response and the correct answer regardless of 
letter order, or the feedback indicated their response was incorrect (i.e., a red asterisk) if this 
letter match was below 70%. This type of coding allowed some spelling errors to be accounted 
for; however, it also resulted in some cases when participants were provided with inaccurate 
feedback.  Manual corrections for feedback errors were done at the data analysis stage (see Data 
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Preprocessing). Accuracy feedback was followed by another 1.5 second fixation cross, and 
“corrective feedback” (i.e., the correct response) that lasted for 2 seconds. Note that corrective 
feedback was presented to participants regardless of their accuracy. There was an inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of 500 ms between questions. 
 
 
Fig 12. Trial sequence of an incorrect response during the first-test. Participants have a 3-minute 
time limit to answer a question. After a response, participants are asked to make a confidence 
rating with a response of 1 signifying the participant is sure the answer is wrong, a 4 signifying 
the participant is unsure whether their answer is right or wrong, and a 7 signifying the participant 
is sure the answer is right. If the answer is marked incorrect, then the participant receives a red 
asterisk paired with a low pitch sound. If the answer is marked correct, a green asterisk is 
presented with a high pitch sound. If a participant does not respond within the 3-minute limit 





















What is the capitol of Canada?
Toronto
1   2   3   4   5   6   7
Sure        Unsure        Sure 
Wrong                          Right What is the capitol of Canada?
Toronto
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marked incorrect. Learning feedback (i.e. correct answer) is presented regardless of response 
accuracy. 
 
The 20-minute period of HD-tDCS occurred during the 3rd block only, and participants 
were told, during the consent process, that they would receive either sham or active stimulation. 
Block 3 was selected for stimulation to: 1) allow additional instances for participants to be 
presented with their goal induction, 2) become aware of difficult nature of the task in the blocks 








Fig 13. First-Test flow. Participants are either presented with MG or PG instructions in Block 1 
(i.e. pre-stimulation block) before answering 40 general knowledge questions. Then they are 
presented with goal reminder instructions in Block 2 (i.e. pre-stimulation block) before 
answering the next 40 questions. In Block 3 (i.e. stimulation block), participants receive a 20-
minute DLPFC, LTC, or Sham HD-tDCS while they are again presented with the same goal 
reminder instructions and another 40 questions. In Block 4 (post-stimulation block), participants 
do not receive any stimulation, but again receive the same goal reminder instructions and answer 




















Given that the task was largely self-paced, some participants completed the 3rd block of 
questions before the 20-minute sham or active stimulation session was over, whereas other 
participants took longer and might have even finished answering questions after the end of 
stimulation (range 12 - 41 minutes; M = 20.28, SEM =.49). Nonetheless, the average time to 
complete questions in Block 3 and the number of questions (range 15 – 40 questions; M = 36.90, 
SEM = .50) answered during active or sham stimulation did not differ between HD-tDCS and 
goal conditions (3 [Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham] x 2 [Induced Goal: MG or PG] ANOVA 
conducted on Block 3 Time: ps > .70; 3 [Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham] x 2 [Induced Goal: 
MG or PG] ANOVA conducted on number of questions answered during 20-minute active/sham 
stimulation: ps > .79).  
Given that not all participants answered all 40 questions in the 3rd block during the 20-
minute stimulation period, however, we examined effects of goals and stimulation using 15 trials 
per block since that was the minimum number of trials that each participant answered under 
sham and active stimulation. This allowed us to examine “on-line” effects during block 3 without 
including later items during that block that were essentially “off-line” for those who took longer 
than 20 minutes to answer all 40 questions in that block. Data from all 40 questions are included 
in Appendix B. 
We examined participants’ subjective experiences of goal inductions among three types 
of ratings: goal adoption, importance of goal induction, and memory for goal induction 
instructions. After each block of questions, for a manipulation check, participants first answered 
questions about how well they adopted the induced goals on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 
(extremely).  For Mastery Goal adoption, participants were asked to rate “how hard did you try 
to develop your knowledge” and for Performance Goal adoption, participants were asked to rate 
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“how hard did you try to do better than other students” (see Murayama & Elliot, 2011). An 
ANOVA indicated that goal adoption did not interact with Block (2 [Goal Adoption: Mastery or 
Performance] x 4 [Block: 1-4] x 3 [Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham] x 2 [Induced Goal: MG or 
PG] ANOVA conducted on ratings: ps > .05)]. Only a block by stimulation interaction 
approached significance, F(5.176, 321.268) =  2.171, p < 0.06, ε = 0.86. We ran 18 pairwise 
post-hoc comparisons between each of the blocks in each stimulation condition to follow up on 
this interaction, and results were considered significant after Bonferroni correction (p < .003). 
However, none of the comparisons condition survived Bonferroni correction (ps> .003). Given 
that there were no block effects, our primary analyses of ratings for Mastery and Performance 
Goal adoption represent the average across the 4 blocks. 
Participants also completed a post-task survey after completion of the goal adoption 
questions in block 4. They were asked to rate the extent that the goals were important to them on 
a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much) (i.e., PG: It was important for me to do better than other 
students; MG: It was important for me to develop my knowledge). Finally, they were asked to 
rate to what extent they agreed, on a scale of 1 (disagree) to 6 (agree), that their instructions were 
MG (i.e., develop your knowledge) and PG (i.e., perform better than other Brooklyn College 
students) focused. One participant did not answer goal importance questions and another 
participant did not answer the instruction questions. These two participants were omitted from 
the analyses in which they were missing data.  
One week-later participants returned to the laboratory and were retested on the same 
general knowledge questions under a MG or PG induction, which we refer to as the “retest”. 
Participants in the MG instruction were instructed to “please keep in mind that you are here to 
explore the general knowledge questions and to develop your knowledge.” For the PG 
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instruction, participants were instructed to “please keep in mind that you are here to do your best 
to perform better than other students at Brooklyn College.” The same evaluative information was 
included at the retest as in the general knowledge test [see the second paragraph of the MG and 
PG inductions above (i.e. “At the end of session 2, …”)]. 
Retest questions were randomized within each block and participants were presented with 
all of the questions from the earlier block before they were presented with questions from the 
later blocks (e.g., questions from Block 1 preceded Block 2). Accuracy and corrective feedback 
were presented at the same time with the correct answer in green if the response was correct, or 
in red if the response was incorrect. One participant, who was included in the analyses, only was 
able to answer 31 out of the 40 questions in Block 4 of the first-test due to a computer crash and 
thus, was retested on 151 trials in total compared to 160 for the other participants. At the end of 
the retest, participants were asked to identify any questions they looked up, rehearsed, or 
discussed with others prior to coming to session 2.  
 
 First-Test Titration (Session 1). Because the main focus was error correction, 
performance was titrated during Session 1 of the first-test of general knowledge to ensure similar 
numbers of error trials across participants in each condition. In order to ensure that participants 
experienced challenge during the task, the titration target was ~35% accuracy in each block. 
Each question item was associated with a normed difficulty value (see Materials above) ranging 
from levels of 0 to 95% accuracy with 0% accuracy representing the most difficult questions and 
95% accuracy representing the easiest questions. In each block, participants would start off with 
a question chosen at random in the 25% to 45% difficulty range. If overall block accuracy was 
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above 34% and below 36% (i.e., 35%), questions would again be randomly selected from the 
25% to 45% difficulty range. 
If overall block accuracy was less than 34% correct, then questions with an easier level of 
difficulty than the previous question would be selected, and this would continue until overall 
block accuracy was between 34% and 36%. For example, if a participant answered a question 
with a difficulty level of 60% correctly, but overall block accuracy was 30% then the next 
selected question would be randomly selected in the 61% to 95% difficulty range. If the easiest 
questions were exhausted, due to a participant answering multiple questions incorrectly, then the 
program would select the next available easy question, which may have been slightly more 
difficult (e.g., 59%) than the previous (e.g., 65%).  
If the overall block accuracy was above 36% then a more difficult question would be 
selected in comparison to the difficulty level of the previous question until overall block 
accuracy was brought down to a minimum of 34%. For example, if a participant answered a 
question with a difficulty level of 60% correctly, but overall block accuracy was 40% then the 
next selected question would be randomly selected in the 59% to 0% difficulty range. If the most 
difficult questions were exhausted, due to a participant answering multiple questions correctly, 
then the program would select the next available difficult question, which may have been slightly 
easier (e.g., 15%) than the previous (e.g., 10%). Mean difficulty of all of the items presented in 
each block did not differ as a function of block order, stimulation condition and/or goal condition 
(4 [Block: 1-4] x 3 [Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham] x 2 [Induced Goal: MG or PG] ANOVA 
conducted on mean difficulty: ps > .20). 
 
 102 
Data Processing. Trials were removed from analyses if participants were provided with 
inaccurate feedback (i.e., feedback indicating an error was made when their response was 
correct, or feedback indicating a correct response when they made an error). Because “accuracy 
feedback” was based on a 70% letter match between a participant’s response and the correct 
answer regardless of letter order, occasionally the computer would give inaccurate feedback. 
Furthermore, this matching rule did not account for synonyms, other spelling errors, and two-
word answers when the correct answer was always a one-word answer (e.g., Vatican City instead 
of Vatican when asked “What city is also the world’s smallest country?”) and would provide 
feedback indicating a response was incorrect. Thus, the data were checked manually for 
“accuracy feedback” errors after the experiment by at least two independent coders. 
   Discrepancies between raters were resolved through discussion, use of online tools, with 
the final decision being made by the first author (Y.O.). In some cases, an on-line thesaurus 
(www.thesaurus.com) was used to check for synonyms between a response and the correct 
answer. For example, for the question “What is the longest-living species of mammal?” a 
response of “people” was marked incorrect by the computer even though the official correct 
response in the database was “human.” Online spell checkers (i.e., www.jspell.com/html-spell-
checker.html, www.gandjlawrence.co.uk/Werdz/ ) were used to check spelling if it was missed 
by the program. For example, for the question “What sailors’ disease resulted from a deficiency 
of vitamin C?” a response of “scurvies” was marked incorrect by the algorithm when the official 
correct response in the database was “scurvy.” At other times, participants were given correct 
feedback for unrelated words because the letter match reached above 70%. For example, for the 
question “Which one of the traditional 9 planets of our solar system has clouds of methane gas?” 
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a response of “Saturn” was marked correct by the algorithm when the correct answer was 
“Uranus.”   
Trials were also removed if it appeared that participants may have known the correct 
answer, but were given the negative accuracy feedback. This included instances when 
participants provided a first name, but the correct answer was a last name, and instances when 
participants’ answers were ambiguous and it was unclear whether a participant did or did not 
know the correct answer at the first test (e.g., for the question “What stringed weapon fires a 
bolt?”, a response of “bow” was marked incorrect when the correct answer was “crossbow”). 
Additionally, some responses were removed because they failed computer spell-checking, but 
were similar to the correct answer. For example, for the question “What is the name of the cord 
that connect a mother and a fetus?”, a response of “abilical cord” was marked incorrect and was 
not flagged as a spelling error by computer spell checking when the correct answer was 
“umbilical.” The rationale for removing these trials was that the degree of learning for these 
“nearly-correct” responses would likely be significantly less than situation where someone had a 
clear miss from the correct answer.  
The rules for removing trials for the retest differed from those for the general knowledge 
test because the retest was the last task and feedback inaccuracies were no longer deemed as 
problematic. If a question resulted in inaccurate feedback during the general knowledge test at 
session 1, then it was also removed from retest analyses at session 2 for that participant. If a 
question resulted in accurate feedback at the general knowledge test, but inaccurate feedback at 
the retest, then retest accuracy would simply be recoded based on the rules above. Specifically, a 
response would be recoded as correct if it was a synonym or passed an on-line spell checker, but 
would be recoded as an error if an unrelated word was generated. However, if first names instead 
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of last names were generated at the retest then these responses were left as errors since the last 
name was clearly given as corrective feedback, and failure to use that information suggested it 
was not learned successfully.  
Finally, any items that participants answered incorrectly on the general knowledge test 
that they reported to have looked up, rehearsed, or discussed with others prior to coming to 
Session 2 were removed from the analyses. It was thought that this additional practice would 
strengthen memory, making it difficult to attribute learning to Session 1 when more learning may 
have occurred during this additional practice and less by the goal induction and/or stimulation 
during the general knowledge test. The majority of participants (109 ; 91%) did not rehearse, 
look up or discuss any information. However, nine participants reported rehearsing 4 items or 
less and these trials were removed for these subjects. Additionally, three participants indicated 
rehearsing more than 15 items (range 16-36), which would have resulted in 4 or more trials lost 
for each block, and thus, we opted to exclude these participants from the analysis as a whole (see 
also Participants section). Notably, for these three participants, these trials were mainly biased 
toward initial errors, whereas for other participants items were typically lost due to both correct 
and incorrect responses being marked inaccurately by the program at the general knowledge test.  
The total loss of trials for the multiple reasons outlined above in the usable sample of 115 
ranged from 0 to 11 (M = 2.15; SEM = .17), which did not differ or interact between conditions, 
(3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) ANOVA conducted on 
number of trials lost: ps > .44). As for the 15 trials per block analyses (see Results section), the 
total loss of trials for the same usable sample ranged from 0 to 5 (M = .86; SEM = .10), which 
did not differ or interact between conditions, (3 [Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham] x 2 [Induced 
Goal: MG or PG] ANOVA conducted on number of trials lost: ps > .29). 
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Data Analyses  
 
We first examined questions related to the success of inducing mastery and performance 
goals. Normality of each manipulation check item was examined using a Shapiro-Wilk test 
within each stimulation and goal condition, resulting in 6 Shapiro-Wilk tests in total for each 
item. A non-parametric test (i.e. related-samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests) was employed if 
normality of any item was violated for at least one stimulation by goal condition. Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections were used when sphericity, as determined by Mauchly’s Test, was violated.  
 Turning to the experimental task, accuracy on the first-test was calculated as a proportion 
of correct responses out of the total number of usable questions in each block. Participants who 
achieved a proportion correct score of less than .30 on either Blocks 1 or 2 were considered to 
have failed titration (i.e. initial poor performance). Although there were no participants who 
scored below. 30 during Block 1, during Block 2 there were three participants whose proportion 
of corrects ranged from .23 to .26. After the removal of these three outliers, scores were within a 
range of .30 to .41 for Block 1 and within a range of .31 to .40 for Block 2. Titration issues were 
not examined during Blocks 3 and 4 since those blocks may also be influenced by stimulation 
and post-stimulation effects, respectively.  
Even after removing outliers and achieving titration, accuracy around the titration target 
varied somewhat and may have been influenced by the goal induction and/or stimulation. Thus, a 
4 (Block: 1-4) x 3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) ANOVA 
was conducted on proportion of correct responses at session 1 to examine differences in recall of 
general knowledge.  
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Turning to the retest, the dependent variable (DV) of interest was error correction, and 
scores were calculated as the proportion of errors corrected divided by the total number of errors 
made on the initial general knowledge test. In these analyses, because accuracy on the general 
knowledge test at Session 1 varied based on Block and Goal (see Results), the DV used in our 
analyses of error correction regressed out the proportion of correct responses on the general 
knowledge test.  “Regressed error correction proportions” were recalculated for each participant 
in each block by taking the sum of the grand mean for the proportion of errors corrected in the 
block and the residual from a regression analysis that included the proportion of correct 
responses on the general knowledge test as the predictor and the proportion of errors corrected 
on the retest as the DV. To test for effects of block, goal, and stimulation on error correction, a 4 
(Block: 1-4) x 3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) was 
conducted on regressed error correction proportions. Post-hoc tests were considered significant 




Manipulation Checks  
 
 Goal Instruction Memory. Our first manipulation check involved confirming that 
participants remembered their Goal Instruction (for the 114 participants that answered this 
question). Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were conducted between the Mastery 
and Performance Instruction ratings for each of the 6 Goal by Stimulation conditions (PG-
DLPFC, PG-LTC, PG-Sham, MG-DLPFC, MG-LTC, MG-Sham) since this data failed 
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normality for all Shapiro-Wilk tests (ps < .05). Participants in each condition remembered the 
instructions. As shown in Table 3, participants under MG had higher medians for the Mastery 
compared to the Performance Instruction item, whereas those under PG had higher medians for 
the Performance compared to the Mastery Instruction item (ps < .01). This suggests that 
participants were aware of their goal manipulation instructions.  
 
Table 3 
Participant responses on the manipulation check items for each condition. Instruction and 
Importance were both measured after the first-test using single items rated on a scale of 1 
(disagree/not at all, respectively) to 6 (agree/very much, respectively), with one item assessing 
Mastery and another item assessing a Performance focus. Adoption measured after each block 
during the first-test was calculated as an average across 4 items rated on a scale of 1 (not at all) 
to 9 (extremely) with 4 items for Mastery and another 4 items for Performance. 
 
           Instruction       Importance        Adoption  
    Mastery Performance  Mastery Performance  Mastery Performance 
              Median                Median                       Median  
               
MG 
 DLPFC 5 1  4.5 2     5.88  3.13 
 LTC  6 1  4 2     5.25  2.13 
 Sham  4 1  5 2     5.75  2.75  
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PG 
 DLPFC 4 6  4 4     5.63  5.63  
 LTC  2 6  4 3     5.75  5.25  
 Sham  2 6  4 4     5.75  5.25  
 
 Goal Importance. Our second manipulation check involved testing whether or not the 
MG group rated mastery goals as more important than performance goals, and the PG group 
rated performance goals as more important than mastery goals, and whether this differed by 
stimulation condition (for the 114 participants that answered these questions). Related-Samples 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were conducted between the Mastery and Performance Importance  
ratings for each of the 6 Goal by Stimulation conditions since data failed normality in 4 out of 
the 6 Shapiro-Wilk tests for the mastery goal item (ps < .03) and in 3 out of the 6 tests for the 
performance goal item (ps < .03).  
The same pattern was found across LTC and sham stimulation conditions, but not for the 
DLPFC condition. For both LTC and sham, participants in both the MG and PG induction 
conditions had higher medians for the Mastery Importance Item (Medians: LTC = 4, Sham = 5) 
compared to the Performance Importance item (ps < .029). In the DLPFC stimulation condition, 
however, participants under MG had significantly higher medians for the Mastery compared to 
the Performance Importance item (p < .001), whereas those under PG had similar medians for 
the Mastery and Performance Importance item (p > .15). This suggests that despite being aware 
of the goal manipulation instructions, participants generally valued mastery goals over 
performance goals in our task. Although the participants who experienced DLPFC stimulation 
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under PG indicated that both mastery and performance goals were valued, differences in goal 
importance ratings did not appear between stimulation conditions (see Appendix B). 
 
 Goal Adoption. Our third manipulation check involved testing whether or not the MG 
group adopted mastery goals more than performance goals, and the PG group adopted 
performance goals more than mastery goals, and whether this differed by stimulation condition. 
Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were conducted between the Mastery and 
Performance Adoption ratings, averaged across the 4 blocks, for each Goal and Stimulation 
condition because these data failed normality in 2 out of the 6 Shapiro-Wilk tests for the 
performance goal average (ps < .05). Shapiro-Wilk tests for the mastery goal average did not fail 
normality (ps > .24).  
The same pattern was found across all stimulation conditions. Participants under MG had 
higher means for Mastery Adoption compared to the Performance Adoption (ps < .001), whereas 
those under PG had more similar means for the Mastery and Performance Adoption questions (ps 
> .06). The comparison under PG did approach significance for the LTC group (p < .08) but not 
for the other stimulation groups (ps < .34) with higher means for Master Adoption compared to 
the Performance Adoption. This suggests that although under MG participants were focused 
more on mastery than performance goals, participants under PG were focused more similarly on 
both goals in our task.  
 
 HD-tDCS & Subject Blinding. As mentioned above, participants were asked to report 
whether they thought they received sham or active stimulation following completion of the 
general knowledge task. Table 4 shows the counts of participants in each of the conditions that 
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thought they received sham or active stimulation. To examine whether these beliefs of active and 
sham differed between stimulation conditions, we ran one logistic regression with DLPFC as a 
reference and another logistic regression with LTC as a reference. The main effect of stimulation 
conditions on stimulation perceptions approached significance (Wald Chi-Square = 5.179, p < 
.08). Significantly more participants reported receiving active stimulation in the DLPFC 
compared to sham condition (Wald Chi-Square = 4.694, p < .031) and the same pattern showed 
only a trend toward significance in the comparison between the LTC and sham condition (Wald 
Chi-Square = 2.967, p < .09). However, there was no difference between DLPFC and LTC 
conditions (Wald Chi-Square = 0.243, p > .62), suggesting that while blinding was not perfect 
between sham and the stimulation conditions, especially with the DLPFC condition, blinding 
was similar between the stimulation conditions.  
 
Table 4 
Number of participants who reported receiving active or sham stimulation in each condition.  
      MG      PG   
   Active  Sham  Active  Sham    
                
 DLPFC 10  8         12  7 
 LTC  11  9  10  9 
 Sham  8  11  5  14  
 
First-Test & Retest Performance 
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 “Online” trials/15 Trial analyses. As mentioned above, we examined the proportion of 
correct responses on the general knowledge test and error correction rate at retest as a function of 
Goal and Stimulation. Given that not everyone answered all 40 items during the 20-minute 
stimulation period, we focused analyses using the first 15 items, which was the minimum 
number of items that all participants answered during active or sham stimulation. Thus, we opted 
to focus our analyses of the effects of Stimulation and Goal during stimulation (i.e., “online” 
effects) on these “early items.” This cutoff was applied for each block (including baseline blocks 
and post-stimulation blocks) to account for any primacy effects that may have occurred within 
each block.  
 First-Test (Session 1): Figure 14 shows performance on the first-test as a function of 
block, stimulation and induced goal condition. A 4 (Block: 1-4) x 3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, 
Sham) x 2 (Induced Goal: MG or PG) ANOVA on the proportion of correct responses showed a 
main effect of Block, F(2.73, 297.60) =  5.425, p < 0.01, ε = 0.91. All other effects and 
interactions were not significant (ps > .19), but the main effect of Goal, F(1, 109) =  3.546, p < 
0.07, and Goal by Block interaction, F(2.73, 297.60) =  2.505, p < 0.07, ε = 0.91, approached 





Fig 14. First-test accuracy across the first 15 items (early items) per block. Proportion of correct 
responses for early items in each block under Mastery (top) and Performance (bottom) Goals for 
each stimulation conditions. Participants were similarly titrated across goal and stimulation 
conditions, but accuracy was significantly worse in Block 4 compared to Block 1. Stimulation 
occurred during the 3rd block only. Error bars denote standard error of the mean.  
 
Six pairwise post-hoc comparisons between each of the blocks were conducted to follow 














































correction (p < .008). The only comparison that was significant showed that participants 
answered more questions correctly in Block 1 (M = .37; SEM = .01) compared to Block 4 (M = 
.34; SEM = .01) (Bonferroni corrected p < .002). These results suggest that titration was less 
effective at maintaining performance at 35% correct in the final block, perhaps because most of 
the easier questions had been exhausted by then. Nonetheless, the lack of stimulation, induction 
condition or interactions indicates that participants were similarly titrated between goal and 
stimulation conditions across the early 15 trials.  
Retest (Session 2): Figure 15 illustrates retest performance as a function of block, 
stimulation and induced goal. A 4 (Block: 1-4) x 3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 
(Induced Goal: MG or PG) ANOVA on proportion of errors corrected with initial accuracy 
regressed out showed a main effect of block, F(3, 327) =  2.718, p < 0.05, a main effect of 
Stimulation, F(2, 109) =  5.551, p < 0.01, and Block by Stimulation interaction, F(6, 327) =  
3.064, p < 0.01. All other effects and interactions were not significant (ps > .18). 
Six pairwise post-hoc comparisons between each of the blocks were conducted to follow 
up the main effect of Block, and results were considered significant after Bonferroni correction 
(p < .008). The only comparison that was significant showed that error correction in Block 1 (M 




















































































Fig 15. Retest accuracy across the first 15 items (early items) per block. Proportion of errors 
corrected with initial proportion correct regressed out for early items in each block under 
Mastery (top) and Performance (middle) Goals for each stimulation condition. The bottom graph 
represents the proportion of errors corrected with initial proportion correct regressed out for early 
items in each stimulation condition across goals and blocks. During Block 2, LTC led to 
significantly better error correction than DLPFC or sham. Across the 4 blocks, both DLPFC and 
LTC led to better error correction than sham. Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
 
As for the main effect of Stimulation, three pairwise post-hoc comparisons between 
stimulation conditions were conducted, and results were considered significant after Bonferroni 
correction (p < .016). Participants in the DLPFC condition (M = .40; SEM = .02) and LTC 
condition (M = .42; SEM = .02) corrected more errors than those in the Sham condition (M = .34; 
SEM = .02), (ps < .008).  
For the Block by Stimulation interaction, twelve pairwise post-hoc comparisons between 
stimulations condition at each block were conducted, and results were considered significant 
after Bonferroni correction (p < .004). The only comparison that was significant showed that 
LTC stimulation (M = .49; SEM = .03) led to better error correction compared to Sham (M = .33; 
SEM = .03) and DLPFC (M = .35; SEM = .03) during block 2 only (Bonferroni corrected p < 
.002).  
These results suggest that both stimulation conditions benefited error correction 
compared to sham overall, at least when considering the first 15 items of each block, and that 





 The primary goal of the present study tested the roles of the DLPFC and LTC in updating 
of semantic knowledge following errors as a function of achievement goals. As predicted, HD-
tDCS over both the DLPFC and LTC benefited subsequent memory on the week-delayed retest, 
compared to sham HD-tDCS, at least when focusing on the first 15 items of each block and when 
collapsing across all four blocks. Interestingly, however, memory benefits of stimulation did not 
appear to be specific to either the stimulation block (Block 3) or the post-stimulation block 
(Block 4), and rather, affected pre-stimulation blocks as well. Indeed, the effects of HD-tDCS 
over LTC was particularly beneficial for learning of Block 2 items, which preceded the 
stimulation period, compared to HD-tDCS over the DLPFC and sham.  
 Our secondary goal was to examine how stimulation effects might be modulated by 
achievement goals, with the main prediction being that DLPFC stimulation would be particularly 
beneficial under an MG induction, whereas LTC stimulation effects would be similar under PG 
and MG inductions. Although other studies have found that MGs lead to deeper elaborative 
processing of the learning information compared to PGs (Ikeda et al., 2015; Mangels et al., 2017; 
Murayama & Elliot, 2011a), there was no evidence of differences in error correction between 
goals in the present study, even during sham condition, suggesting that the manipulation did not 
influence encoding strategies overall. Not surprisingly, stimulation effects did not interact with 
the induced goals either. 
 In the following sections, we first consider how these results may inform our 
understanding of the role of the DLPFC and LTC in learning following errors and then why the 
achievement goals induction may not have been as effective in moderating these effects. 
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Effects of HD-tDCS over the DLPFC and LTC on Learning 
 
 Although HD-tDCS was applied only during Block 3, leading us to expect effects of HD-
tDCS in Blocks 3 and 4, unexpectedly there were improvements in learning across all 4 blocks 
for DLPFC and LTC groups compared to sham HD-tDCS. One interpretation of the global 
benefits of stimulation on error correction across pre-stimulation, stimulation, and post-
stimulation blocks is that both DLPFC and LTC stimulation similarly facilitated consolidation 
(for a review see Dudai, Karni, & Born, 2015) and/or reconsolidation (for a review see Besnard, 
Caboche, & Laroche, 2012) of question and answer associations activated during the first general 
knowledge test. Consolidation typically refers to the formation of novel memories, whereas 
reconsolidation refers to updating of previously established memories. With respect to 
reconsolidation, greater benefits in error correction are shown when there is already some degree 
of a pre-existing relationship between a question and answer compared to when a question and 
answer comprise a novel association (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003). However, it is not clear if 
participants were familiar with the question and answer relationships and if stimulation benefited 
learning through consolidation and/or reconsolidation processes. Consequently, stimulation over 
the DLPFC and LTC may have strengthened the association between a novel question and 
answer as well as the previously learned question and answer. Although there is a little research 
on the effects of tDCS on post-encoding processes, Rossi and colleagues (2011) showed that 
TMS over the left DLPFC disrupted memory for scenes only when applied 500 ms post-
stimulus, but not when applied earlier from 100 to 400 ms post-stimulus, suggesting that the 
DLPFC may support post-encoding and/or consolidation processes. As for LTC, we are not 
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aware of any studies that examined the effects of LTC on post-perceptual processes or 
consolidation, and in our study HD-tDCS over LTC was especially beneficial to learning in the 
block that immediately preceded stimulation. It is not clear why benefits were greatest in this 
block, however, along with benefits in learning ERPs over LTC were also shown to be enhanced 
during negative feedback following high compared to low confidence endorsement (Butterfield 
& Mangels, 2003), and these types of memory mismatches more generally have been shown to 
benefit consolidation (Aberg, Müller, & Schwartz, 2017) and reconsolidation (Ecker, 2015). 
Thus, it may be that LTC stimulation may have been especially beneficial to consolidation 
and/or reconsolidation of question-answer associations following errors that were presented 
before the stimulation period putatively through mismatch-related bottom-up processes. 
  It is worth noting that brain stimulation-mediated consolidation effects are typically 
indexed by comparing memory performance before and after stimulation, where better later 
memory performance when compared to other stimulation conditions or baseline signifies 
greater effects of consolidation. The present study did not obtain memory measures prior to 
stimulation as a comparison to the week later retest and cannot speak to consolidation in terms of 
differences in memory performance before and after the stimulation. Further research is needed 
to examine these possible consolidation effects using memory measures before and after 
stimulation, as well as potentially obtaining more explicit measures of salience, arousal, or 
novelty of question-answer associations in order to determine if stimulation is particularly 
beneficial to these items, as might be predicted by a consolidation-based effect. Whereas bottom-
up features such as stimulus novelty and semantic relatedness may mediate the post-encoding 
stimulation effects of LTC stimulation, it may be that top-down, goal-relevant variables such as 
stimulus interest or curiosity may mediate post-encoding effects of DLPFC stimulation.   
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 We chose to stimulate over LTC and DLPFC regions because of their putative 
involvement in semantic and associative processes, respectively, both of which were 
hypothesized to be necessary for updating errors in semantic memory through sequentially 
presented feedback. The finding the stimulation of both regions facilitated error correction 
compared to sham supports the hypothesis that these areas contribute to this error correction 
process to a similar degree, and indeed may work together to support this associative process (i.e. 
Summerfield et al., 2006; see also Stagg et al., 2013). Nonetheless, a parsimonious explanation 
that aligns with past research would suggest that the LTC provides bottom-up semantic 
processing of the verbal stimuli (Gold et al., 2005; Gold & Buckner, 2002; McCandliss et al., 
2003; Wittig et al., 2018), whereas the DLPFC primarily contributes top-down elaborative 
processes that also align with its more general role in working memory (Ranganath et al., 2005; 
for a review see Kane & Engle, 2002). Consequently, LTC-mediated bottom-up and DLPFC-
mediated top-down processes may lead to similar behavioral outcomes when it comes to 
updating of factual information following errors for which there is some degree of a pre-existing 
association. Since LTC seems to support learning of weak pre-existing associations (Butterfield 
& Mangels, 2003) and DLPFC seems to support learning when elaborative associations are 
necessary (for a review see Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007), the roles between LTC and DLPFC 
in semantic learning may be more dissociable when it comes to learning novel information that 
may be more dependent on the DLPFC.  
 
Effects of MG vs. PG Inductions 
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  Based on previous EEG and fMRI work (Lee & Kim, 2014; Mangels et al., 2017; see 
also Chapter 2), we initially predicted that stimulation over the DLPFC would infer a greater 
benefit learning for those under MG compared to PG; however, the similar benefits of 
stimulation of both DLPFC and LTC to learning regardless of goals suggest that participants 
under both MG and PG may have engaged in similar cognitive processes. This is further 
supported by the finding that under sham conditions, MG and PG groups also performed 
similarly. In the sham condition, the pure effects of the induction could be observed in the 
absence of influence from the stimulation effects. We note that goal effects also failed to emerge 
even in the baseline Blocks 1 and 2, which was before any effects of expectations associated 
with sham stimulation might have influenced performance. 
It is unclear why benefits of an MG induction failed to emerge. One possibility may lie in 
the nature of the instruction. A meta-analysis of personal achievement goals has noted that 
differences in wording can influence the size and direction of goal effects (Hulleman et al., 
2010). For example, when PGs are defined in terms of demonstrating ability they are associated 
with negative outcomes, but when they are defined in normative terms as in the present study, 
they are associated with positive outcomes. However, the present study purposefully used the 
same instructions employed by the first study in this dissertation that showed a benefit in error 
correction under MG compared to PG. Thus, it would be difficult to attribute the lack of goal 
differences solely to instructions.  
The effects may be influenced by other environmental factors, such as having the 
experimenter in the room in the present study. In the present study, it was necessary that the 
experimenter be in the same room during the entire session in order to administer HD-tDCS, 
unlike in the first EEG study of this dissertation where the experimenter could monitor the 
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recording outside of the room after the electrodes were applied. The presence of the 
experimenter combined with expectancy effects associated with the application of active 
stimulation (or sham) may have overshadowed more subtle effects of the goal manipulation. 
Another consideration is the extent to which the groups adopted the goals they were 
instructed to, and the extent to which they felt these adopted goals were important to them. The 
lack of benefits of MG compared to PG on learning in the present study is unlikely to have been 
driven by reports of goal adoption. Similar to the first study in this dissertation, where an MG 
induction advantage for error correction was observed, participants reported greater adoption of 
mastery compared to performance goals under MG, but similar levels of mastery and 
performance goal adoption under PG. However, in the first study of this dissertation goal 
importance was not assessed, and for this measure both the LTC and sham groups indicated 
valuing mastery over performance, regardless of induction condition (i.e., even in the PG group 
when performance goals were emphasized). The PG induction was more effective at balancing 
the importance of PG and MG goals in the DLPFC group, however. For the DLPFC groups, the 
MG induction condition demonstrated the expected bias in importance toward MG goals, but 
under PG induction, both goals were valued similarly. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
when instructions emphasize PGs, students may still highly value learning, even if they attempt 
to adopt more of a performance goal than under MG instructions, and this may have neutralized 
differences between goal conditions.  
Other goal manipulation studies have also failed to find quantitative differences in overall 
memory between goals (Crouzevialle et al., 2015; Mangels et al., 2017; Murayama & Elliot, 
2011a), even though differences might emerge in the qualitative phenomenology of the 
memories. For example, Murayama and Elliot (2011) showed that memory for correctly 
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generated responses were more likely to be accompanied by contextual details (i.e. “remember” 
judgments) under PGs on an immediate test, but based more on familiarity (i.e. “know” 
judgments) under MGs. Additionally, it is interesting that in some studies, direct neural measures 
(e.g., fMRI, ERPs) of cognitive processes have also found significant neural differences between 
goals despite a lack of behavioral differences (Lee & Kim, 2014; Mangels et al., 2017). Taken 
together, these findings suggesting that behavioral measures of overall memory can be less 
sensitive to differences between goals than neural measures that might differentiate underlying 
processes that might nonetheless lead to similar behavioral outcomes, or behavioral measures 
that might differentiate memory based on more subtle aspects of memory phenomenology.  
Finally, it is possible that there were neural differences between MG and PG inductions 
outside of the DLPFC and LTC areas that were stimulated. Indeed, Mangels and colleagues 
(2017) showed that despite a lack of behavioral differences, MG goals resulted in encoding-
related activity over bilateral frontal regions that were more inferior than the sites stimulated in 
the present study, although that study did not analyze more superior frontal sites. Future research 
is needed to examine under which circumstances achievement goals result in differential 




We made the choice to examine only the first 15 trials from each block because the 
number of questions participants answered during the 20-minute sham or active stimulation 
session varied. We chose the minimum number of trials that every participant answered during 
that 20-minute period to examine more pure “on-line” and “off-line” effects of stimulation, and 
showed significant effects of DLPFC and LTC stimulation on error correction. Although we 
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believe that the analyses of 15 trials are cleanest, it is important to note that when analyzing all 
40-trials (see Appendix B), the effects of stimulation were in the same direction, but less robust. 
We can only speculate why this is the case. One possibility is that participants may have 
experienced fatigue toward the end of each block, which may have interacted with stimulation 
effects. Thus, one caveat to our findings is that they may only apply to early items but not to all 
of the items in a challenging task.  
Another potential limitation relates to participant blinding to the HD-tDCS condition. 
Blinding in the sham condition was not perfect, where perceptions of receiving active was higher 
for the stimulation conditions compared to the sham condition, especially for DLPFC. Although 
these perceptions were not significantly different between active stimulation conditions, it is 
possible that participants perceptions of receiving sham in the sham condition led to poorer error 
correction compared to the active conditions. However, these perceptions in the sham condition 
would then only be expected to influence error correction during the stimulation block and do 
not explain the benefits shown for LTC compared to sham during the pre-stimulation block.  
Although individual differences did not appear between stimulation conditions, it is 
possible that benefits of stimulation over LTC on error correction compared to stimulation over 
DLPFC and sham during the pre-stimulation block reflect a benefit of individual differences that 
may have existed between LTC and these other groups that were not measured. Similarly, the 
general benefits of stimulation over DLPFC and LTC across all blocks compared to sham may 
also reflect individual differences between the active and sham groups. Additional research is 
needed to examine whether HD-tDCS can indeed benefit memory for items that are presented 
before the stimulation period as well as lead to general enhancement of consolidation and/or 
reconsolidation processes.  
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Lastly, because current is applied over the scalp in an attempt to target a specific neural 
region of interest, other nearby regions under the electrodes or regions that are functionally 
connected to the target regions may receive stimulation (for a review see Yavari et al., 2018). 
Using fMRI, conventional tDCS over the DLPFC has been shown to influence perfusion in the 
primary sensory cortex, areas of the cingulate cortex, and parietal cortex (Stagg et al., 2013). 
Thus, it is plausible that other neural regions besides the target region were influenced by 
stimulation and may have led to benefits in learning. Similarly, the 20-minute stimulation that 
occurred throughout the block may have influenced other cognitive processes that underlie the 
targeted region. For example, researchers suggests that DLPFC indexes cognitive control 
(Koechlin, 2003; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000) and this cognitive process may 
have supported feedback-based learning as well. Consequently, we are making reverse 
inferences regarding the cognitive processes that underlie DLPFC and LTC regions and can only 
speak to the effects of stimulation over DLPFC and LTC regions, but not to the actual cognitive 




 The present study examined the influence of MG and PG inductions on feedback-based 
learning following errors as a function of HD-tDCS over the DLPFC, LTC, and sham HD-tDCS. 
Goals did not differentially influence learning, however, stimulation over both DLPFC and LTC 
led to learning benefits compared to sham stimulation. These benefits were shown for items 
presented across all four blocks even though stimulation only occurred during the 3rd block. 
Stimulation over the LTC was also shown to benefit learning for items presented during the 2nd 
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block compared to both DLPFC and sham stimulation. These findings suggest that stimulation 
over the DLPFC and LTC may facilitate feedback-based learning prior to, during, and after 
stimulation, and that LTC may be especially beneficial for learning of semantic information that 
precedes stimulation. Stimulation over both the DLPFC and LTC may reflect top-down 
elaborative associative and bottom-up semantic processes, respectively, that more generally 
support feedback-based learning following errors.  
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
 
The main goal of the studies in this dissertation was to examine whether and how 
achievement goals influenced error correction, with a primary focus on the neurocognitive roles 
of regions within the lateral prefrontal and temporal cortex. Both experiments manipulated 
mastery goals (MGs) and performance goals (PGs) in the same manner, with MGs defined in 
terms of developing knowledge and PGs defined in terms of doing better than others. The first 
experiment approached this question using event-related potentials (ERPs), a correlational 
method with high temporal resolution, but poor spatial resolution, and the second used high-
density transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS), a causal method with better spatial 
resolution, but poorer temporal resolution. In this section, results of each experiment will be 
reviewed followed by a discussion of the inconsistencies between the two experiments in relation 
to the effects of goals on error correction. This section will end with a discussion on how 
findings from both studies contribute to the broad literature on achievement goals and the 
cognitive processes that support learning. 
 
Overview of Results: Experiment 1 
 
            In this ERP experiment, although the MG induction was expected to boost error 
correction at the delayed retest compared to a PG induction, MGs were shown to benefit error 
correction equally across both the immediate and delayed retest compared to PGs. In terms of 
where parallel benefits for MGs were observed in the ERP responses to learning feedback, 
enhanced activity for the MG condition was found at superior frontal sites at both early (200-300 
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ms) and late (1000-1500 ms) time periods following the onset of learning feedback, both of 
which were also predictive of subsequent memory (i.e., Dm effects). Importantly, although the 
MG and PG groups both exhibited Dm effects at these sites, suggesting both groups engaged in 
the processes associated with this activity, the overall greater amplitude of these waveforms 
(regardless of subsequent memory) suggests a quantitative difference in the degree of 
engagement between MG an PG groups. In addition, in the mid-latency period (500-1000 ms), 
activity along both posterior (i.e., inferior temporo-parietal) and anterior (i.e., fronto-temporal) 
sites proximal to the ventral visual stream were predictive of subsequent memory. While no 
overall goal differences were observed at these sites, they exhibited evidence of greater 
sensitivity to Dm effects in the MG group compared to the PG group, particularly in terms of 
predicting memory on the delayed retest. Thus, it appears that MGs facilitate learning through 
both qualitative differences in bottom-up processing of the correct answer within the visual 
ventral stream and quantitative differences in involving both early and late frontal activity, 
putatively associated with initial attention to the correct answer (Blanchet et al., 2007), and later 
elaboration of its association with the question (see also Fabiani et al., 1990; Y. Liu et al., 2017).  
 In terms of processes specific to PGs, the only region where PGs appeared to result in 
enhanced activity was over parietal sites during the later time period of learning-feedback 
processing, which interestingly was one of the few regions examined that did not exhibit 
sensitivity to encoding success. Indeed, late positive-going waveforms in this region have been 
previously associated with poorer memory (Y. Liu et al., 2017), possibly indexing the presence 
of less successful elaborative processing. In a similar vein, the prediction that successful 
encoding under PGs might differentially engage early visual processing in parieto-occipital 
regions (Mangels et al., 2017) was not supported, although in the present study this region was 
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also surprisingly less sensitive to encoding success overall. Moreover, PGs did not appear to 
result in enhanced attention to performance feedback, regardless of whether considering 
waveforms associated with more bottom-up (FRN, P3a) or top-down (P3b, LPP) aspects of 
attention. Thus, while PGs appeared to result in quantitatively less engagement of memory-
related processes involving frontal regions, we did not find evidence of unique correlates of 
encoding for the PG group, unlike in Mangels and colleagues (2017), and no evidence for 
differential attention to accuracy feedback.  
            Taken together, these behavioral and ERP results provide support for the general idea that 
MGs benefit learning compared to PGs through greater elaboration of information (Ikeda et al., 
2015; Mangels et al., 2017; Murayama & Elliot, 2011), but provide novel evidence that this 
benefit can extend to both the immediate and the more long-term updating of semantic 
knowledge following repeated failures, as well as for the time course and engagement of the 
mechanisms supporting this learning advantage.  
  
Overview of Results: Experiment 2  
 
In this second study, we targeted HD-tDCS stimulation on two of the regions that 
Experiment 1 had shown to be predictive of subsequent memory—dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) and lateral temporal cortex (LTC) — in order to test both their causal roles in 
encoding, and their possible modulation by achievement goals. In both cases, stimulation was 
applied to the left hemisphere, given the greater involvement of this hemisphere in processing of 
verbal materials such as those in the current studies, although we note that in Experiment 1, 
hemisphere effects were often not found, or in some cases favored the right hemisphere.   
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 HD-tDCS over both regions of interest boosted error correction on a delayed retest 
relative to sham, however no effects of achievement goals were found either in the sham or 
stimulation conditions, thus failing to replicate the MG advantage found in Experiment 1. Also, 
somewhat surprisingly, even though HD-tDCS was administered during the 3rd block of 
questions, benefits of stimulation to left DLPFC and LTC were shown across all blocks, with 
stimulation of the LTC regions being especially beneficial to learning of items presented in the 
block that immediately preceded stimulation. The presence of stimulation effects on learning 
occurring before (and after) stimulation presents a challenge for hypotheses that stimulation only 
influences the encoding process, and suggests a role for post-encoding processes, including 
consolidation.  
 In summary, these findings contribute to the extensive literature supporting the role of the 
DLPFC and LTC in declarative memory and demonstrate a causal role in the updating of 
knowledge in semantic memory through successful encoding of feedback. Interestingly, they 
show that benefits may occur retroactively for items encoded before stimulation, suggesting a 
role for these regions in post-encoding processes, as well as encoding-specific plasticity. 
However, the findings from this experiment do not provide clear evidence on the relationship of 
these processes to achievement goal manipulations, given that the lack of goal effects should be 
considered in light of the lack of goal differences in the sham condition as well.  
 
Inconsistencies in Behavioral Differences Between Studies 
 
Goal differences on error correction that were found in the first experiment at the 
immediate and delayed retests were not replicated in the second experiment at the delayed retest. 
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One difference between the two studies was the absence of an immediate retest in the second 
study. Indeed, in the first study the difference in errors correction between goals was more 
apparent under the immediate compared to the delayed retest. Thus, in the second study, only 
measuring learning at the delayed retest may have led to a decrease in sensitivity to capture 
differences between goals, suggesting that the influence of goals on learning may be more 
transient. However, this may be specific to only brief learning opportunities since participants 
were only able to engage with the learning feedback for two seconds. Goals may still 
differentially benefit learning given a delayed retest when participants have more time to engage 
in deeper processing of the learning feedback. 
Another factor that could relate to the failure to replicate is the potential differences in 
accuracy on the first test of general knowledge between groups in the second study; the MG 
group performed worse than the PG group. This was not the case in the first study, and indeed in 
that study, MGs even led to a boost in accuracy in relation to the titration level that was less 
apparent in the PG group. Even though first test accuracy was regressed out of error correction 
scores, this potentially worse initial accuracy under MG compared to PG may still have impacted 
error correction. Indeed, first test accuracy was a strong predictor of error correction in both 
studies (rs > .45, ps < .001) and thus, poorer first test accuracy for the students in the MG 
condition may have reflected a difference in cognitive processes necessary for error correction 
that could not be captured simply by regressing out these initial performance levels. For 
example, poorer first-test accuracy may impact or reflect lower levels of engagement, effort, or 
use of self-regulation strategies that may have impacted both first-test accuracy and later error 
correction. Perhaps if first-test accuracy had been better matched in the two groups, differences 
in retest accuracy may have emerged.  
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Differences in manipulation check ratings between the two studies may also explain why 
goal inductions were not successful in influencing error correction in the second study. As shown 
in Table 5, Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Tests indicated that reports of mastery 
adoption (i.e. trying hard to develop knowledge) were similar across goal conditions (ps > .53) 
and that reports of performance adoption (i.e. trying hard to do better than others) was higher 
under PG than MG (ps < .002) in both studies. Thus, difference in goal adoption between goal 
conditions was similar across studies. However, Related-Samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests 
within goal conditions show a different pattern between the two studies. Here, reports of mastery 
and performance adoption was similar under PG in the first study (p > .68), but mastery adoption 
was greater compared to performance adoption under MG in the first study and under both goal 
conditions in second study (ps < .04). Thus, although performance adoption was suppressed 
under MG compared to PG in both studies, participants in the second study adopted mastery to a 
greater extent than performance regardless of the goal induction. Unlike the first study, PGs did 
not lead to similar rates of mastery and performance adoption and instead resulted in boosting 
mastery over performance. Consequently, greater mastery adoption compared to performance 
adoption in the second study under both goal conditions may explain why differences in error 
correction were not evident. 
 
Table 5 
Median Goal Adoption Ratings. Participants rated adoption of Mastery and Performance under 
each goal condition. In the first study, ratings were completed after the first-test on a scale of 1 
(not at all) to 6 (very much). In the second study, ratings were completed after each block on a 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely) that then were averaged across 4 blocks. 
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   MG         PG   
  Mastery Performance  Mastery Performance  
               
  
Study 1 4  3        4  4.5 
  
 Study 2 5.5  2.5         5.8  5.4  
 
 
 It is important to note some of the possible methodological differences that may have led 
to inconsistencies in mastery ratings between the two studies. Having the experimenter being 
present in the room in the second study may have led to greater reports of mastery as students 
tend to provide higher ratings of mastery adoption to present themselves in a positive light to 
others (for a review see Darnon, Dompnier, & Marijn Poortvliet, 2012). In the first study, the 
experiment did not have to be in the room since EEG activity had to be monitored outside of the 
room in which participants completed tasks and answered survey questions, but the experimenter 
had to be in the room during the second study to administer HD-tDCS while participants 
completed tasks and answered survey questions. Thus, participants in the second study may have 
focused more on mastery regardless of their goal induction because the experimenter was present 
in the room and consequently may have deemed mastery goals to be relevant to the study.  
Differences in endorsement of personal goals that were measured prior to goal inductions 
may also speak to inconsistencies in error correction between studies. Related-Samples 
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Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests showed that endorsement of personal mastery goals was greater 
than endorsement of performance goals for both studies (ps < .002) (see Elliot & Murayama, 
2008). However, Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Tests indicated that endorsement of 
personal mastery was greater in the first (Median = 4.67) than in the second (Median = 4) 
experiment (p < .001), but there were no differences in endorsement of personal performance 
goals (First Study Median = 4, Second Study Median = 4, p > .51). It may be that the greater 
endorsement of mastery by participants in the first experiment amplified benefits of the MG 
compared to the PG induction and that these pre-existing differences between samples from both 
studies may have led to differential effects of goal inductions on error correction.  
Finally, the way in which MGs and PGs were operationalized may not been sufficient to 
influence reliable learning differences in a long, focused experimental task. In the present study, 
MGs and PGs were operationalized by focusing students on a goal in relation to MG or PG (i.e. 
to develop knowledge versus doing better than others) and its evaluation (i.e. informed about 
how well knowledge was developed versus performance compared to others) at the beginning of 
each block, but there were no pervasive reminders of these goals while doing the task. Given that 
classroom definitions of MGs and PGs incorporate differences in the value of making mistakes, 
role of ability, and/or effort (Ames & Archer, 1988) it may be that operationalizing goal 
environments in relation to those features may mediate the relationship between goal 
environments as defined in terms of a goal and learning. For example, it may be that focusing 
students on interpreting errors as part of learning or as indicators of low ability may lead to 
adoption of MGs and PGs, respectively, and lead to differences in learning. Further research is 
needed to examine which aspects of MG and PG environments lead to greater and consistent 
differences in learning.  
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Converging/Diverging Evidence of Neural Mechanisms 
 
Across both studies, activity over lateral frontal regions was consistently associated with 
error correction. ERPs over superior frontal regions and DLPFC activation have both been 
implicated in elaborative associative processing (e.g., Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007; Fabiani et 
al., 1990; Liu et al., 2017) and may reflect similar processes that are involved in the 
strengthening of the relationship between the correct answer and its related question. Although 
ERPs can only speak to an association between involvement of frontal regions and error 
correction, HD-tDCS over DLPFC demonstrated the causal influence of frontal regions on error 
correction. Taken together, the involvement of frontal regions on learning from errors supports 
assertions that this type of learning relies on elaborative processes (Cyr & Anderson, 2015; 
Huelser & Metcalfe, 2012; Knight et al., 2012). Even though these findings are not surprising, 
they confirm the role of the frontal regions in updating semantic knowledge. Previous work has 
primarily focused on associations of word pairs (e.g., Blumenfeld, Parks, Yonelinas, & 
Ranganath, 2011; X. L. Liu, Liang, Li, & Reder, 2014), whereas the present study establishes the 
role of frontal regions, along with its causal involvement, in learning of associations that are 
more complex (i.e. a general knowledge question and its related answer) and more relevant to 
education. Thus, this evidence can be used to inform students about the learning benefits of 
elaboration even when it comes to learning from errors.  
 There were inconsistencies between experiments, however, in how achievement goals 
influenced activity in this memory-related area. In the first experiment, ERPs were more positive 
going over lateral frontal regions during encoding of the correct answer when that answer was 
later corrected compared to not corrected on both the immediate and delayed retest. These same 
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ERPs were also more positive going under MG compared to PG across both retest delays. 
However, when applying HD-tDCS stimulation to a left hemisphere DLPFC region 
corresponding to the sites were these goal effects have been observed in the ERP study, there 
was no differential improvement in error correction for the MG condition compared to the PG 
condition. Thus, although both experiments implicated the importance of frontal regions in error 
correction that supported learning when either an immediate or 1-week delayed retest was 
employed, MGs were only associated with greater enhancement of frontal activity compared to 
PGs in the first experiment, where MGs also significantly benefitted behavioral measures of 
error correction. 
One possibility for this inconsistency is that the ERP methods in Experiment 1 were able 
to detect neural differences specific to small time windows specifically within the presentation of 
the learning feedback, whereas the HD-tDCS used in Experiment 2 could only look at the overall 
behavioral effects of stimulation that had occurred throughout the entire test-feedback sequence. 
Using ERP and fMRI methods, other studies have also found neural differences between goals in 
the absence of behavioral differences (Lee & Kim, 2014; Mangels et al., 2017), and indeed, the 
majority of goal-related ERP findings in Experiment 1 persisted even when analyzing the 
subsample, which had not shown a significant behavioral effect of achievement goals. We also 
note that Experiment 1 had not found that superior frontal activity was more predictive of 
subsequent memory in MG compared to PG, but rather, the evidence suggested that these regions 
were simply more engaged overall in MG, regardless of memory outcomes. Thus, in Experiment 
2, it may be that MGs led to greater engagement of frontal regions through greater engagement 
of elaborative processes compared to PGs, but that HD-tDCS over DLPFC led to similar boosts 
in these processes for both goals. Finally, the lack of goal-related differences in error correction 
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even in the sham HD-tDCS may explain why HD-tDCS over DLPFC did not lead to greater 
learning benefits for MG compared to PG. Further studies where benefits of a goal manipulation 
were achieved during sham would improve the ability to make conclusions about interaction of 
achievement goal contexts and the neural regions underlying successful learning. 
 Across both studies, activity over lateral temporal regions was consistently related to 
error correction as well. Although ERPs confirmed the presence of LTC in error correction 
similar to past ERP studies (Butterfield & Mangels, 2003; Mangels et al., 2018; Whiteman & 
Mangels, 2016), HD-tDCS over the LTC confirmed its causal influence on error correction. 
Thus, these regions, which other studies have shown to be engaged in semantic processing of 
verbal stimuli (Gold et al., 2005; Gold & Buckner, 2002), are also a component of the process of 
updating errors in semantic knowledge with the correct information. Interestingly, although 
Experiment 2 suggested that this area is similarly engaged in both MG and PG conditions, with 
the caveat of similar behavioral effects across induced goals, Experiment 1 suggested that this 
regions provided encoding-specific benefits under MGs regardless of delay, but only short-term 
benefits to the immediate retest under PGs. 
  
Future Research and Implications 
 
 Interestingly, majority of research on environmental achievement goals has relied on 
surveys to measure both goals and outcomes (for a review see Anderman & Patrick, 2012) 
making it challenging to understand the causal effects of goals on objective measures. Few 
studies have examined the influence of goal inductions and even fewer have found goals to 
influence behavioral measures (e.g., Avery & Smillie, 2013; Avery et al., 2013; Murayama & 
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Elliot, 2011). Thus, even though both dissertation studies employed the same goal inductions and 
measured learning in the same manner, other factors (see also Van Yperen et al., 2015) may have 
influenced the effects of goals and further research is needed to examine which factors are 
relevant. Educators may need to be informed that the benefits associated with inducing MGs 
compared to PGs may not always be evident when it comes to behavioral measures such as 
grades (see Linnenbrink, 2005; but see Dishon-Berkovits, 2014), but that differences in cognitive 
processes may still exist (see also Lee & Kim, 2014; Mangels et al., 2017). Ultimately, 
understanding which behavioral and neural measures are sensitive to differences in cognitive 
processes may be essential to better understanding aspects of learning and how they are 
influenced by achievement goals.  
 When it comes to implications for education, the present findings suggest that instructors 
and institutions could benefit from instilling an MG compared to a PG environment for students. 
It is important to keep in mind that in the present dissertation participants were not provided with 
any normative feedback during the completion of the task, but under PG classroom environment 
students may eventually want to be informed about how they compare to others. Although 
focusing students on doing better than others may not necessarily impair a focus on learning, 
providing normative feedback that informs students that they are performing below average can 
be detrimental (see Cianci et al., 2010). As for learning from errors, the ways in which students 
engage with the learning information may influence the extent to which they learn from their 
mistakes. Thus, instructors may want to encourage and provide their students with the time to 
engage with the corrective information and use elaborative associative strategies to learn from 








P2, P3a, and FRN peak-picked mean latencies (ms) following onset of negative feedback to 
errors and positive feedback to corrects as a function of goals. (SEM) are shown in parentheses. 
 
   MG     PG 
  Errors    Corrects  Errors   Corrects  
             
  
P2 210.47 (7.42)  212.20 (6.26)  206.20 (6.58) 200.93 (7.27) 
 
 FRN 294.53 (9.59)  295.53 (9.22)  288.53 (7.42) 298.07 (9.06) 
 








Manipulation Check. Although we were primarily interested in whether manipulation check 
ratings differed between MG and PG, we also examined whether these ratings differed between 
stimulation groups. Including only stimulation as a factor in an Independent-Samples Kruskal 
Wallis test revealed no differences between any of the 6 manipulation check (i.e. instruction, 
importance, goal adoption) items (ps > .09). A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test within each 
Stimulation condition revealed greater ratings of Mastery importance and Mastery adoption 
compared to Performance importance and Performance adoption, respectively (ps < .001). As for 
instruction items, differences between MG and PG were not found within each stimulation 
condition (ps > .38). We also included stimulation and goal as factors in an ANOVA to examine 
presence of Stimulation and Goal interactions on instruction, importance, and goal adoption 
items. The 3 ANOVAs did not reveal any effects of stimulation (ps > .13). 
 
HD-tDCS Side Effects. A chi-square test for independence was conducted on each of the 9 side 
effects (see Table B1) between stimulation conditions. Side effect responses were recoded into a 
dichotomous variable with sensations being either absent or present (i.e., mild, moderate or 






Number of participants in each condition who reported side effects during the stimulation period 
(i.e. Block 3). 
    MG    PG 
        DLPFC   LTC  Sham  DLPFC  LTC  Sham 
             
Headache   6       3      7  5      5      3 
Neck Pain   2      1      3  2      0      2 
Scalp Pain    10      11      8  8      4      5 
Scalp Burns   9      7      7  5      6      7 
Tingling   15      16      13  18      16      13 
Skin Redness   0      1      1  1      0      3 
Sleepiness   10      12      9  9      12      11 
Trouble Concentrating  13      12      12  13      15      10  
Acute Mood Changes  3      5      4  8      8      5 
 
40 Trial analyses. We subsequently ran analyses for all 40 trials within each block, however, it is 
important to note that during the 3rd stimulation block, for 46 participants (22 in MG), at least 
some items were answered after the 20-minute stimulation was over. Thus, for these participants 
effects of stimulation during the 3rd block would also capture “offline” effects in addition to the 
“online” effects. This suggests that for some participants block 3 would speak to both “online” 
and “offline” influences of stimulation, whereas for the remaining participants who answered all 
40 items within the 20-minute stimulation period would only speak to “online” stimulation 
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effects. Similar patterns were found for the analyses using 40 compared to 15 trials for each 
block. 
 
First-Test: A 4 (Block: 1-4) x 3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 (Induced Goal: 
MG or PG) ANOVA on proportion correct showed a main effect of block, F(1.43, 155.84) =  
8.659, p < 0.01, ε = 0.48, and Goals, F(1, 109) =  4.781, p < 0.05. All other effects and 
interactions were not significant (ps > .39) and a Goal by Block interaction approached 
significance, F(1.43, 155.84) =  3.348, p < 0.06, ε = 0.48.  
Six pairwise post-hoc comparisons between each of the blocks were conducted to follow 
up on the main effect of Block, and results were considered significant after Bonferroni 
correction (p < .008). All 3 blocks differed from block 4. Participants answered more questions 
correctly in Block 1 (M = .36; SEM = .002), in Block 2 (M = .35; SEM = .002) and in Block 3 (M 
= .35; SEM = .004) compared to Block 4 (M = .33; SEM = .008) (Bonferroni corrected ps < 
.006). In addition, participants under MG performed worse overall (M = .34; SEM = .01) 
compared to those under PG (M = .35; SEM = .01) (see Figure B1).  
These results suggest that although our titration resulted in proportion of correct that was 
around .35 when examining accuracy across all items, our titration was not able to titrate 
participants equally under each block and each goal condition. There were no differences in 
titration between stimulation conditions. Thus, we decided to regress out proportion of correct 








Fig B1. First-test accuracy across all items. Proportion of correct responses for all question items 
in each block under Mastery (top) and Performance (bottom) Goals for each stimulation 
conditions. Stimulation occurred during the 3rd block only. Proportion of correct was 
significantly worse in Block 4 than the other 3 blocks and overall proportion of accuracy was 



















































 Retest: A 4 (Block: 1-4) x 3 (Stimulation: DLPFC, LTC, Sham) x 2 (Induced Goal: MG 
or PG) ANOVA on proportion of errors corrected with initial accuracy regressed out revealed a 
main effect of block, F(3, 327) =  5.903, p < 0.01. All other effects and interactions were not 
significant (ps > .25) and the main effect of stimulation approached significance, F(1, 109) =  
.898, p < 0.07. 
 Six pairwise post-hoc comparisons between each of the blocks were conducted to follow 
up on the main effect of Block, and results were considered significant after Bonferroni 
correction (p < .008). All 3 blocks differed from block 1 (Bonferroni corrected p < .008). Error 
correction in Block 1 (M = .44; SEM = .01) was better than Block 2 (MEAN = .40; SEM = .01), 
Block 3 (M = .40; SEM = .01), and Block 4 (M = .39; SEM = .01) suggesting that participants 
benefited from a primacy effect (see Figure B2).  
These results suggest that there were benefits in memory for Block 1, but that there were 
no differences in error correction based on goal. Although the effects of stimulation were 
significant when examining the 15 items, they merely approached significance for the 40 items. 
This marginal effect of stimulation showed benefits of DLPFC compared to Sham, (Bonferroni 
corrected p < .02), but LTC showed only a trend toward significance compared to Sham, 
(Bonferroni corrected p < .09). These comparisons did not survive Bonferroni correction (p < 
.016) for the 3 comparisons between stimulation conditions. However, it is worth noting that 
there was a similar pattern of overall stimulation benefits for the DLPFC condition compared to 


























































































Fig B2. Retest accuracy across all items. Proportion of errors corrected with initial proportion 
correct regressed out for all question items in each block under Mastery (top) and Performance 
(middle) Goals for each stimulation condition. The bottom graph represents the proportion of 
errors corrected with initial proportion correct regressed out for all items in each stimulation 
condition across goals and blocks. Error correction in Block 1 was significantly greater than the 
other 3 blocks, regardless of stimulation condition. Main effects of stimulation indicated only 
marginally greater error correction in the DLPFC compared to sham condition. Error bars denote 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Block 2 Error Correction: We also examined whether the LTC benefit during Block 2 on 
error correction shown for the 15 items existed for the 40 trials by examining block 2 error 
correction as a function of stimulation. There was a significant effect of stimulation, F(2, 109) =  
3.209, p < 0.05. Three pairwise post-hoc comparisons between stimulation conditions were 
conducted to follow up on this main effect, and results were considered significant after 
Bonferroni correction (p < .0167). Only LTC in comparison to sham resulted in a significant 
benefit on error correction (Bonferroni corrected p < .0162). This suggests that the 40 item 
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